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And when your fears subside
And shadows still remain
I know that you can love me
When there’s no one left to blame
So never mind the darkness
We still can find a way
‘Cause nothin’ lasts forever
Even cold November rain
I dedicate this book to the memory of my brother Tomek (1977–2016)
       R.P.
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Preface
The progressive and supposedly pro-indigenous regimes that emerged during the last decade were applauded by advocates of post-development or post-growth concepts for the incorporation of the sustainable and 
environmentally balanced model of buen vivir (live well). Inspired by indigenous 
cosmovisions and principles, it was expected to be a new alternative to the old-
fashioned paradigm of unlimited resource exploitation and endless growth. 
However, the global boom in commodities prices has led Latin American 
governments to embrace extraction and the further commodification of 
natural resources as a key pillar of their development policy regardless of their 
political ideology. Extractivist activities, such as the expanding agro-industrial 
monocultures, road infrastructure and energy mega projects like hydro-electric 
dams, are provoking a growing number of conflicts with local communities 
throughout the region over control of land and resources, often leading to 
serious human rights abuses. Observers report violence and repression, pointing 
to the threat produced by such policies to the wellbeing of affected populations 
and the ability of indigenous peoples to sustain themselves both physically 
and culturally and also to defend their right to decide their own model of 
development. Despite the progress made within the international human 
rights legal framework, in particular the protection of indigenous rights, as 
well as national legislation introduced by states in Latin America regarding the 
rights of local communities in the last decades, the proliferation of extractivist 
activities has massively impacted on indigenous and peasant communities and 
the plundering of their resources. For many communities, extractivism means 
a neocolonial invasion that devastates territories, natural environment and 
human lives by converting them into elements of a global capitalist commodity 
chain. The explosion of social-environmental conflicts that has accompanied 
the expansion of extractive activities has posed a challenge to the political and 
economic ideology of the current development model. This challenge comes 
from the new relational ontologies of local and indigenous communities and 
cultures who have opened up debates about the relationship between the 
human and non-human world, the rights of nature and human rights and 
duties.
This book offers a multidisciplinary perspective on contemporary 
development discussions in Latin America, marked on the one hand by 
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the pursuit of economic growth, technological improvement and poverty 
reduction, and on the other by growing concern over the preservation of the 
environment and human rights. The discussions in the book are guided by two 
interconnected analytical frameworks: the clashing notions of development 
and nature between state and non-state actors in social-environmental 
conflicts and the promotion of current development priorities. The chapters 
in this volume address two critical questions: how and why do development 
priorities often override environmental, social and cultural concerns? And how 
do state and non-state actors contest extractivism? In doing so, they analyse 
some of the crucial challenges, contradictions and promises within current 
development, environmental and human rights practices in Latin America. 
Using the human rights framework as a lens to analyse social-environmental 
conflicts and the conflicting notions of development and nature among state 
and non-state actors, the collection brings together a variety of case studies 
from Latin America that deconstruct key concepts that underpin the human 
rights discourse on natural resources and development policies. The book 
focuses on the interaction of state and non-state actors in the promotion and 
opposition to natural resource development, taking a multi-level perspective 
that links the local, national, regional and transnational levels of inquiry. Each 
contribution examines the roles of contemporary states in the natural resource 
development, ranging from acting as a promotor of extractive industries and 
an ally of transnational capital, through to being rights brokers and agents of 
law enforcement and institutional order, to defending and guaranteeing the 
rights and interests of society. The multi-dimensional scope of the book reveals 
the intricacy of social-environmental conflicts. The collection contemplates the 
complex panorama of competing visions, concepts and interest grounded in the 
mutual influences and interdependencies that exist between state power agents, 
international institutions and legal systems, civil society and social movements, 
all of which determine the conditions, course and outcomes of these conflicts. 
In the opening chapter, Malayna Raftopoulos and Radosław Powęska set 
out to offer an overview of some of the major themes and questions that mark 
current development and human rights theories and practices in Latin America. 
The link between human rights abuses and natural resources, particularly 
within mining and energy projects, has become the focus of growing concerns 
following the intensification of natural resource extraction and a permanent 
cause of social-environmental conflicts. As natural resources have become an 
increasingly contested and politicised source of development, the environment 
has emerged a new political background for human rights. Raftopoulos and 
Powęska introduce the dilemmas of natural resource development across the 
hemisphere that have been widely discussed in scholarly debates and beyond 
and emphasise the new theoretical, political and economic conceptualisations 
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of the relationship between humans and the natural environment that are 
being formulated, assessed and challenged in Latin America. Furthermore, 
the chapter raises questions over the role of contemporary states in natural 
resource development and the interaction between state and non-state actors 
in the promotion and protection of both human and environmental rights. By 
focusing on different, though interrelated, levels of interaction (local, national, 
transnational) between actors, this chapter sets out the challenging scenarios, 
sets of relations, mutual influences and dependencies that are currently shaping 
the contemporary arena of social-environmental conflicts in Latin America.
In chapter 2, Radosław Powęska examines indigenous rights under 
the Morales government and discusses how interethnic conflicts and the 
appropriation of the indigenous agenda by the state is hindering the challenge 
to extractivism in Bolivia. Powęska’s critique of buen vivir and plurinationalism 
demonstrates why economic priorities are overriding indigenous rights and 
environmental concerns in Bolivia. Moreover, it reveals how the rhetoric of 
indigenous identity and nature interacts with the Bolivian government’s 
focus on development priorities, with the state using this rhetoric to justify 
extractivist investments. Powęska argues that despite Morales’ fame as 
a defender of Mother Earth, by focusing on the exploitation of fossil fuels 
to drive the country’s economic development and fund the government’s 
ambitious social programmes, his policies have quickly contradicted the official 
utopia of buen vivir. The expansion of mining and hydrocarbon sectors, as 
well as the realisation of infrastructural and energy projects, go hand in hand 
with undermining indigenous rights to decide autonomously their own model 
of development and environmental policy. However, as the chapter shows, 
indigenous peoples are far from united in their struggle against the state’s 
extractivism. Numerous interethnic conflicts over territories and resources have 
come to the fore. The discrepancies in interests between various indigenous 
groups fuel different approaches to the very theme of indigenous rights and 
government policy. Moreover, due to its organic ties to social movements, the 
government represents itself as legitimate incarnation of indigenous power and 
natural advocate of indigenous peoples’ interests. The ‘indigenous state’ has re-
appropriated the indigenous agenda, domesticating it as part of state ideology 
and discursively transforming it to fit its own development and economic 
priorities, hindering the ability of indigenous peoples affected by extractivism 
to defend their rights. 
Malayna Raftopoulos makes the case for carrying out a series of 
community-based human rights impact assessments (HRIAs) on the 
international mechanism Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation plus Conservation and Sustainable Development (REDD+) in 
chapter 3. Raftopoulos problematises the common assumption that forest 
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protection through REDD+ also protects and promotes the rights of local 
communities and argues that more attention to the human rights dimension 
is needed in the debate. In outlining the prima facie case, Raftopoulos 
questions the commodification of nature in REDD+ and discusses the key 
issues of concern surrounding the scheme. Furthermore, in its discussion on 
why REDD+ necessitates a HRIA, the chapter explores the implications that a 
specific link between human rights and REDD+ would have on the promotion 
and protection of indigenous rights. Raftopoulos argues that understanding 
potential environmental and social harms connected to REDD+, the current 
legal duties and safeguards placed on national and regional governments 
with regards to the scheme and its potential human rights impacts on future 
generations is crucial to developing appropriate safeguards and incorporating 
procedural standards into the rhetoric of REDD+ in the future. Formulating 
this connection could potentially secure the protection of traditional knowledge, 
law, customs and lands of those communities in which it operates, ensuring 
that indigenous communities do not bear the negative costs of such policies.
Magdalena Krysińska-Kałużna in chapter 4 discusses the situation 
and reaction of indigenous peoples in the Amazon in response to extractive 
activities carried out without compliance to international human rights law. In 
her chapter, Krysińska-Kałużna also contrasts what the Peruvian government 
defines as the national interests in development with the indigenous response, 
resulting in repeated violent clashes. Focusing on the Cintas Largas in Brazil 
and the Wampis and the Awajún in Peru, Krysińska-Kałużna looks at the 
reasons behind the violent actions of and against indigenous peoples from the 
Amazon region to natural resource extraction projects taking place in their 
territories. The chapter also looks at the behaviour of the Mashco-Piro group 
who remain in voluntary isolation but have recently began to make contact 
with the outside world and have attacked neighbouring indigenous groups. The 
expansion of extractivist activities in the Amazon has led to a deterioration of 
the living conditions for many of the groups remaining in voluntary isolation. 
The chapter sets out to address whether such actions undertaken by indigenous 
peoples mean a rejection of ‘Western’ ways of doing things, or the opposite - 
their appropriation? Furthermore, is violence, used by the dominated minority 
– in this situation – an expression of strength or powerlessness in the face 
of imposed structures? Krysińska-Kałużna argues that while national societies 
require indigenous groups to adapt to the predominant standards of civilization, 
acting within the boundaries of existing legal regulations and without the use 
of violence, these same minorities encounter structural, institutional, cultural 
and physical violence on a daily basis at the hands of the dominant society, 
supporting the reproduction of patterns of violence. 
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In chapter 5, Doug Specht reflects on how cartography is used to control 
the exploitation of natural resource in Latin America and the role of counter 
maps to readdress the power dynamic. Specht argues that critical mapping 
strategies can allow for the inclusion of alternative knowledges and even the 
contestation of knowledge in social-environmental conflicts. The chapter 
explores the duality of digital neogeographies, examining the ways that in 
which they have been used to bring about the illusion of participation by 
INGOs. It also looks at how digital neogeographies have been used by local 
peoples to go beyond spatial representations and towards eliciting competing 
localities and grounded truths, which enunciate and draw conflict to the centre 
of attention. Specht argues that cartography, through increased access to digital 
platforms, has been slipping from the control of the powerful bourgeoisie 
bringing about the notions of ‘neogeography’ and the democratisation of 
participation. This has created the potential for an ‘insurrection of knowledges’ 
in which GIS platforms allow for the expression of a variety of knowledges 
creating a more level playing field for comparing consensus and division. In 
turn, this allows for a wider exploration of the cultural and political conditions 
that direct human understandings of the environment. These ‘counter-maps’ 
which express local knowledges in cartographic form can act as a powerful 
tool in promoting the rights of communities. Conversely, the shift towards 
GIS and Big Data analytics by international aid organisations has helped to 
reinforce historic power structures. The digital divide which had begun to close 
as access costs decreased has begun to open again as skill and infrastructure 
costs increase dramatically. 
In chapter 6, Robert Coates reflects on the way human rights are 
constructed, justified and practised in relation to the human and the non-
human, and on the authorities which claim to understand and demarcate both. 
Coates argues that the urbanization associated with the development process 
has contributed to natural disasters, underlining the interdependence between 
humans and their natural environment. The chapter examines the construction 
of vulnerability to floods and landslides in the Brazilian city of Nova Friburgo 
and asks what role human rights discourses can play in understanding, and 
ultimately reducing, vulnerability in these situations. Instead of viewing 
disasters as an exception to ‘normal life’, Coates sets out to unpack the everyday 
realities of vulnerability within the context of long-term flood and landslide 
risk. Drawing on extensive qualitative fieldwork, the chapter focuses on 
uncovering the meaning of rights and citizenship across the different social 
groups who are on the frontline of vulnerability and risk reduction in Nova 
Friburgo. Coates argues that human rights discourse, in which humans are 
viewed as separate to and dominant over nature and the non-human world, 
is too narrow to inform an understanding of vulnerability and disaster. 
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Questioning why flood hazards continue to increase, despite an understanding 
of rights and their associated interventions, the chapter contends that liberal 
governance, of which human rights discourse plays a role, depends upon its 
relationship to ‘nature’ – in the form of environmental problems – in order to 
declare what it is to be human. Coates argues that the discursive production 
of natural disasters serves to reproduce separation between the human and the 
environmental, which enables the urbanising, anthropocentric and vulnerable 
milieu to repeat in a cyclical fashion. Furthermore, disasters, externalised as 
natural, authorise liberalism to proclaim an absence of rights, which justifies 
urbanising interventions, ultimately leading to greater vulnerability.   
Joanna Morley in chapter 7 explores the dynamics of the social-
environmental conflict surrounding Nicaragua’s Grand Canal project and 
questions it development potential. Morley uses the Nicaraguan Canal as a case 
study to challenge how indigenous rights inform participation and consultation 
as well as how the costs and benefits are distributed. The chapter focuses on the 
economic, environmental and human rights concerns of all the actors involved 
in the conflict, including local communities along the proposed canal route, 
the Nicaraguan government and the Hong Kong Nicaragua Development 
Group (HKND Group) – the Chinese firm behind the canal project. Morley 
argues that the extent to which  the tensions and conflicts surrounding the 
construction of the Interoceanic Grand Canal in Nicaragua  adhere to the 
observations of multiple international Special Rapporteurs regarding the 
human rights risks of indigenous peoples and human rights defenders, points 
to the unique and distinct nature of conflicts surrounding natural resource 
exploitation.  In discussing the environmental and social consequences of 
mega-projects on human rights and the environment, the chapter argues that 
construction of the Grand Canal in Nicaragua, while seen as the platform 
for driving development and poverty reduction by the Ortega government, 
would have  ‘irreversible’ consequences for eco-systems which are already 
threatened.  Moreover, President  Ortega’s pragmatic political calculation 
to prioritise economic growth  through the Grand Canal  mega-project over 
the social and environmental pillars of sustainable development is  evidence 
of political moves to the left that require pragmatic steps and are inherently 
contradictory, inevitably leading to conflict. The political cost of this choice has 
been the alienation of Ortega’s traditional support base and strong opposition 
to the project. The chapter demonstrates that a state’s adaptation to global 
influences and dependencies within economic and environmental governance 
hugely impacts the complex ecological, social and cultural relationships within 
local and regional environments. 
Finally, chapter 8 by Bogumiła Lisocka-Jaegermann critically examines 
the concepts of sustainable development, the politics of place and decoloniality 
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which have been developed within three different theoretical and disciplinary 
contexts. The chapter discusses possible encounters of these three visions, 
drawing on critical reading of theoretical texts and the field experiences of the 
author, and also the tensions and contradictions which separate these concepts. 
Lisocka-Jaegermann argues that those using critical approaches within the 
social sciences should be seriously concerned about the power of concepts that 
organise research, which are usually organised in accordance to mainstream 
disciplinary paradigms. With thought and knowledge being strongly 
channelled through existing sets of ideas, it is very difficult to notice what is 
left behind. Therefore, attention must turn to thinking about the origins of key 
concepts and the hidden senses that they may contain. Critically dismantling 
traditional modes of thought and overall concepts, is critical to understanding 
both other-realities and our own limitations. Drawing on her research with 
afro-indigenous communities in rural and urban areas of Peru, Ecuador, 
Colombia and Venezuela, Lisocka-Jaegermann explores these three concepts 
within other-realities. Through theoretical discussion and analysis of practical 
experiences the chapter contributes to the reflection about the production of 
alternative concepts and models to counter prevailing visions of development.

1. Forces of resistance and human 
rights: deconstructing natural resource 
development in Latin America
Malayna Raftopoulos and Radosław Powęska
On 5 June 2009, the then-president Alan Garcia ordered Peruvian security forces to clear a narrow strip of highway, known locally as the Devil’s Curve, outside the small city of Bagua Grande in 
the heart of the Amazon in northern Peru. Several thousand protestors led 
by the Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva (AIDESEP), a coalition 
of indigenous community organisations in the region, had been blocking the 
highway for several months in an attempt to cut off access to the Amazon 
jungle. The protestors demanded the repeal of two legislative decrees that 
opened up the Amazon rainforest to further oil exploration, mining, large-
scale and agricultural development. With the protests escalating, Alan Garcia 
declared a state of emergency and deployed the military. The standoff at the 
Devil’s Curve ended in a state-orchestrated massacre, with security services 
opening fire on protestors. According to official figures 34 people died, 
including 10 civilians and 23 policemen. However, there have been claims that 
the number of indigenous people who died was around 50 and victims’ bodies 
were removed from the scene, burnt and disposed of by police in Utcubamba 
River. The incident at Bagua, known as the Baguazo, demonstrates the major 
challenge faced by communities throughout Latin America as governments 
in the region pursue natural resource development on the grounds of socio-
economic development regardless of the social-environmental costs and at 
the abrogation of the most fundamental human rights that this development 
model entails.
The link between human rights abuses and natural resources, particularly 
within mining and energy projects, has become the focus of growing 
concerns following the intensification of natural resource extraction and a 
permanent cause of social-environmental conflicts. As natural resources have 
become an increasingly contested and politicised source of development, the 
environment has emerged as a new political battleground for human rights. 
This policy disposition has led to a plethora of social conflicts that are not just 
manifestations of struggles over human rights, forced displacement, citizenship 
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and control over political economic processes and natural resources but, as 
Blaser argues, are also in defence of the ‘complex webs of relations between 
humans and nonhumans’ that for indigenous peoples are ‘better expressed 
in the language of kinship than in the language of property’. This opening 
chapter introduces the dilemmas of natural resource development across the 
hemisphere that have been widely discussed in scholarly debates and beyond, 
emphasising the new theoretical, political and economic conceptualisations of 
the relationship between humans and the natural environment that are being 
formulated, assessed and challenged in Latin America. Furthermore, it raises 
questions over the role of contemporary states in natural resource development 
and the interaction between state and non-state actors in the promotion and 
protection of both human and environmental rights. By focusing on different, 
though interrelated, levels of interaction (local, national, transnational) between 
actors, this chapter sets out the challenging scenarios, sets of relations, mutual 
influences and dependencies that are currently shaping the contemporary arena 
of social-environmental conflicts in Latin America. 
Nature, knowledge and decoloniality
The continued reliance on the exploitation of natural resources, which has not 
been sufficient to overcome high levels of poverty and social injustice, and the 
destruction of nature in post-colonial regions as a consequence of this mode 
of development, has made scholars question established historiographical 
paradigms and led to the decentring of euromodernist perspectives. In Latin 
America, a cognitive and epistemic shift has been advocated over the last two 
decades or so in order to move away from modernist paradigms and to adopt 
original epistemological and ontological narratives in which rearticulating 
the natural environment’s role is paramount. Intellectual and social actors 
from academia, social and indigenous movements, governmental and non-
governmental institutions in the region have posed a challenge to the political 
and economic ontology of the current development model through new 
relational ontologies coming from local and indigenous communities and 
cultures (Coletta and Raftopoulos, 2016). This questioning of the historical 
as well as the theoretical legacy of modernist categories across disciplines has 
led to the evolution of the category of ‘decoloniality’ (Dussel, 2000; Quijano, 
2000), and the search for new ways of understanding and approaching the 
region’s post-colonial status. Diasporic Latin American scholars have begun 
to ask whether it was possible to imagine Latin America’s future within the 
modernist paradigm, while acknowledging the fact that ‘Euro-modernity’ 
would not have been possible without colonialism (Mignolo, 2002; 2007). As 
Grosfoguel comments, ‘[c]oloniality and modernity constitute two sides of the 
same coin’ (2007, p. 218). Therefore, unlike post-colonialism which indicates 
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a chronological process encompassing political, economic and cultural 
structures, decoloniality expresses a relational, non-linear and multidirectional 
structure which in itself does not respond to modernist patterns (Coletta and 
Raftopoulos, 2016). 
Articulating the concept of modernity/coloniality, the Peruvian sociologist 
Anibal Quijano argued that the conquest of what is today known as Latin 
America ‘began the constitution of a new world order, culminating, five 
hundred years later, in a global power covering the whole planet. This process 
implied a violent concentration of the world’s resources under the control and 
for the benefit of a small European minority – and above all, of its ruling classes’ 
(2007, p. 168). Linked to this Eurocentred coloniality of power, elaborated and 
consolidated through political and economic domains, was the coloniality of 
knowledge, expressed through the cultural complex of modernity/rationality. 
As Gudynas notes, ‘modernity is a particular ontology that in the last centuries 
determined the division between nature and society, a colonial distinction 
between modern and non-modern indigenous peoples, the myth of progress 
as a unidirectional linear path, and a strong confidence on Cartesian science’ 
(2011, p. 447). This dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity, or the 
Cartesian distinction between a thinking subject and the object of the subject’s 
thought, was reproduced in the European mind’s objectification of the New 
World’s nature. Critically, missing from this dichotomy was the idea of the 
‘other’ which ‘not only postulates an atomistic image of social existence in 
general; this is, it denies the idea of the social totality’ (Quijano, 2007, p. 
173). This made it possible ‘to omit every reference to any other “subject” 
outside the European context’ (Quijano, 2007, p. 173). The notion of totality 
resulted in the dominance of eurocentric epistemology that repressed non-
western subaltern modes of knowing and producing knowledges, cultures and 
cosmovisions whilst simultaneously expropriating the knowledge, in areas such 
as mining and agriculture, and products of the colonised (Quijano, 2007). 
Euromodernist perspectives of nature exclude the idea of nature as a living 
being and as an object of rights. That is to say that, nature was and is identified 
as a resource and not as a living being. The denial of ‘otherness’ is vital to 
understanding how Latin American nature was historically created and also 
the pivotal role it has played in the importation of the modernist development 
category. Under the category of decoloniality, new ways of conceptualising 
nature and development have emerged that move away from the centre-
periphery axis through the production and organisation of knowledge from 
multiple loci. As Radcliffe comments ‘socio-natures – that is, the overlapping 
and mutually constitutive relations and material assemblages that blur a 
conceptual divide between nature and culture, humans and non-humans – 
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now lie at the heart of multidisciplinary debates about development’ (2016, 
p. 161). 
The alternative platforms put forward by the progressive left and centre left 
governments in the region have looked, at least discursively if not in practice, 
to transcend traditional growth-centric economic models and break imperialist 
dependency by offering radical alternatives to the way in which socio-economic 
development discourses are constructed. As Mignolo argues, for a de-colonial 
epistemic shift to occur there needs to be a de-linking from the ‘colonial 
matrix of power and logic of coloniality embedded in la pensee unique’ and 
an engagement in ‘border epistemology and in alternatives TO modernity or 
in the global and diverse project of transmodernity’ (2007, p. 456). The post-
development concept of buen vivir [live well], which has gained broad social, 
cultural and political support in Ecuador and Bolivia, moves beyond traditional 
western development theory, based on a narrow set of indicators, transforming 
the relationship between development policy and social wellbeing. Distinct 
from western forms of knowledge, which are grounded on lineal advancement 
notions, the concept of buen vivir has emerged both as an expression of 
decolonial efforts and as an attempt to strengthen plural cultural identities 
(Gudynas, 2011). Deduced and inspired by the Andean indigenous philosophy 
and worldview, buen vivir is based upon the indigenous moral principles of 
reciprocity and complementarity (Medina, 2011; Huanacuni, 2012) and 
underlines the crucial goal of solidarity and balance within communities and 
also between humans and their natural environment (Nature as a subject). 
It abandons the utilitarian understanding of natural and human resources, 
paying less attention to accumulation in economic activity and focusing on the 
de-commodification of social relations (Acosta and Martinez, 2009; Farah and 
Vasapollo, 2011; Arkonada, 2012).
Both Bolivia and Ecuador have redefined themselves as plurinational 
states in a post-colonial context, incorporating buen vivir principles into their 
national development plans and new constitutions (Fatheuer, 2011). In Bolivia, 
buen vivir (officially vivir bien within Bolivia’s nomenclature) represents the 
state’s basic principles and orientation, promoting a pluralistic society’s ethical 
and moral principles. It refers to the Aymara concept of Suma Qamaña and 
to the Guarani ideas of ñandereko [harmonious living], teko kavi [the good 
life], ivi maraei [the land without evil] and qhapaj ñan [the path to a noble 
life], emphasising in particular the protection of Pachamama [Mother Earth]. 
The Ecuadorian conceptual framework for buen vivir differs in that it refers 
to plural sets of rights based on the indigenous Quechua notion of sumak 
kawsay, which includes the rights to freedom, participation, health, shelter, 
education, food, as well as the rights of nature, rather than an ethical principle 
for the state as in the case of Bolivia (Gudynas, 2011, p. 443). Buen vivir 
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implies a comprehensive critique of euromodernity and modern ontological 
modernisation, presupposing, both in theory and practice, a new set of rights 
based on plurality and coexistence rather than on dialectical dualities and 
hierarchies. The incorporation of strong environmental and intercultural 
components into the rhetoric of buen vivir is contrary to modernist 
development ideas which view nature as a discrete system of ‘resources’ devoid 
of any intrinsic relational value (Gudynas, 1999). As Lalander explains, the 
Law of Mother Earth (established 2010) reconnects buen vivir and the ethno-
environmental profile of Bolivia by embracing ‘the rights to the protection of 
the integrity of life and natural processes, the continuation of vital life cycles 
and processes free from human alteration and to not be affected by mega-
infrastructure and development projects that disturb the balance of ecosystems 
and local communities’ (2017, p. 472). 
The questioning of Western (mainstream) approaches to human rights 
and the incorporation of intercultural perspectives which expands the notion 
of human dignity marks one of the most important developments in the 
environmental rights revolution. As de Sousa Santos argues, this pragmatic 
transition in human rights is occurring because ‘our time is witnessing the final 
crisis of the hegemony of the socio-cultural paradigm of western modernity’, 
spread throughout the world through colonialism and imperialism (2009, p. 
1). Hegemonic political thinking has reduced ‘the understanding of the world 
to the western understanding of the world, thus ignoring or trivializing decisive 
cultural and political experiences and initiatives in the countries in the global 
South’ (de Sousa Santos, 2009, p. 4). Therefore, conventional human rights have 
historically lacked the theoretical and analytical tools to position themselves in 
relations to movements of resistance, ignoring alternative ideologies that could 
contradict the universality of human rights or question the notion that human 
nature is individualistic, self-sustaining and fundamentally different from non-
human nature. As Gionolla comments, ‘in terms of their relationship to the 
environment, mainstream human rights approaches construct the protection 
of the environment as being an implication of the protection of human 
beings’ (2013, p. 62). Indigenous movements in Latin America have played a 
critical role in moving environmental protection up the human rights agenda. 
Furthermore, they have led the transition towards a new approach to human 
rights built upon alternative cosmologies that offer an alternative conception 
of human dignity to the western notion, whereby nature has inalienable rights 
and the false dichotomy of humans being separate and superior to the non-
human world is rejected. Recognition of ‘rights of nature’ in countries like 
Bolivia and Ecuador represents a transition away from euromodernist human 
rights discourses and is reflective of the ‘epistemic turn’ that has occurred 
in both the methodology and practice of critical thought in Latin America 
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since the late 1990s. These have questioned both the historical as well as the 
theoretical legacy of modernist categories and led to the adoption of original 
epistemological and ontological narratives. Yet despite incorporating the notion 
of living in harmony with nature into their national constitutions and granting 
nature inalienable rights, Ecuador and Bolivia, are still struggling to overcome 
the legacy of modernist development paradigms continually reinforced by the 
state (Raftopoulos, 2017).
The Commodity Consensus and extractivism
The dilemma between exploiting natural resources for socio-economic 
development and defending both human and environmental rights represents 
a major challenge for Latin American countries. Although the continent has a 
long history of extracting and exploiting natural resources dating back to the 
colonial era, there has been a marked increase in these activities in the region 
in the last decade or so, associated with the strong international demand for 
raw materials and a cycle of high prices. High demand for natural resources 
among both industrialised and newly industrialised countries, in particular 
China, has allowed natural resource exploitation to become both politically 
acceptable and a legitimate development strategy implemented over alternative 
concepts of development (O’Toole, 2014). However, the recent downturn in 
the price of minerals and hydrocarbons has further exacerbated the problem, as 
the decline in profits is offset by the further expansion of extractive frontiers. 
Less diversified economies dependent on natural resource extraction are 
more prone to export higher volumes at a lower price to recover revenue 
loses. Indigenous and peasant communities throughout the continent are 
engaged in a continual battle against natural resource exploitation, resulting 
in repeated clashes, violence, repression and human rights abuses perpetuated 
by the state or security forces. Increasingly, governments across Latin America 
are criminalising social protests through the use of repressive legislation, and 
deterring or curtailing communities and activists from political mobilisation 
through the use of violence, harassment and threats, as they seek to protect the 
large revenues associated with extraction and guarantee the supply of natural 
resources. According to a study conducted by Global Witness, 2016 was the 
worst year on record for the murder of land and environmental defenders, 
with a total of 200 assassinations across the globe, 122 of those taking place 
in Latin America. Moreover, in Latin America, there is no country with large-
scale mining projects that is not involved in social conflicts. Repeated clashes 
between communities and both mining companies and those governments 
associated with them have led to emergence of self-organised (transnational) 
networks. Organisations such as the National Confederation of Communities 
Affected by Mining (Concacami) founded in Peru in 1999 and the Andean 
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Coordination of Indigenous Organisations (CAOI) founded in 2006, bring 
together grassroots movements to deal with the social-environmental challenges 
associated with extractivism (Global Witness, 2016, p. 55). 
Over the last decade or so Latin America has moved away from the Washington 
Consensus model, with its focus on finance and neoliberal governance, towards 
the Commodity Consensus focused not on the re-design of the state but on 
enabling the large-scale export of primary products. This move marked the 
beginning of a new political-economy order that challenges existing state and 
social structures and also curtails democracy in the region (Svampa, 2013). 
While extractivism previously referred to activities that involved extracting, 
such as in mining, oil and gas, the term is now increasingly used to refer to 
the accelerated pace of natural resource exploitation at an industrial level and 
the construction of mega-projects and infrastructure intended to make full 
use of natural resources (UNHRC, 2015). From an economic stance, the 
commodity consensus has involved the reprimarisation of Latin American 
economies, ‘emphasising their reorientation toward mainly extractive or 
rent-based activities, with little added value’ (Svampa, 2015, p. 65). Socially, 
it has deepened the dispossession and accumulation of land and resources. 
Territories that were previously isolated or protected and ‘often biologically 
fragile environments populated by vulnerable populations who share their land 
with minerals or energy sources’ have been opened up for exploitation during 
the expansion of the extractive and infrastructure frontiers in Latin America 
(McNeish, 2012). As Acosta explains, the region’s history tells us that the socio-
economic conditions produced by extractivist economies lead to widespread 
poverty, social injustice and recurrent economic crisis. All of which ‘aggravates 
the weakness and scarcity of the region’s democratic institutions, encourages 
corruption, breaks up societies and local communities, and seriously damages 
the environment’ (Acosta, 2013, p. 62).
Despite the region’s changing political climate that saw the rise of left and 
centre-left governments in countries such as Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and 
Venezuela, accompanied by a shift towards new post-neoliberal and post-
development agendas that questioned conventional means of development, 
the global surge in demand for raw materials cemented extractivism as the 
cornerstone of growth-oriented development policies in Latin America. 
Although the Washington Consensus is being questioned in Latin America, the 
neoliberal discourse is still very much hegemonic, with the neoliberal ideology 
interwoven with neo-extractivism. While post-neoliberal progressive regimes 
differ from typical neoliberal agenda by introducing protectionist mechanisms 
to defend their national economies from the negative impact of global flows 
of capital and market deregulation, there is a general acceptance of the global 
market relations to which every state needs to adapt, no matter its domestic 
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economic policy. Moreover, independently of competitive alternatives of 
‘less’ vs. ‘more’ state, the discourse about universal and egalitarian economic 
development accessible for everyone that goes beyond the realm of politics has 
become hegemonic narrative independent of ideological banner. To go further, 
‘more state’ is not perceived as opposition to global forces anymore, but as a way 
to guarantee better taking advantage of domestic resources in the global market 
competition. As Svampa remarks, the current development model based on 
extractivism ‘draws from the idea of “economic opportunities” or “comparative 
advantage” provided by the commodities consensus and deploys social 
imaginaries (the vision of El Dorado) that overstep the political-ideological 
borders constructed in the 1990s’ (2015, p. 67). This new order has also allowed 
progressive governments that question the neoliberal consensus to coexist with 
non-progressive governments that continue to deepen the neoliberal political 
agenda in Latin America (Svampa, 2015). While conventional extractivism, 
characterised by the limited role of the state, continues in those countries with 
non-progressive governments such as Peru and Colombia, Latin America’s 
progressive governments have created a new type of extractivism that bears 
a ‘progressive stamp’ and whereby the state has taken on a much more active 
role. Under the framework of neo-extractivism, regulation of the appropriation 
of resources and export duties and taxes have increased, contracts have been 
renegotiated and surplus revenue has been redirected to social programmes 
(Gudynas, 2009). 
The region’s changing political climate fostered optimism that finally 
natural resource extraction could offer long-term, broad-based benefits to its 
local communities and national economies (Haarstad, 2012). However, even 
under its contemporary guise, neo-extractivism fails to substantially change 
the current structure of accumulation and move away from a productivist 
appropriation of nature; extractivist policies remain hegemonic in the region 
while the lingering and persistent problems associated with the previous 
imperialist system prevail. Although it was hoped that the rise of progressive 
governments in Latin America would lead to a transition away from extractivist 
activities towards a more sustainable type of development, these governments 
have in fact continued to maintain classic extractivism, albeit with a progressive 
twist. Veltmeyer and Petras argue that in opting for the resource development 
strategy, progressive governments have done little more than strike a better 
deal with ‘the agents of global extractive capital in a coincidence of economic 
interests: to share the spoils (windfall profits and enhanced claims on ground 
rent)’ (2014, p. 28). Consequently, the capitalist state remains ‘at the centre of 
the system in its active support of extractive capital – in paving the way for the 
operations of extractive capital and backing up these operations with the power 
at its disposal’ (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014, p. 2). Progressive governments have 
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replaced the old extractivist discourse that pointed toward exports or the world 
market with one that points to globalisation and competition, conventional 
extractivism and neo-extractivism still share key aspects in common such 
as ‘the appropriation of nature to feed economic growth, and the idea of 
development understood as an on-going, linear process of material progress’ 
(Gudynas, 2013, p. 165). As Gudynas posits, the persistence of conventional 
development is symptomatic of ‘how deeply rooted and resistant to change the 
ideologies of “modernity” and “progress” are in our culture’ (2013, p. 168). 
Therefore, any alternative to development must deal with extractivism and 
promote a post-extractivist agenda that will break and overcome dependency, 
an idea that has been dismissed by critics as impossible or naive. This does not 
suggest a ban on all extractive industries but rather a massive decrease whereby 
the only industries left operating are those that are essential, directly linked to 
national and regional economic chains, and meet social and environmental 
conditions. To reach this stage, economies must move immediately from 
‘predatory extractivism’ to ‘sensible extractivism’ where industries fully comply 
with social and environmental laws and are rigorously controlled, and finally 
to ‘indispensable extractions’ where only essential industries remain (Gudynas, 
2013, p. 175). Furthermore, if the transition to post-extractivism is considered 
within the buen vivir framework, the process of change must meet two critical 
conditions: poverty eradication and prevention of new losses of biodiversity. 
This would involve considering both environmental limits and quality of 
life when considering the use of natural resources in the production matrix 
and reducing over-consumption, which contributes to poverty levels and 
environmental problems (Gudynas, 2013). Importantly, such a reformulation 
of natural resource development towards a ‘sensible extractivism’ model 
can be greatly compatible with indigenous peoples’ perspective. It should 
be acknowledged that they are not necessarily against any kind of resource 
extraction or development projects as such, insofar as they are not imposed and 
are under the control of local communities, for the sake of securing their interests 
and diminishing possible negative outcomes. What indigenous peoples seek is 
rather a genuine recognition of their rights for sovereign decision-making on 
their territories and resources, fair and agreed benefits, and especially to set 
their own priorities according to their visions, traditions and values. 
Civil society activism and conflicting notions of 
development
Current Latin American governments’ continued fidelity to the neoliberal 
developmental agenda, coupled with globalisation, has led to a new cycle of 
protests in the region and opened up new political spaces for human rights 
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based resistance in natural resource governance. Peasant and indigenous 
communities throughout the continent have found themselves at the forefront 
of the resource wars, clashing with governments and multinational corporations 
over the use and control of the global commons. Territories containing natural 
resources have become sites of contestation and resistance against the neoliberal 
capitalist model, dominating visions of development and society-environment 
relations (Composto and Navarro, 2014; Bebbington, 2011a; Radcliffe, 2016). 
Mobilising around the crisis of the modernist paradigm, social movements, in 
particular indigenous movements, have ‘posed a challenge to the political and 
economic ideology of the current development model through new relational 
ontologies coming from local and indigenous communities and cultures that 
have opened up debates about the relationship between the human and non-
human world, the rights of nature and human rights and duties’ (Raftopoulos, 
2017). By challenging ‘the epistemological frameworks based on a dialectic 
system of inclusion-exclusion upon which the developmentalist socio-economic 
model is based’ (Coletta and Raftopoulos, 2016, p. 4), these agents of change 
have, and continue to, demand cultural recognition, political empowerment, 
territorial sovereignty, environmental rights and generally a greater say over 
their lives and future (Postero and Zamosc, 2004; Pajuelo Teves, 2007). 
Escobar (1995; 2008) and Peet and Watts (1996) place strong emphasis 
on the role of social movements, understood as organised activism of local 
population with a pronounced counter power agenda, in the process of 
challenging globally dominating developmental discourse. For these authors, 
the dominating visions of development in a given society are enacted upon 
power relations operating within such society and as with everything that is 
politically conditioned, these visions or forms also can be subject to dispute. The 
very notion of development, as well as the question of the economic priorities, 
models of resources management, relation to and the very understanding of 
environment (ontology), the foreseen goals of development and the preferred 
values that should direct the viability of a given development model, can all be 
negotiated and are never natural. Such a social-constructivist perspective about 
development is part of a wider approach to social economic and developmental 
themes in a growing academic literature. Yet in Bourdieu’s view the existing 
visions or beliefs about economy are a system of socially constructed beliefs 
without universal validity, rather a product of collective history in a long 
term (Bourdieu, 1977). These authors follow Polanyi’s cultural approach 
to economics, seeing economics as embedded in society and its culture 
(Polanyi, 2010). Even the perception of poverty and well-being, and social 
responses to social-economic challenges (inequality, capital scarcity etc.) are 
determined by cultural patterns recreated in everyday practices and relations 
(Miyashita, 2009). It is mainly acknowledged that local people, particularly 
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indigenous peoples, share culturally specific understanding of and relations 
to their natural environment, given their intimate and prolonged interaction 
with local biophysical conditions (Dove and Carpenter, 2008, p. 8). Existing 
ethnographic literature provides vast materials proving different ontological 
approaches of indigenous communities to their natural surroundings (Taussig, 
1980; Salas Carreño, 2017).
Scholars such as Escobar and Peet and Watts argue that if in a given 
society the dominating model of development is the product of existing 
power relations, social movements can seek a new type of social relations and 
formulate alternative models of development, including an ‘alternative to’ 
development. The locally oriented and territorially conscious social movements 
are the bearers of distinct knowledges and practices, values and visions that can 
serve as an epistemological fundament to build a counter power challenging 
dominating development models. For Escobar (1995), those social movements 
engaged in the defence of their territories and natural resources are most 
promising, because territory is the indispensable spatial-political dimension 
of any social project that implicates power. Moreover, territory as politicised 
space of human everyday existence and interaction with nature is directly 
connected to the question of ways of living that inform understanding of 
development. Here, the notions of locality and politics of place are crucial. 
In academic debate (see Lisocka-Jaegermann, chapter 8, this volume) these 
elements are stressed as constitutive for the enactment of new narratives and 
concepts about development, because of people’s everyday experiences and 
locally evolved knowledges, gathered and constructed in specific ecological, 
geographical (spatial) and economic conditions and limits. Locally conscious 
populations are seen as better equipped to deal with everyday problems related 
to the social and economic reproduction of community and are expected to 
have more balanced and place-specific set of visions, values and techniques 
fitting concrete local circumstances. Thus, as Lisocka-Jaegermann argues in 
this volume, local communities ‘engage in politics in ways that stem from 
their specific social, cultural and economic place-based experiences and 
problems’. Furthermore, the ‘politics of place’ does not mean the rejection of 
or defence against modernity and global capital and top-down imposed forms 
of development. Instead it is about the possibility of choice and the rejection 
of hegemonic social, economic and cultural processes in favour of building 
community place-based political agendas on the basis of their own experiences, 
knowledge, values and needs and based on their own protagonism (see Lisocka-
Jaegermann, chapter 8, this volume).
However, critical to avoiding the stereotyping of local knowledges and 
indigenous ontologies, the focus on locality and place should never be 
understand as the reduction to some artificially constructed opposition 
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between mutually excluding elements such as modernity and tradition or 
development and preservation. The democratisation of access to new digital 
tools, globalised communication and increasing accessibility to technology 
worldwide, is facilitating local communities in the dissemination of local 
knowledge and values, and counterhegemonic views and interpretations, 
as they seek to counteract top-down imposed lectures of local development 
resources. One of the most promising examples of applying new technologies to 
local counterhegemonic struggles in social-environmental conflicts is through 
neogeography and the construction of electronic maps that serve as vehicles to 
promote local knowledges and perspectives. Access to technologically advanced 
but easily operational digital tools are challenging the monopoly of Western 
centres which have traditionally controlled processes of knowledge production 
and facilitated the dominance of eurocentric discourses on the environment. 
As Specht demonstrates in this volume, the growing access of subaltern groups 
involved in social struggle to these new digital tools should be considered not 
only as an improvement of methods of communication or data processing but 
in terms of power redistribution. Bebbington argues that social-environmental 
conflicts over natural resource development and extractivism in Latin America 
are a ‘sort of competition between opposed geographic projects’ (2011b, pp. 54–
5) in the sense of different kinds of logic of territory and resource management 
and spatial policy. On the one hand, a project that entails long term territorial 
management and successive changes, introduced and controlled by the local 
population which operate within frames of local history and tradition; and on 
the other hand, a project that implies drastic territorial changes and devastation 
of spatial understanding, going against the own political and economic systems 
of the local population (Bebbington, 2011b). 
The core dimension of these conflicts is not about natural resources as such, 
but that ‘the meaning and the use of a certain territory by a specific group 
occurs to the detriment of the meanings and uses that other social groups may 
employ for assuring their social and environmental reproduction’ (Zhouri, 
2014, p. 7). Such conflicts should be seen as wars of visions and values, where 
the dominating conceptions are imposed upon local visions of environment 
and development. They involve the question of ‘production of territory’ 
(Bebbington, 2011b, p. 63) - a strictly political process that encompasses 
disputes about the prevailing type of relations between the community and 
its environment and resources, which is the essence of development. This 
encompasses the following fundamental questions: who should govern 
territory and how? What goals and priorities should prevail? What responds 
directly to the question whom interests would dominate over others? And what 
type of relationship should a territory have with its surroundings? (See Coates 
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in this volume (chapter 6) regarding this dimension of social-environmental 
conflicts.)
Therefore, social-environment conflicts also confront more fundamental 
issues such as transparency, justice and dignity, citizenship, political subjectivity 
and communal sovereignty in issues directly related to the existence and 
reproduction of local populations (Bebbington, 2011a; Powęska, 2017). The 
central question of self-determination and true democracy in deciding own 
model of development is what links the themes of natural resource conflicts 
and the human rights agenda (Powęska, 2017). The claim for direct democracy 
and local communities’ political empowerment is shown by alternative 
development theorists as a critical element in territorially based alternatives 
(Friedmann, 1992, p. vii). For Veltmeyer, the competence of local people for 
sovereign decision-making and their political autonomy regarding development 
means that not only should ‘endogenous development’ respond to local realities 
and present holistic treatment of social, economic, cultural and environmental 
factors; going further, it implies that local communities should have control of 
development activities and shape their development strategy according to their 
own aspirations (1996, pp. 22–5).
The question of democracy and self-determination regarding development 
is also crucial in the context of the relationship of indigenous peoples and 
natural environment. Despite the essential role the environment played 
in social-environmental conflicts, we should be cautious not to reduce civil 
society’s agenda to the preservation of Nature. The protests are never only or 
simply against environmental destruction and Nature is never conceived as an 
aim and value in itself. Such protests also constitute a mechanism to recover 
control over the most fundamental aspects of communal sovereignty – decision-
making related to own territory of which natural resources are essential part 
(Damonte Valencia, 2011, p. 190). Neither indigenous peoples nor other local 
groups ‘reject all natural resource development; rather, they seek methods that 
respect their rights, that are consensual and from which they can benefit fairly’ 
(Lennox, 2012, p. 11).
Appealing to the principles of Nature conservation has become a discursive 
and symbolic tool, employed in the struggle to achieve other goals, since 
many social movements shape their discursive strategies adjusting them to the 
expectations and imagination of NGOs and international organisations (Hufty 
and Bottazzi, 2007; Molina Argandoña, 2011; Damonte Valencia, 2011). 
This can be seen as similar to the strategic adoption of the term ‘territory’ 
by indigenous peoples and their organisations in their operational political 
discourse while claiming rights for their collectivities to be recognised by 
addressed states. Even if particular indigenous groups do not share the same 
abstract categories and in their everyday life employ culturally very different 
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and far more complex understanding of relationships with their spatial 
surroundings, the internationally accepted term is widely used and referred to 
for strategic political reasons. It can however result in the domestication and 
disarmament of more inconvenient consequences of indigenous challenge to 
state power (Bryan, 2012; Hale, 2011). 
It is important to note that these examples of strategic adaptation to politically 
charged categories, terms and discourses reflect the unequal power relations 
between global forces, national states, and local non-state actors. Given the 
already enormous and still growing importance of natural preservation in the 
international public context, the environmental concerns and their employment 
in wider indigenous narratives serve as a tool of defence for the vulnerable 
groups that take the unprivileged side in the power asymmetry. However, as 
the content and meaning of those symbolic and discursive tools are beyond 
local communities’ control, their eventual negotiating position always depends 
on greater outside forces that can convert apparently emancipatory narratives 
into a trap. Consequently, the defence of indigenous rights through their 
discursive association with ecological preservation has a double end and may 
lead to indigenous peoples being perceived as part of Nature, equally denying 
indigenous peoples subjectivity as well as their right to self-determination 
and the autonomy to decide their own development (Assies and Hoekema, 
2000, p. 6). Indigenous peoples are often imagined by policymakers (states, 
NGOs, international institutions) as organic ‘guardians of biodiversity’ and 
closely linked to Nature (Hufty and Bottazzi, 2007, p. 180; Radcliffe, 2016, 
p. 161). This creates a paradox in which, on the one hand the supralocal actors 
(organisations, states, NGOs etc.) share positive beliefs about indigenous 
ontologies and their models of resource management, but on the other hand, 
by stereotyping and artificially binding indigeneity with environmental 
conservation, policymakers monopolise definitions of environmental policies, 
ignoring real indigenous needs and interests while denying their subjectivity. 
This results in the reproduction of colonial relations and the subjugation of the 
interests and rights of local groups in the name of ecology (Radcliffe, 2016, 
p. 162). An excellent example of this problem is the global climate change 
initiative Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD+) as discussed by Raftopoulos in this volume. Although REDD+ has 
the potential to generate co-benefits such as poverty alleviation and biodiversity 
conservation (Scriven, 2012), it has also proved highly controversial, denying 
indigenous peoples’ demands for collective self-determination and ignoring 
local customary models of forest exploitation. The Ecuadorian Yasuní-ITT 
initiative is another example of outside actors manipulating indigenous and 
environmental interests, raising ‘key issues about the differential valuing 
of western and indigenous epistemologies in environmental policymaking’ 
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(Radcliffe, 2016, p. 172). Despite its intention of protecting vast areas rich in 
biodiversity from oil exploitation, the Yasuní-ITT initiative was criticised by 
local indigenous peoples for trespassing on their ancestral territories, imposing 
a quasi-colonial land management programme on indigenous communities 
without their consultation and for violating their rights to self-determination 
and autonomous decision-making (Radcliffe, 2016, pp. 172–3).
In regards to buen vivir, the academic literature offers a romanticised, abstract 
review of supposedly indigenous visions and principles while overwhelmingly 
failing to address the relationship of these constructs with their practical and 
viable application in existing economies (Medina, 2001; Farah and Vasapollo, 
2011; Arkonada, 2012). Gudynas suggests that ‘there is strong evidence that 
suma qamaña [aymara expression for buen vivir] is not found in the everyday 
life of (…) rural communities, but that the terms were a recent creation’ 
(2011, p. 444). While challenging the abstract character of buen vivir concept, 
Gudynas points out that it is in fact rather vague in content and can have 
diverse interpretations within different sociopolitical contexts (2015, p. 201–2). 
Therefore, simply identifying similar, often intellectually manipulated concepts 
with apparently ancient indigenous philosophy supposedly always opposed to 
development and growth should be avoided. Such understanding of buen vivir 
as a de-contextualised, imagined ‘traditional’ way of thinking may be a risky 
generalisation and essentialisation of the original cultural values of indigenous 
peoples (Demmer and Hummel, 2017; Portugal Mollinedo, 2011). Moreover, 
the counter-narratives associated with indigenous ancestral philosophy may 
also be subject to the instrumental domestication and re-appropriation of 
indigeneity for conjunctural political-economic goals of states and global 
market. As Powęska discusses in this volume (chapter 2), this is particularly 
valid in case of the progressive and supposedly pro-indigenous governments of 
Ecuador and Bolivia, where the state manipulates discourses about indigeneity 
and the environment in order to align indigenous cosmovisions and an 
indigenous rights framework with the state’s developmental interests and 
extractivist priorities. 
Therefore, indigeneity and environmental discourses are generally associated 
with emancipatory struggles against the states powers and globalising market 
forces, the ambiguous and dubious nature of discursive and symbolic tools 
should be kept in mind. Indigeneity, especially in an environmentally concerned 
fashion, is a disputed field of political meaning, where different forces come to 
the fore. The struggles over meaning are embedded in asymmetrical power 
relations, whereas state actors can equally participate and dispute indigenous 
narratives for their own ends, emptying them from emancipatory potential. Thus, 
social movements resistance should be characterised as ambiguous rather than 
universally challenging extractivism, as the employment of pro-environmental 
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narratives is often more a result of power relations and strategic adaptation 
to globally dominating themes and not necessarily their original and primary 
concern. In those territories, where resources and other objective elements that 
constitute the physical basis for development are situated, communities are 
subject to interwoven global and local influences. Swyngedouw coins these 
processes as ‘glocal’ because the communal sphere is never autonomous to 
construct local development strategies, but instead is radically conditioned and 
limited by external forces and circumstances. However, it should be noted that 
external influences (political/institutional, economic, and cultural/discursive) 
are also mediated by local society, culture, perceptions and values, as well as 
power relations, interests and internal political structures (Swyngedouw, 1997). 
As a consequence of this complex interplay, development visions designed by 
local people not only draw on territory and resources and culture and traditions, 
but also interact constantly with national and international institutions and 
their policies. All these elements and levels form a ‘development repertoire’ 
to use. Extra local regulations and influences (including rights, state policy, 
outside political/institutional structures) shape the ability of local communities 
to follow their ‘alternative paths of development’ (Ray, 1999). However, as 
shown by Raftopoulos in chapter 3 of this volume, in the interplay between 
local and global, it is the visions and interests of the latter that prevail over local 
people’s right to self-determine their own development models.
Resource wars and human rights 
The environment has become a new arena for human rights as an increased 
demand for natural resources has sparked conflicts between local communities 
and the state, as governments throughout the region push through major 
development projects without integrating economic, social and cultural 
rights. Current development policy is shaping protests in the region and has 
ultimately led to the incorporation of human rights into these protests and 
the opening up of a new political space for indigenous peoples and minority 
groups to further their call for respect of their internationally recognised rights. 
Moreover, as Veltmeyer and Petras argue, the social and political struggles 
surrounding extractivism have given rise to a new class struggle predominately 
in rural areas. This has created a new proletariat composed of waged workers 
and miners, indigenous communities, peasant farmer communities and semi-
proletarianised rural landless workers who form the backbone of the forces of 
resistance against the ‘workings of capitalism and imperialism in the economic 
interests of the dominant class’ (2014, p. 46). These forces of resistance are 
drawn together and united around the negative impact of extractive industries, 
notions of development, territorial sovereignty and the defence of the commons 
and biodiversity. 
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This new cycle of protests has opened up new political spaces for human rights 
based resistance by indigenous and peasant communities, social-environmental 
activists and social movements. These groups are at the forefront of the forces 
of resistance against resource extraction in Latin America and are increasingly 
looking towards human rights institutions, discourses and practices to provide 
a means to contest the unjust capitalist structures that are causing the social-
ecological destruction of the planet (Raftopoulos, 2017). For many indigenous 
movements, the international human rights system has become a crucial 
channel to demand attention from their respective states and motivate Latin 
American governments to recognise human and particularly indigenous rights 
in the framework of their constitutions and national legislations (Lightfoot, 
2016; Burger, 2016; Sieder, 2016; Brysk, 2000). Moreover, with current 
international law on environmental management by sovereign states limited 
to managing the environment in a manner that the misuse of natural resources 
does not disadvantage other states, the international human rights framework 
has become increasingly important in the protection of the environment. The 
potential of human rights to act as ‘language of protest’ and a ‘platform for change’ 
(Gearty, 2010, p. 7) has contributed to the increasing transnationalisation of 
human rights discourses in the last two decades and led to the development of 
transnational human rights networks that bring together ordinary social actors 
in their pursuit against similar claims of injustice. Furthermore, the use of 
human rights has become an important means of exposing both the ecological 
and social destruction that accompanies many extractivist projects and has 
ultimately broadened the frame of both action and discourse surrounding 
social-environmental conflicts while simultaneously increasing the attention 
focused on human rights and the rights of nature (Raftopoulos, 2017).
In the last two decades, human rights law has undergone a rapid greening 
whereby the focus has been on reinterpreting universally recognised rights, 
leading to a convergence between human rights and environmental protection. 
Environmental integrity is being recast as a mechanism for the enforcement 
of human rights, ‘functioning as sine qua non conditions of existence for the 
realization of much of the human rights agenda’ (Gearty, 2010, p. 13). This 
has led to the emergence of three theoretical approaches to the relationship 
between human rights and the environment. Firstly, the environment is seen as 
a precondition to the enjoyment of human rights. Secondly, human rights can 
be used as a tool to address environmental issues from both a procedural and 
substantive stance. Lastly, human rights and the environment have increasingly 
been grouped together as the conditions for sustainable development 
(Boyle, 2012, p. 617). The idea that people are entitled to the right to a 
decent environment has gained traction over recent years as a consequence 
of the broadening of economic and social rights to incorporate elements of 
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environmental protection, evident in rights treaties such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on 
Economic and Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the United Nations 
Declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (Boyle, 2012). 
While it is increasingly recognised within international law that environment 
degradation can deprive human rights and that ‘mere recognition of such 
deprivations is not enough to promote and secure a healthy environment’, 
a non-derivative human right to the environment has yet to be recognised 
(Bosselmann, 2015, p. 531). 
A report published by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
in 2015, while stating that states have the freedom to exploit their natural 
resources through concessions and private or public investments, also 
importantly emphasised that these activities should not be executed at the 
expense of human rights and justice. Along with this increasing recognition 
of the linkage between human rights and extractivism, questions are being 
raised within human rights law regarding states extraterritorial obligations. 
Transnational corporations, which are often unsupervised and operate out of 
the control of the host country, have been complicit in human rights violations 
in those areas where large mineral deposits and energy sources are located, 
harming both the local population and the environment. However, human 
rights defenders in Latin America have repeatedly reported the deficiencies 
found in current legal, institutional and political frameworks and called 
for transnational corporations to be held accountable for their actions. The 
concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has also been widely promoted 
by the UN and in 2011 the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted 
the Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights. As the first corporate 
human rights responsibility initiative to be endorsed by the UN, it set out three 
guiding principles for preventing and addressing the risk of adverse human 
rights impacts linked to business activity. These Guiding Principles included: 
states’ existing obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights and 
fundamental freedoms; the role of business enterprises as specialised organs of 
society performing specialised functions, required to comply with all applicable 
laws and to respect human rights; and the need for rights and obligations to be 
matched to appropriate and effective remedies when breached. 
While it has long been recognised that it is the state’s responsibility to 
protect and promote human rights in its territories, it is also increasingly 
acknowledged that they have a duty to adopt an appropriate and effective 
regulatory framework in order to prevent human rights abuses. As García-
Falcés notes, for effective enforcement of [indigenous peoples] rights the ‘state 
cannot treat this problem alone, but its role is at the same time crucial to 
guarantee [international] agreements in the domestic level. The state is the 
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entity which should put into practice (...) the recognition of indigenous 
peoples’ rights’ (2005, p. 52). Therefore, while human rights may have been 
strengthened on an international level, they can only be realised if individual 
states guarantee and enforce human rights agreements domestically. In 
addition to enforcing international human rights standards, the state also has 
an important role to play as a ‘meta-mediator‘ where it ‘acts as manager of 
the national territory, including natural resources, at the same time as it acts 
also as mediator of interaction between different sectors of society - firms and 
affected peoples - and the natural resources of the country’ (Zhouri, 2014, p. 
9). States have an obligation to monitor and supervise extraction, exploitation 
and development activities, to guarantee mechanisms of effective participation 
and access to information, prevent illegal activities and forms of violence, as 
well as to guarantee access to justice through investigation, punishment and 
adequate reparations for violations of human rights committed under these 
circumstances. However, the persistent problem of the ‘implementation gap’ 
remains (Stavenhagen, 2006) and a number of barriers, such as differences 
in legislative and judicial approaches, make it very difficult to achieve justice 
across jurisdictions (IACHR, 2015). Krysińska-Kałużna in this volume 
(chapter 4) shows how the absence or lack of commitment of the state (or 
simple failure in effective law enforcement) greatly influences the escalation 
of human rights violation. Moreover, the failure of the government to protect 
indigenous peoples or resolve disputes over natural resource development, 
despite indigenous communities’ willingness to negotiate their rights peacefully 
and in accordance to the legal frames and expectations imposed by states, is 
contributing to the escalating violence. 
Despite the adoption of a UN resolution requiring states to ensure the rights 
and safety of human rights defenders, it has become increasingly clearer that 
states are not doing enough to protect those lives at risk from harassment and 
violence and bring those responsible to justice. Furthermore, in many cases 
the state and security services are perpetuating violence against those opposed 
to extractivist activities and leading a campaign to vilify and stigmatise 
indigenous groups and social movements in an attempt to build a framework 
of acceptance for curtailing human rights in the name of development. The 
contradictory roles played by the state in extractivism are apparent throughout 
Latin America, particularly in those countries with so-called progressive 
governments (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014; Machado and Zibechi, 2016; 
Gandarillas Gonzáles, 2014). Consequently, Latin America has become one of 
the most dangerous places for human rights activists and environmentalists in 
the world. The murder of Berta Cáceres, a well-known activist for indigenous 
rights, human rights and environmental protection in Honduras in March 
2016 exposed the level of violence that often accompanies mega-projects 
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and resource extraction in Latin America as indigenous communities and 
governments clash over the use and control of natural resources and land. 
Speaking ahead of World Environment Day 2016, The UN Special Rapporteur 
on human rights and the environment, John Knox, along with the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Michel Forst, and 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous people, Victoria Tauli 
Corpuz, issued a joint statement urging governments to protect environmental 
rights defenders. However, because of the commitment of Latin American 
governments to pursuing and intensifying extractivism, the role of the state is 
focused not on acting as a guarantor of human rights but rather protecting and 
facilitating their own economic interests. Increasingly, the state is acting as a 
guarantor for legal and public order and providing security for natural resource 
investments (Svampa and Antonelli, 2009, p. 31). As Morley demonstrates in 
this volume, environmental protection, the rights of nature and human rights 
are continuously sidelined in the name of economic development, even in 
those countries with a more progressive development agenda. Latin American 
states are acting as an active promoter of extractivism, allying themselves 
with transnational capital to the detriment of its own citizens. Governments 
across the region are criminalising social protests through the use of repressive 
legislation, and deterring or curtailing communities and activists from political 
mobilisation through the use of violence, kidnapping, torture, harassment 
and threats. However, the active involvement of states in securing extractivist 
activities is justified by governments as being in ‘the interest of the nation’ or 
‘majority’, or ‘public interest’ (Lennox, 2012).
The dilemma between exploiting natural resources for socio-economic 
development and defending both human and environmental rights represents a 
major challenge for Latin American countries. The struggle over the expansion 
of the extractivist and (neo)-extractivist development models, the absence of 
participatory democracy, and the criminalisation of resistance have led to the 
rupture between the state and social movements, resulting in the growth in 
social-environmental conflicts throughout the continent. This book addresses 
the dilemmas of development in today’s Latin America, marked by the pursuit 
of economic growth, technological improvement and reduction of poverty 
on the one hand, and growing concerns about the environment, natural 
resource preservation and human rights on the other. It examines the roles of 
contemporary states in natural resource development, ranging from acting as a 
promotor of extractive industries and an ally of transnational capital, through 
to being rights brokers and agents of law enforcement and institutional order, 
to defending and guaranteeing the rights and interests of society. Furthermore, 
attention is paid to how the current development model is contested by 
non-state actors as well as the interaction between the local and the global. 
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By focusing on the different, though interrelated levels of interaction (local, 
national, transnational), as well as actors and roles, the book contemplates the 
complex panorama of competing visions, concepts and interests grounded in 
mutual influences and interdependencies that is shaping the contemporary 
arena of social-environmental conflicts in Latin America.
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2. Indigenous rights in the era of ‘indigenous 
state’: how interethnic conflicts and state 
appropriation of indigenous agenda hinder 
the challenge to extractivism in Bolivia
Radosław Powęska
Evo Morales, wearing his characteristic ethnic suit and decorated with colourful wreaths, pours liquid from a vessel and speaks into the microphone: ‘…and with this offering to Pachamama [Mother Earth] I 
declare inaugurated this open-pit mine’. This humorous graphic made by Spanish 
illustrator Emma Gascó1 perfectly demonstrates the contradictions of Bolivian 
economic policy under Morales. The election of Evo Morales as Bolivia’s first 
indigenous president has launched the process of inner decolonisation of the 
state, becoming a revolutionary promise for the native majority of the Bolivian 
population. Bolivia has incorporated one of the most advanced and far-
reaching set of indigenous rights in Latin America, including the right to self-
determination and self-government through territorial autonomies, the right to 
prior consultation and to self-determined development. The indigenous right 
to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development is inherent 
from their right to self-determination. However, despite Morales’ reputation 
as defender of Mother Earth, the Bolivian state’s focus on the extractivist 
model of economic development (natural resource exploitation as a source of 
state revenues and supply for social redistribution through ambitious social 
programmes) puts in question the authenticity of its apparently pro-indigenous 
agenda. The extractivism-oriented development priorities of the state quickly 
contradicted the official policy of vivir bien, leading to regular devastations of 
the environment.
The project of decolonisation became problematic for the policy of 
nationalisation of resources. The expansion of hydrocarbon exploitation and 
mining, as well as the development of infrastructure and energy projects, have 
progressed at the expense of the most fundamental indigenous rights. The 
Bolivian state’s ‘pragmatic retreat’ undermines indigenous rights to territorial 
and resource control, especially through prior consultation, resulting in the 
1 The illustration is available in Cúneo, 2011.
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denial of their right to autonomously decide their own model of development 
and determine their relationship with the environment. Thus, the promise of 
the plurinational state has been converted into a mere ornament, an empty 
rhetoric that covers actual political economic practice. Bolivia’s economic 
dependence on fossil fuels revenues meant that despite the considerable drop 
in global resource prices few years ago, the country intensified its extractivist 
policies, adopting laws and decrees to encourage foreign investment and reduce 
obstacles stemming from indigenous rights.
In February 2017, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) 
called for the Bolivian government to explain the growing controversies 
surrounding fossil fuel exploitation in the Amazon in the department of La 
Paz. For several months, it was known that during the preliminary phases of 
exploration, the cooperative of Bolivian state company YPFB and the Chinese 
BGP had come across an uncontacted indigenous people but had failed to 
stop their operations, threatening the material survival of the group previously 
remaining in isolation (Monasterio Mercado, 2017). By doing so, the Bolivian 
state violated its own constitution that incorporates the rights of indigenous 
peoples in voluntary isolation to maintain such conditions, to have protected 
occupied territory and to be protected and respected in their way of living 
(art. 31) (Jiménez, 2017). The event symbolically illustrates the dramatic pace 
of the Bolivian extractivist expansion and the real face of the Plurinational 
State. Moreover, the Bolivian state not only failed to take relevant measures 
to protect the endangered people, but the government also denied that it had 
been informed of the problem in 2016 and showed no concern over the matter 
(Survival, 2016; Jiménez, 2017).
In this chapter I draw on the Bolivian case to show that nothing can guarantee 
and ensure the effective realisation of indigenous rights in practice, when 
confronted with complicated nuances of internal politics and development 
dilemmas. More importantly, no serious improvement in indigenous peoples’ 
rights is possible without the sincere and compromised engagement of the 
state. In the case of contemporary Bolivia, the problem with the genuine 
implementation of indigenous rights is even more difficult because of the 
state’s appropriation of the indigenous agenda and a state-managed official 
indigenous discourse that tries to mask the existing contradictions and conflicts. 
I maintain that the visible discrepancies between pro-indigenous rhetoric on 
the one hand, and the acceleration of extractivist logic on the other, put the 
Bolivian state apparatus in dramatic need of managing official discourse with 
the very particular end of legitimisation of the current policy and its portrayal 
as fully coherent with the idealistic principles derived from indigenous identity. 
No matter if the government is rhetorically pro-indigenous and itself has its 
roots in organic indigenous movements, maintaining strategic alliance with 
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chosen organisations. Due to its organic ties to social movements, the Bolivian 
government claims to represent the legitimate incarnation of indigenous power 
and be the natural advocate of indigenous peoples’ interests. However, the 
Bolivian case demonstrates that drawing on these ties to civil society’s activism, 
the government, as the most powerful part of the state’s apparatus, appropriates 
the indigenous agenda as part of state ideology and discursively transforms 
it to fit into its own development and economic priorities. I argue that the 
indigenous rights and indigenous agenda are being deformed, manipulated 
and domesticated by the ‘indigenous state’, hindering the ability of peoples 
affected by extractivism to defend their rights.
Importantly, in the process of re-elaboration of the discursive framework 
to serve its policy, the state can count on existing conflicts and divisions 
between various indigenous peoples. Although the global audience likes to see 
indigenous peoples as unified by similar historical situation, traditions, values 
and lifestyles, as well as united in their struggle for recognition, they are in fact 
very far from united in their struggle against the state’s extractivism in Bolivia. 
Yet soon after Morales ascent to presidency and the launch of the plurinational 
state project, numerous interethnic conflicts over territories and resources 
came to the fore, eventually ending the era of anti-neoliberal and anticolonial 
alliances and a great, united Bolivian indigenous movement.2 The discrepancies 
in interests between various indigenous groups fuel different approaches to 
the theme of indigenous rights and the government’s development policy. 
Crucially, resource wealth is concentrated in the lowlands where there are the 
fewest indigenous peoples.
The question of state power underlies my analysis. Scholars studying recent 
Latin American pink tide governments’ policies have already observed that in 
cases when the process of change is being developed from the top down, using 
state apparatus, the state can be as much an instrument of revolutionary process 
as an impediment of genuine profound transformation of power relations and 
structures of domination. The state power and its institutions operate with 
their own logic and interests that can seriously limit the ability to respond to 
social movements’ more radical, counter-hegemonic stance (Martínez et al., 
2015). Elsewhere, I have argued that the state remains a crucial element in the 
implementation of the indigenous peoples’ rights and any social-environmental 
conflicts:
We face a fundamental paradox – even if indigenous rights are being 
strengthened through international activism on the global level, their 
2 In fact, the indigenous peoples and their organisations were never united. Rather the 
opposite, the always-present conflicts of interests, over territories, resources, representation 
and political influences are typical for the history of contemporary indigenous activism. The 
apparent wide coalitions of indigenous movements are rather products of strategic political 
decisions and calculations. On the Bolivian case see, for example, Powęska, 2013.
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implementation strictly depends on local circumstances … although 
indigenous peoples indeed defy states’ authority and power, states still 
hold the best cards in dealing with this challenge. The State preserves all 
the prerogatives for shaping the legal framework regulating territorial 
and resources control, their use and exploitation, as well as about the 
effective implementation of domestic and international rights. Despite 
some academic optimism about Indigenous movements activism on the 
international fora and its effect on the reconstruction of power relations 
within Latin American states, there remains the ever-present problem of 
‘implementation gap‘ … Any international legal provision will remain a 
dead letter if it is not put into operation by the state. Even in the case of 
an international courts unfavourable judgement to state interests, it is the 
state that has the last word regarding its compliance (Powęska, 2017, pp. 
442–3).
I have shown that the Bolivian state has a crucial interest in hindering the 
genuine implementation of indigenous rights because of the strategic role 
of natural resource exploitation for the national economy, but also for the 
reproduction of political power based upon the traditional patterns of the 
Bolivian political culture – paternalist-clientelist state-society relations fuelled 
by state-controlled resource revenues (Powęska, 2017).
Among its tools for effective political strategy to contend the challenging 
potential of indigenous peoples, the state employs management of indigenous 
rights discourse, domesticated and incorporated into the state’s ideology. There 
is already a great tradition of theoretical discussion of the role of discourse 
in the processes of power reproduction or constructing counter-power 
movements. For Foucault, the establishment and reproduction of power is 
possible through the discourses that transmit and instil the ‘adequate’ manner 
of seeing and understanding social reality, building ‘unquestionable’ norms 
(Foucault, 2005). Following Foucault, discourses have the ability to generate 
relations between ‘institutions, economic and social processes, forms of 
behaviour, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification and ways of 
characterisation’ (Foucault, 2006, pp. 73–4). Bourdieu proposes the concept 
of symbolic violence to describe a mechanism of imposing perceptions, beliefs 
and values as legitimate and natural, dissimulating power relations upon which 
this symbolic imposition is based. The symbolic violence is exercised by those 
who culturally dominate others and the communication/discourse plays a 
fundamental role in this process (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
2001). Similar way of thinking can be found in the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony, built upon the imposed ‘truths’ that serve the reproduction of 
the position and interests of dominating forces, ‘truths’ accepted as objective 
ones by the subaltern groups (Gramsci, 1971). Thus, discourses are crucial 
mechanisms for the construction of power legitimacy. For Lipset, ‘[l]egitimacy 
involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that 
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the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society’ 
(Lipset, 1983, p. 64).
The discursive processes can be oppressive but they can be also mechanisms 
of resistance or the construction of alternative beliefs and values (Fraser, 1990). 
For Laclau and Mouffe, the struggle for power is nothing more but a struggle 
over the re-appropriation of the process of discursive reproduction (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985). Thus, the indigenous and environmental discourses can be 
seen as a field of political meanings, disputed by different forces and actors, 
embedded in unequal power relations. In this chapter I concentrate on the 
state side of this struggle. For this analysis, I adopt Bob Jessop’s approach to 
state power as ‘a complex social relation that reflects the changing balance of 
social forces in a determinate conjuncture’; this relation is mediated through 
the instrumentality of juridical-political institutions, political organisations 
and state capacities. Crucially, state apparatus may privilege some actors, 
identities and strategies over others. State structures have differential impact 
on the ability of particular political/social forces to pursue their ‘interests and 
strategies in specific contexts through their control over and/or (in)direct access 
to these state capacities’ (Jessop, 2009, pp. 376–8).
In this approach, the asymmetries of power in a society play a pivotal role. 
The state system is seen as the site of competition of interests of different 
groups differently structurally oriented toward state power. It is clear enough 
in Jessop’s state apparatus definition ‘as a distinct ensemble of institutions 
and organizations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce 
collectively binding decisions on a given population in the name of their 
“common interest” or “general will”’ (Jessop, 1990, p. 341). But ‘[w]hatever 
the political rhetoric of the “common interest” or “general will” might 
suggest, these are always “illusory” insofar as attempts to define them occur 
on a strategically selective terrain and involves the differential articulation and 
aggregation of interests, opinions, and values. Indeed, the common interest or 
general will is always asymmetrical, marginalizing or defining some interests 
at the same time as it privileges other. There is never a general interest that 
embraces all possible particular interests (...) a key statal task is to (...) [manage] 
contradictions, crisis-tendencies, and conflicts to the benefit of those fully 
included in the “general interest” at the expense of those more or less excluded 
from it’ (Jessop, 2009, p. 373).
Such a theoretical approach to state helps to explain why the Bolivian state, 
controlled by a supposedly pro-indigenous government, is more sensitive 
to the interests and expectations of some chosen indigenous groups that are 
structurally better situated in the system of power and thus more influential 
on the state, while at the same time the same pro-indigenous state and its 
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government ignores the rights and interests of weaker and more vulnerable 
indigenous groups.
Power relations and indigenous peoples as guardians of 
Nature
The power relations operating on the interrelated local, national and global 
levels, as well as different structural situation of particular indigenous groups 
towards state power in Bolivia and finally, last but not least, the vulnerability 
of particular indigenous groups to extractive enterprises in their territories, 
are all important factors in indigenous-state relations. They all form a set of 
conditions determining different orientation towards the state’s extractivist 
policy, as well as the very theme of indigenous rights and environmental issues, 
but also discourses and forms of struggle.
First of all, the indigenous peoples ‘do not reject all natural resource 
development; rather, they seek methods that respect their rights, that are 
consensual and from which they can benefit fairly’ (Lennox, 2012, p. 11). The 
main concerns include also the ways in which projects are undertaken, questions 
of transparency, citizenship and democracy, and problem of disregarding 
communities’ interests (Bebbigton, 2011, pp. 25, 28). Yet during the drafting 
of the new Bolivian constitution in 2006–7, many indigenous organisations 
demanded the right of indigenous communities to own and control all the 
natural resources, including non-renewable ones and subsoil. Such claims 
were presented to local populations during constitutional workshops 
and were announced in the congress of the biggest indigenous-peasant 
organisation, Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos 
de Bolivia (CSUTCB), although in the end this movement, a strategic ally 
of the government, did not include the claims in its constitutional proposal 
(CSUTCB, 2006; 2008, p. 55). The important organisation of traditional 
Andean communities, Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu 
(CONAMAQ), demanded in its constitutional project that indigenous 
autonomies have the right to ‘property and sustainable administration of 
renewable and non-renewable natural resources’ (CONAMAQ, 2007, pp. 
12, 24–5). The Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní (APG) also claimed to own 
and the right to administer the indigenous peoples’ soil and subsoil. The 
Central de Pueblos Étnicos Moxeños del Beni (CPEMB) claimed that ‘the 
indigenous peoples are owners of the renewable and non-renewable resources 
in their territories and have a right to administer, use, and sustainable control 
of the resources (Zegada, Tórrez and Salinas, 2007, pp. 65, 68–9). Finally, 
the coalition of the nine biggest indigenous peoples organisations in Bolivia 
prepared a compromised constitutional project reflecting the different interests 
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of the movements. In that document the movements demanded indigenous 
peoples’ rights to ‘participate in the co-administration of the non-renewable 
natural resources with the national government’, to ‘participate in direct, real 
and effective form in administration, management, decision-making and 
benefits coming from the use of natural resources (...) found in their territories’ 
and claimed that ‘indigenous peoples can be partners in forming companies’ 
undertaking resource exploitation’ (Pacto de Unidad, 2007, pp. 19, 21). Given 
the economic and political interests of the state, these were utopian claims.
The question of environment is without doubt an essential issue in 
indigenous struggles. However, Damonte Valencia stresses that ‘the protest of 
communities against environmental destruction is, in a certain way, a response 
to and about environmental destruction, but the social-environmental struggles 
have converted also into mechanisms to gain control about fundamental aspects 
of communal sovereignty’. The communities ‘understand the environment not 
only as a fundamental part of their own social life, but also, in itself, as a 
political tool to employ in conflict with opposing actors and to achieve support 
of external agents and global auditory’ (Damonte Valencia, 2011, p. 192). The 
indigenous protests against extractivism, he concludes, are ‘dynamic forms 
of struggle against subordination that operate inside the power structures’; 
they are not necessarily ‘ecologist’ nor ‘autonomous’ ‘but conscious political 
responses shaped by decades of struggles and negotiations with and against 
the State’ (Damonte Valencia, 2011, p. 192). To make it clearer, appealing to 
ecological claims of environmental protection has become a discursive tool, 
employed by indigenous movements to achieve their goals, not necessarily or 
directly related to the protection of the environment. The movements adjust 
their discursive strategies to the imagination and expectations of the global 
public and supporting organisations (Ramos, 1994; Hufty and Bottazzi, 2007; 
Molina Argandoña, 2011, pp. 78, 84; Trentini and Soroche, 2016, p. 143). 
What the indigenous groups intend to achieve with the use of ecological 
discourses as a discursive strategy is, through gaining the attention of the 
domestic and international public, and/or establishing political alliances, to 
pressure the state to respond to globally growing environmental concerns, and 
to gain protection from decisions and actions harmful to their interests. 
Although indigenous activism has successfully incorporated ecology into 
its ‘repertoires of contention’, there is also a paradoxical or ‘swindling’ side of 
environmentally oriented articulation of struggles. Assies and Hoekema warn 
that:
the recent ‘greening’ of indigenous movements’ discourse, by which 
indigenous peoples are represented as natural born ecologists (...) involves 
a dubious play on ascription and identification. While linking up 
with transnational activism around environmental issues brought new 
opportunities for indigenous peoples’ movements and provided them with 
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new leverage, the resultant tendency to equate Indian rights with ecological 
preservation may entail patronization and the subordination of political 
identity to an imposed view of Indians as Nature (Assies and Hoekema, 
2000, p. 6). 
Without denying that generally indigenous peoples have culturally specific 
understanding of and relations to their natural environment, and that there is 
a fundamental difference between their biocultural paradigm and the capitalist 
growth paradigm, I stress that the indigenous peoples should be themselves 
the only subjects defining their relations to land and environment, without 
imposing on them our visions and expectations. The prospects for their genuine 
self-determination and self-determined development require the avoidance of 
artificial attachment of indigenous rights to the condition of conservation of 
‘traditional’ culture and relations to the environment, as the preservationist 
approach to indigenous rights can actually narrow available ‘development 
repertoires’. As Rudnicki accurately remarks, the approach based on cultural 
essentialism and the imagined idealised indigenous lifestyle threatens to limit 
native peoples’ economic, political and territorial autonomy (Rudnicki, 2012, 
pp. 44, 62). Therefore, there is a need to ‘support solutions that can bring 
more and not less autonomy, including within particular indigenous groups 
(...) and to oppose the assumption, that the indigenous peoples should enjoy 
the recognition of their substantial rights only because they are bearers of a 
culture worthy to be saved for the good of mankind’ (Rudnicki, 2012, p. 63).
Rudnicki points out that the generalised belief in the so-called ‘special 
relation to the land’ and ‘traditional way of living’ of indigenous peoples treated 
as ‘Guardians of Nature’ creates a risk that the states would forbid them to use 
lands or resources in a way that differs from the state’s view of ‘traditional’ 
use or even refuse to recognise their status as indigenous peoples because of 
the lack of supposed ‘sustainable’ management of land (Rudnicki, 2012, pp. 
57–61). There are existing examples of this threat from elsewhere in Latin 
America. In Colombia, the Yanacona people in San Agustín department were 
forbidden to use motorised vehicles on the road belonging to the terrain of the 
San Agustín Archaeological Park, though this area is also a part of Yanacona’s 
traditional territory. The state authorities declared that further use of the road 
would damage a ‘millenarian landscape’ of the zone (Cuenca, 2015). In the 
north-western Mexican state of Baja California, federal authorities banned 
Cucatá indigenous people from fishing in their traditional territories under the 
excuse that their fishing techniques and goals are not sustainable and therefore 
not properly indigenous anymore, which meant those people did not deserve 
special rights to territory and resource use (Navarro, Bravo Espinoza and López 
Sagástegui, 2013, pp. 138–48).
35INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE ERA OF ‘INDIGENOUS STATE’
According to Assies and Hoekema, ‘[t]his type of recognition of indigenous 
territories [in exchange for their dwellers being environmental guardians, RP] 
may well sustain existing relations of inequality. It makes indigenous people 
carry the weight of problems generated elsewhere which, therefore, should be 
solved in other ways’ (Hoekema and Assies, 2000, p. 255). There is an urgent 
need for ‘sincere discussion about inequalities that underlie indigenous peoples’ 
problems and that incite their claims’, because ‘actions towards protection 
of groups instead of changing basic structures of power against which these 
groups seek protection, can result pointless in the long term, and even to some 
extent harmful’ (Rudnicki, 2012, pp. 62–3).
The relations of inequality and power asymmetry are key to understanding 
the problem of the ecologist discursive trap. Indigenous peoples with better 
relationships with state power and not directly affected by extractivism, 
even expecting the redistribution of revenues from resource extraction, are 
not so prone to adopting similar discourses and often openly manifest their 
disagreement with other indigenous peoples’ rights. Given the location of the 
vulnerable groups on the ‘weaker’ side of the social-environmental conflicts 
and within the local-national-global set of power relations, this resort to Nature 
in discursive strategies can be seen as an example of the ‘weapon of the weak’, 
to borrow from James Scott’s concept (Scott, 1985).
Certainly, there is an enormous and still growing sense of the importance 
of natural preservation in the international public context, which is reflected 
in public debates on the national scale around the globe with Bolivia being no 
exception. Notwithstanding, the content and meaning of politically charged 
notions and narratives about the natural environment protection are beyond 
local communities’ control. Their eventual negotiating position greatly depends 
on the definitions of environmental policies being monopolised by external 
forces that ignore real indigenous needs and interests, thus denying their 
subjectivity. The deliberate adoption of such discourses implies the adjustment 
to foreign interpretations and the self-censorship of their own, often different 
and more complex relationships with the environment.
This is exactly the case of the Chiquitano people in the Bolivian lowlands, 
where local communities employed ecologist discourse for strategic reasons. 
As Weber comments, ‘Discourses around indigenous peoples’ capacities to 
manage territories sustainably and concerning “ecologically noble” tropes often 
play powerful roles in the struggles surrounding indigenous territories … But 
while Chiquitano discourses on their territory and practices, in relation to land 
and resources, partly resonate with the “eco-native” trope, their visions for 
development and their future also disrupt it … [The “eco-native” trope] fails to 
articulate more complex notions of environment, socio-natures, ignoring their 
[Chiquitanos’] knowledges and lived realities’ (Weber, 2016, p. 140).
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As argued, the indigenous groups are primarily concerned with the 
autonomous control of natural resources in their territories, which does not 
necessarily equate to rejecting any resource exploitation. This means that the 
indigenous contestation of extractivism is more ambiguous and complex than 
the ecologist discourses may suggest. Moreover, for vulnerable, powerless 
groups such discourses can be a question more of necessity than free choice. 
The struggle can result in limited success or even different outcomes from what 
was expected.
We should be cautious not to continue the vision of some ‘Hyperreal 
Indian’, as called by Alcida Ramos, a vision of indigenous peoples who are 
entirely anti-modern and live in perfect symbiosis with Nature (because they 
are Nature themselves) (Ramos, 1994). The indigenous peoples’ relations 
with the environment should not be seen as set in stone as our lecture of 
indigenous cosmovisions may suggest. Portugal Mollinedo accurately points 
out that social knowledge and everyday practices are not necessarily a copy of 
a cosmovision. ‘The cosmovision is not a method of knowledge nor technique 
of production’, but rather the opposite, the constantly ‘changing knowledges 
and social relations modify and adjust cosmovision’ that reflects them (Portugal 
Mollinedo, 2011, pp. 61–2).
Panorama of extractivism and indigenous rights
Despite the high hopes of the Bolivian indigenous peoples and the international 
fame of Evo Morales as the first indigenous president of that country, the 
political practice of the state regarding the indigenous rights resulted in a great 
contradiction with the state’s official pro-indigenous agenda. In practice state-
led extractivism prevails over indigenous rights. The state has not only failed 
to secure them but has also promoted extractivism. It became symbolic that 
before Morales’ ascent to power, the 2005 Ley de Hidrocarburos (Hydrocarbons 
Law) incorporated indigenous peoples’ right to be consulted with the aim of 
achieving agreement or obtaining consent for the project under consultation 
(República de Bolivia, 2005). However, in 2006, the very same year that 
Morales’ presidency was inaugurated, the Constitutional Court pronounced 
against this measure, arguing that the norm should be only to consult on the 
eventual impacts and damage that some extractive projects can do. To receive 
the permission of affected people should not be among the goals of such 
consultation, since the subsoil is under state control and nothing can be an 
obstacle to the interests of the majority, as expressed by the state authorities 
(Arias López, 2012, pp. 210–12). 
The initial pro-indigenous position of Morales’ government was backed 
by the new constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, promulgated in 
2009. It emphasises many indigenous political, cultural and developmental 
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rights, among them the right to territory, territorial-administrative autonomy, 
own political systems, control of renewable resources and to decide their 
way of development. The constitution guarantees the right to free, prior and 
informed consultation (but not consent), obligatory for the state for any 
legislative acts or administrative decisions that would affect the interests of 
indigenous peoples, including the exploitation of non-renewable resources 
from their territories (Art. 30, 352, 403) (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 
2009). Such recognition follows the path established by the ratification of the 
169 Convention of International Labour Organisation (ILO 169) in 1991 
and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). 
Bolivia ratified UNDRIP in 2007 and the same year converted it in its entirety 
into the national law (National Act no. 3760) (Gaceta official de Bolivia, 
2007), making pointless any discussion about the declaration’s (non-)binding 
character. However, 12 years since Morales’ first electoral victory and despite 
the ratification of important IHR instruments, Bolivia still lacks any real 
recognition of self-determination rights, especially right to consultation under 
the principles of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC).
The problem with the implementation of indigenous rights is directly 
related to the new economic policy launched by the government in 2006. It 
is based on the central role of the state in the economy, with modernisation 
projects and nationalisation of strategic resources (mainly gas alongside oil and 
more traditional mining industry) being treated as an ‘engine’ for the country’s 
development. The export revenues provide budget for public investments 
and industrialisation projects, but they also fuel the system of redistribution 
through state-managed social programmes. These include the Renta Dignidad 
(Dignity Pension) programme for seniors, the Juancito Pinto stipend for 
children who regularly attend school, and the Juana Azurduy payments to 
pregnant women and mothers of infants (Mendonça Cunha, 2010; Powęska, 
2010; República de Bolivia, 2006). However, it is important to acknowledge 
the great achievements of the new state policy in terms of economic growth 
(GDP per capita in 2005 was 1,018 USD in 2005 and 3,147 USD in 2014) 
and poverty reduction. In 2005 60 per cent of all Bolivians were poor and 36.7 
per cent were extremely poor. In contrast, in 2013 the level of poverty fell to 
39 per cent and the extreme poverty level dropped to 18.9 per cent (in rural 
areas the total poverty level was 80 per cent in 2005 and 60 per cent in 2013, 
while extreme poverty dropped from 65.6 per cent in 2005 to 38.8 per cent 
in 2013).3
The importance of resource extractivism for the national economy 
exacerbates the tendency to accelerate the consultations or omit them, in order 
to move quickly towards exploitation with the lowest costs and the biggest 
3 Elaboration by the author on the base of Instituto Nacional de Estadística, www.ine.gob.bo.
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volume possible, avoiding prolonged deliberations and negotiations. For 
the state, the consultations are a waste of time and only complicate effective 
economic and social policy.
The lack of any enforced regulatory law about consultations in activities 
other than resource extractive ones, e.g. construction of dams and other 
infrastructural projects, is alarming and will likely provoke new conflicts in 
the future. Bolivia still does not have any general law regulating indigenous 
consultations. The existing proposal for a Prior Consultation Law was ready 
in 2014, but it never entered into parliament debate and is awaiting a ‘better 
future’ (Erbol 2015a). The proposed law very carefully and evasively establishes 
that the aim of consultations is to obtain consent, but its general overtone 
reveals a very superficial and manipulative understanding of consent, in no 
way anticipating the actual withholding of consent by affected population. The 
proposed law mentions the consent only as a ‘consensus achieved in the process 
of intercultural dialogue’ between the state and indigenous peoples, and limits 
its scope to the incorporation of the population’s view of development into 
the implementation of administrative decisions. Moreover, the project literally 
‘guarantees the execution and continuation of extractive activities’ given 
their ‘strategic character and public interest for the national development’ 
(Ministerio de gobierno, Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2014).
It is surprising that given that mining has been so important for the Bolivian 
economy throughout its history and has had such a huge impact for all the 
highland parts of Bolivia, the regulations for consultation in mining were only 
implemented in 2014. The new Mining Law explicitly denies indigenous rights 
to dissent to mineral activities and allows only for negotiations about mitigation 
of impacts and compensation (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2014). The 
previous lack of regulations provoked several claims for damages on the part 
of indigenous communities, one of the most famous being the Coro Coro 
case around the mine which devastated pastoral lands and sources of water for 
the local community; its operation had been never subject to consultation nor 
environmental study (Madrid Lara et al., 2012).
In many cases, indigenous peoples affected by extractive activities complain 
about the lack of any consultation. One of the biggest problem regarding the 
right to consultation in Bolivia is related to the issue of collective land titling 
and legal recognition of indigenous territories. The state does not apply the 
consultation mechanism in affected areas where the indigenous population lacks 
legal territorial recognition. This is especially worrying among the Guaranís, 
one of the groups most affected by hydrocarbon exploitation. Despite the fact 
that legal frameworks regulating indigenous territorial recognition has existed 
in Bolivia since 1996, the entitlement processes are extremely slow and there 
are many cases when the processes cannot be concluded for decades, depriving 
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the local population of their rights (Anthias, 2012). The latest case occurred 
in the Takovo Mora territory, invaded by a gas exploitation project without 
consulting local Guaraní people. Tired by endless administrative struggle (the 
Guaranís confirm that they were asking for entitlement for 19 years), in 2015 
the indigenous peoples organised a road blockade to demand compliance with 
their rights. The protest was brutally repressed by the police (Erbol, 2015b; 
Heredia, 2015). The condition of legal entitlement of territory for the execution 
of consultation rights is considered a severe violation of human rights in light 
of existing interpretations of indigenous peoples’ rights by the Inter American 
HR system. For the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ‘the property 
rights of indigenous peoples are not defined exclusively by entitlements within 
a state’s formal legal regime, but also include that indigenous communal 
property that arises from and is grounded in indigenous custom and tradition’ 
(IACHR, 2004).
The centrality of the resource extraction in the national economy cannot 
be underestimated. In the last few years the gas and oil industry, together with 
traditional mining, has been generating 70 per cent of all export value.4 The 
overall area designated for gas and oil exploitation has grown eightfold since 
2007 and in 2012 it was about 24 million hectares, about 22.5 per cent of 
the whole country. This included 64 indigenous territories affected by subsoil 
resources extractivism (37 in the lowlands and 27 in the highlands) (Jiménez, 
2012, pp. 7, 15 and 17). In 2010 the President issued Supreme Decree 
0676 conceding vast territories in protected natural areas for hydrocarbon 
exploitation (Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia, 2010a). This move was repeated in 
2015 with Supreme Decree 2366 opening up extensive protected areas for 
extractivism (Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia, 2015a).
Recently Bolivia, similarly to Ecuador and Venezuela, suffered a severe 
decline of state revenues from fossil fuels, caused by the global price fall. 
However, the government’s response, instead of seeking alternatives to resource 
exportation, is to further intensify resource exploitation and create a new set of 
incentives for foreign investment to help recover prosperity (Honty, 2016). Not 
only were vast protected areas opened for extractivism, but indigenous rights 
were also modified. With the supreme decree 2298 issued in 2015, the state 
shortened the period of the consultation processes in fossil fuel exploitation and 
introduced modification that gives the state the ultimate decision about any 
project that could not be consulted on due to the fault of interested population 
(this simply means, for example, in case of lack of agreement) (Gaceta Oficial 
de Bolivia, 2015b).
The most infamous case of indigenous rights violation and subsequent 
conflict of international fame had to do with the government’s imposition of 
4 Elaboration by the author on the base of Instituto Nacional de Estadística, www.ine.gob.bo.
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the decision to build a highway through the middle of Territorio Indígena 
Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS), a national park and indigenous 
territory with the richest biodiversity in the country. Concern about extensive 
deforestation, biodegradation and massive land invasions by colonos and cocaleros 
into their territory as a result of the proposed highway, the inhabitants opposing 
the project organised a march to the country’s capital in 2011, claiming respect 
for their territory, the right to self-determination and autonomous decision-
making regarding their vision of development. Specifically, they demanded 
compliance with the right to consultation, the suspension of construction 
works and prohibition of the highway project in the park. The protest was 
brutally broken down by the police in the locality of Chaparina, with more 
than 70 people injured and many protesters arrested.
However, with the opposition continued and under growing pressure from 
indigenous movements and national and international public opinion and 
activists, in October the government promulgated the 180 Law of TIPNIS 
protection. The law declared TIPNIS an intangible zone and prohibited any 
highways from passing through the park and any unauthorised settlements 
and land occupations by people from outside. This did not last for long 
as the government did not abandon the plan and in August 2017 the law 
was abrogated. The new 266 Law of TIPNIS Protection and Integral and 
Sustainable Development was issued and did not maintain the previous 
protectionist measures, leaving the park open for the reactivation of the 
highway project and all the related concerns. 
Development, state and discursive appropriation of the 
indigenous agenda
Rivera provides an interesting observation that can be useful to reflect on the 
current indigenous-state relations in Bolivia:
In Bolivia, we can observe a sort of dissimulation of the elites that seem to 
respond to a great extent to the challenge of the indigenous insurgency, but 
who after some time finish in expropriating and deforming its demands, 
up to converting them into a tool of a new state engineering. In the 1990s 
the official multiculturalism ... re-created an image of the indigenous as a 
rhetorical ornament of power, which served to legitimate [the] monopoly 
[of official power] (2008, p. 203).
For Rivera, through the multicultural reforms of the 1990s, the Bolivian 
neoliberal state exercised ‘symbolic violence, naming and classifying the 
indigenous in order to subjugate and diminish them: to convert them into mere 
ornaments of the new schemes of the state’s domination’ (2008, p. 210). This 
fragment can be easily applied to describe the hegemony of power in today’s 
Bolivia with Morales at the top. The hegemonic discourses are not reserved 
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only to neoliberal regimes, and Rivera acknowledges it very clearly: ‘I am going 
to say it very strongly, the right is Evo now’. She called the decolonisation 
process in Bolivia just a mere show (Erbol, 2014).
The ornamental character of the pro-indigenous and pro-environmental 
official agenda of the Plurinational State of Bolivia is very clear in the example 
of the constitutional recognition of the concept of Vivir bien5 inspired by 
Andean cosmovision, and its incorporation as an official state paradigm of 
alternative understanding of development, as well as economic and social 
relations to be followed and promoted in the country (Estado Plurinacional de 
Bolivia, 2009). At the United Nations forum Evo Morales criticised Western 
notions of development and capitalism as ‘the worst enemy of humanity’. 
He was lobbying the UN to change Earth Day to Mother Earth Day, and at 
the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in 2009 he said: ‘We 
have two paths: either Pachamama or death. Either capitalism lives or Mother 
Earth lives … Long live the rights of Mother Earth! Death to capitalism!’. In 
2009, the UN General Assembly declared Evo a ‘World Hero of Mother Earth’ 
(Postero, 2013).
Following this course, in 2010 the Bolivian government issued the Mother 
Earth Law. The document recognises Nature as ‘dynamic living system 
conformed by an indivisible community of all systems of life and living 
beings, interrelated, interdependent and complementary’, and Mother Earth 
is considered sacred (art. 3.). Going further, the law gives Mother Earth rights 
to be protected, to maintain diversity of life, for preservation, equilibrium, 
renovation, to live free from pollution (Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia, 2010b). The 
former foreign minister David Choquehuanca even declared that the human 
beings are secondary to the interests of the environment: ‘everything serves the 
life. The human being is in the second place, first there are ants, butterflies, 
water, rivers, stones, trees, mountains, the moon, plants, animals. We are after 
them’ (Choquehuanca, 2012).
Analysing the current situation of indigenous literature in Bolivia, Ayllón 
underlines an interesting contradiction. When indigenous discourse became 
inherent part of state narratives and symbolic machinery, paradoxically 
indigenous literature in Bolivia became less manifest and seemingly almost 
non-existent. Ayllón explains this by the state monopoly about indigeneity 
that does not leave much margin for expressing alternative understandings 
of indigenous identity (Ayllón, 2016, p. 9). This is exactly the case of state-
appropriated indigenous discourse and identities in the field of political rights 
and development debate. The vice-president and the prominent intellectual 
leader of the new state ideology, Álvaro García Linera, explains that thanks to 
the recent process of indigenous movements’ activism and the incorporation of 
5 For discussion of Vivir bien or Buen vivir, see the first chapter in this volume.
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indigenous identities into the new concept of society and the new model of state, 
a new nation is being constructed in Bolivia built on plural ethnic identities, 
but merged into a broad political nation, indianised by newly incorporated 
citizens and their traditions, values and practices. This new indianised Bolivian 
nation is inclusive and universal, and its indigenous character is now shared 
by the whole society (generalised indigenous culture as the national culture) 
(García Linera, 2015, pp. 360–8).
The crucial outcome of this concept is that if the new nation is an indigenous 
nation and the plurinational state is an incarnation of such a new nation, the 
state has the power to define not only national interests and priorities, but also 
the meaning of indigeneity and the scope of indigenous rights. The interest 
of the majority can be presented as the interest of the indigenous peoples.6 It 
is very dangerous, since inclusive indigenous culture associated with majority 
groups of society has the potential to exclude marginal indigenous groups 
(Canessa, 2012). It can be found in official state propaganda. During my last 
research trip to Bolivia in 2016, I saw a poster presenting Evo Morales together 
with the 18th-century Aymara anti-colonial hero Tupac Katari and the slogan: 
‘We have got back the resources. Now we have homeland. It is going well for 
us!’. The state controls and exploits natural resources in the name of the whole 
indigenous nation. The imposition of the development model and violation of 
the rights of peoples impacted by extractivism is silenced. 
From the position of power and being associated with indigenous culture, 
the Bolivian state defines indigeneity and indigenous rights, being able to 
decide what should and can be accepted. The fate of the Vivir bien paradigm 
is very illustrative in this regard. It became reduced, manipulated and 
domesticated, due to the more recent position of the Bolivian state and its 
officials questioning the original content of the proposal and reorganising it 
accordingly to the classic concept of Western modernity (López Flores, 2014, 
p. 38). When the state decided to extend extractive projects into the natural 
protected areas, the vice-president said: ‘It is good we have parks, we need 
to have many parks, we are the government that profoundly respects Mother 
Earth. But it does not mean that we are going to keep living like 400 or 300 
years ago and leaving this wealth [natural resources] for others to come and 
exploit it in the future, not Bolivians’ (El Día, 2013).
This radical shift in discourse about environment and Mother Earth is 
becoming more evident in the official messages of the state authorities. While at 
the beginning of the Plurinational State project the government promoted the 
paradigm shift and special relations with the environment based on indigenous 
principles of complementarity, recently this connection has become much 
looser and more indirect. An excellent example can be found in the discourse 
6 For more about a universalising, inclusive understanding of indigeneity, see Canessa, 2012.
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presented by the vice-president in the context of the controversies and conflict 
which arose around the project of the construction of a hydroelectric dam 
in Bala and Chepete (for many criticised as irrational and extremely harmful 
for environment and local indigenous peoples). ‘The Mother Earth is also 
for modification … perhaps our ancestors did not construct terraces? They 
modified the Mother Earth to produce more. The Mother Earth is to modify 
her … to change and generate production in favour of the people … They want 
to forbid us to build dams and they tell us that we cannot build roads because 
of some tree. With this road or dam, we will have more trees’ (Chuquimia, 
2016). Moreover, García Linera called on the Ponchos rojos (pro-government 
Aymara militia from Achacachi) to defend the government against the rightist 
enemies of national development (Chuquimia, 2016).
On numerous occasions, Evo Morales repeated that indigenous peoples are 
the moral reserve for the whole of humanity, because of their better principles 
and values. It had become a typical discursive repertoire for many indigenous 
movements, depicting indigenous cultures as almost mythical examples of 
solidarity and brotherhood, dialogue, harmony and equilibrium, in opposition 
to the destructive and corrupt Western civilisation of injustice and poverty, 
plunder, deception and exclusion.7 It was continued by Morales after his 
presidency, when he suggested a direct relationship between the ideology and 
policy of the new Bolivian state and traditional positive indigenous values. In 
2014, during the First World Conference on Indigenous Peoples held in New 
York, Morales reiterated that ‘we learned to live in harmony and equilibrium 
with Mother Earth and we are the moral reserve of the humanity’ (AVN, 
2014). However, as early in 2015 Morales commented: ‘because of the fault of 
some indigenous brothers, who knows, the indigenous movement is no moral 
reserve any more, but because of some … who take money for compensation 
[for resource extraction], they deposit it in foreign banks and this money never 
comes back to their communities’. Symbolically, this message was given to 
the public at the International Gas and Oil Congress held in Bolivia (Erbol, 
2015c).
If the indigenous state is the emanation of all the Bolivian indigenous 
peoples whose interests it stands for, everyone who opposes the interests of the 
majority can be perceived as traitor. The interest of the majority is presented as 
an interest of all the indigenous peoples and state policy is presented as realised 
in the name of all the indigenous groups. If some sectors oppose it and criticise, 
it is suggested to be due to foreign interference and manipulation by some 
NGOs, literally that they are paid off by the NGOs or other foreign forces. 
These indigenous groups are described as rightist and traitors. Once Morales 
said: ‘Since the Right can’t find arguments for opposing the process of change, 
7 See Bolivian examples in Powęska, 2013, pp. 159–161, 205–8.
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it’s using rural, indigenous or original people leaders who have been paid off 
in special favours by NGOs’ (quoted in Zibechi, 2010). On another occasion, 
in an effort to discredit the indigenous protest organised by the CONAMAQ 
movement, Morales said: ‘I know all their leaders. Some of them have left their 
posts and later I have found them in the U.S. Embassy’ (La Razón, 2010). Such 
accusations suggest also that the protesting indigenous peoples are not able to 
think and decide on their own and are only puppets in foreign hands. This is 
just one example of the typical discourse used against indigenous peoples by 
contested forces, depicting the former as only manipulated and deceived. The 
same schema was employed against the 1990 March for Territory and Dignity 
of the lowland indigenous peoples (Molina Argandoña, 2011, pp. 123, 130).
Moreover, if the state’s development policy is the realisation of indigenous 
interests and desires for a better life, those who oppose it can be even classified 
as racist. In August 2017, when in the middle of protests against the TIPNIS 
new law, Evo Morales was receiving an award from the Latin American Social 
Science Council (CLACSO), the vice-president García-Linera commented 
that the protests were racist and were being organised by some rightist and 
NGOs gangs. For him, the opposition to the reactivation of the highway 
project in TIPNIS, as well as the critiques of awarding Morales, are racist, 
because the president was awarded for the recognition of indigenous peoples 
rights previously ignored in the country and Evo was honoured on behalf of 
the indigenous and peasant peoples (eju.tv, 2017). 
The Bolivian government suggests an opposition between the protesting 
indigenous groups and the interests of society through underlining the 
importance of the national development policy and social programmes financed 
by the resources revenues. When numerous indigenous protests and critics of 
development policy arose in Bolivia few years ago, Morales said: ‘They are saying 
... that the Bolivian people ought not have money, that there should be neither 
IDH [a direct tax on hydrocarbons used to fund government investments] nor 
royalties, and also that there should be no Juancito Pinto, Renta Dignidad nor 
Juana Azurduy [social programmes]’ (quoted in Bebbington, 2009, p. 16). This 
way Morales antagonises different indigenous groups, pointing to the minority 
indigenous sectors as obstacle producers and trouble makers. As Canessa 
points out, for the Bolivian authorities the state ‘represents and articulates the 
“collective interest of all the people”, but this state has legitimacy because of its 
indigenous credentials’. It is ‘a state based on indigenous legitimacy but which, 
paradoxically, subordinates indigenous interests’ (Canessa, 2012, p. 22) We 
can say that the state has indigenous credentials and uses them against another, 
‘bad’ indigenous groups.
Hale argues that the neoliberal state was recognising indigenous rights and 
organisations, as long as they did not question ‘basic state prerogatives’ and its 
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economic model. Through the instrumental treatment of ethnic issues the state 
domesticated indigenous actors, creating an indio permitido, an ‘authorised 
Indian’ who adapts the state’s logic and perpetuates its domination. The indio 
permitido is associated with development projects, while the ‘protesting Indian’, 
opposing to ideological dogma, remains excluded (Hale, 2004, pp. 17–19). 
The same can be said about current relations between the Bolivian state and 
indigenous peoples in the context of contemporary state-led extractivism. It 
is certain that the Bolivian government treats the different indigenous groups 
differently. The ones whose interests and development expectations coincide 
with the state’s priorities are manifestly privileged, while groups with another 
perspective and who oppose governmental development policy experience 
many problems, as discussed in the next section.
Interethnic conflicts, the TIPNIS case and the fall of ‘the 
indigenous movement’ in Bolivia
When we discuss the rights of indigenous peoples, it is often overlooked 
that indigenous peoples are not a homogenous, unified, monoblock. On the 
contrary, they are highly diverse and often conflicted groups. This is the case 
for indigenous peoples in Bolivia and it is well reflected in the indigenous 
approach to the question of their political and developmental rights.
If previously many indigenous organisations were united against neoliberal 
policies, after Morales’ ascent to power the indigenous coalition fell down and 
several interethnic conflicts erupted. If we need a metaphor, we could say that the 
conflicts were voiced while the cake was being cut at the victory celebrations. In 
the aftermath of the new Bolivian constitution new laws were introduced and 
struggles began over specific gains by different indigenous groups following the 
launch of the general decolonisation project, as well as after the implementation 
of concrete reforms. The difference of interests between apparently united 
indigenous groups generated different interpretations of what decolonisation 
exactly entailed, what the right to territory meant, how indigenous autonomies 
should be organised, to whom resources belonged, and so on.
In Bolivia, there are some indigenous groups that are more traditional and 
have stronger ties to their ancestral territories than other groups. However, 
all of them compete over lands and resources. Some of them are the 
majority, other marginal minorities. Some are consequently opposed to the 
governmental plans of centrally controlled economic development, and some 
of them are undisputable allies of the government and seeking to co-opt the 
state. Generally, the more market-oriented peasants, colonisers and cocaleros, 
mainly from Aymara and Quechua majorities, have a different approach to 
the question of territorial control, political autonomy and resources than, 
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for example, their minority counterparts in the lowlands and Amazon. It is 
important to underline that all these groups are perceived equally native and 
in light of the new constitution they are treated the same. The constitutional 
concept of ‘pueblos y naciones indígena originario campesinos’ recognises 
historically determined differences in self-definitions applied by different 
peoples, but does not differentiate them as rights holders. As is shown in this 
section, this has serious consequences for social-environmental conflicts and 
natural resource and/or territory disputes. Rival groups can evoke the same 
indigenous rights, vying over who has a more legitimate claim. Sometimes 
opposing groups with different interests draw on different aspects or elements 
of the same indigenous rights framework.
In September 2009 a conflict erupted between, on the one side, Moxo, 
Yuracaré and Chimane indigenous peoples, and, on the other, the cocaleros and 
colonisers who invaded their territory in the previously mentioned TIPNIS 
national park and indigenous territory (El Deber, 26 September 2009). Other 
similar conflicts over territory have been seen between campesinos and Leco 
indigenous people in La Paz, or between campesinos and Guarayo people in the 
Eastern lowlands (Los Tiempos, 2010). The executive secretary of the CSUTCB 
confederation of indigenous peasants, Roberto Coraite, criticised the transfer 
of territorial rights to the lowland indigenous peoples: ‘in determined territory 
there is no sole sector living that can dispose of the resources ... in the 
Constitution it says we have the same rights, we should be treated in an equal 
way and with equality of conditions and opportunities’ (Erbol, 2010). The 
former executive of the CSUTCB, Isaac Ávalos, also commented on lowland 
indigenous territorial claims in a similar manner: ‘The indigenous want land 
to be redistributed only among them. And what will be left for us?’ (La Razón, 
5 July 2010). Leonida Zurita, a cocalera leader and MAS militant expressed it 
this way: ‘It cannot be that the fiscal lands are kept only by the indigenous, the 
land should be distributed equally for everyone … we also have right to land 
equally to them’ (Lora Fuentes, 2011).
The same way of thinking can be found in the words of Evo Morales, who 
once said: ‘How it is possible that all the national parks or fiscal lands go to 
hands of some indigenous brothers; that some wood concessions go to the 
small groups of indigenous movement? I believe this is a form of opposing 
the policy we are developing’ (eju.tv, 2010). The conflicts over territory 
and resources led the CSUTCB to prepare a new law called Ley de Tierras 
(Lands Law). According to the CSUTCB activists, the law was conceived as a 
mechanism to regulate the redistribution of land and guarantee equal access to 
land resources to all sectors, not only the lowland indigenous. The general aim 
was thus the ‘democratisation of the land access’. From the point of view of 
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the CSUTCB, TCOs8 have to be revised, since they have converted into ‘new 
latifundias’. The movement’s leaders maintain that ‘the current agrarian policy 
privileged only the [lowland] indigenous peoples’ (Erbol, 2011). The project 
proposes to take a census of indigenous peoples, to quantify their real territorial 
necessities, and to redistribute equally the excessive lands of the TCOs. The 
actual owners of the TCOs would have to demonstrate that they administer 
land and resources properly, and if not, the land would be expropriated. In 
order to balance the rights of indigenous and campesinos, the project proposed 
the creation of Tierras Comunitarias Campesinas (Communitarian Peasant 
Lands, TCC) that would dispute with the TCOs over territories. What is also 
important here is that TCCs could be established also by the rural populations 
who migrated into new territories and not only by populations with historical 
and cultural rights to occupied land, as in the case of TCOs (CSUTCB, 2011). 
The campesinos’ willingness to monitor lowlanders’ way of using their territories 
harks back to old discourses about savages that do not know how to work 
properly, reproducing colonial stereotypes (Weber, 2016, p. 144).
Regarding the consultation rights, in 2010 the executive secretary of the 
CSUTCB Roberto Coraite said publicly that the idea of consultation of 
indigenous peoples about the exploitation of resources and other governmental 
projects should not be incorporated for the unilateral benefit of some indigenous 
groups, but should be subject to a national referendum in order to not harm 
the development interests of the majority (Erbol, 2010). Interestingly, such an 
approach, which privileges the majority, is widely accepted and fully promoted 
by President Morales. Arguing against the consultation in TIPNIS, he said: 
‘The constitution and international law mandate previous consultation, and 
we always respect that, but letting a group of families tell us what to do would 
mean paralysing all our work on electrification, hydrocarbons and industries’ 
(quoted in Canessa, 2012, p. 27).
In the infamous TIPNIS conflict over highway construction there are also 
other motives for the rejection of the state’s project, which was suspected to 
be promoting the further expansion of resource exploitation and facilitating 
new waves of migration of the colonisers and cocaleros to lowland indigenous 
territory. From the point of view of state authorities, they all held the same 
rights as indigenous groups, so why should the interests of the majority be 
subsumed to the interests of the small minority? Moreover, the TIPNIS case 
repeated the very common pattern seen in the Aymara and Quechua colonisers 
in treating lowlanders as inferior, uncivilised and predestined to be subjugated, 
echoing colonial discourses and power relations (Canessa, 2012, pp. 24–8).
8 Tierras Comunitarias de Origen – indigenous collective lands transferred to communities 
on the basis of their historical and cultural rights to occupied territories, recently renamed as 
Territorios Indígena Originario Campesinos (TIOC).
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The TIPNIS case is Bolivia’s most emblematic example of discursive struggles 
embedded in asymmetrical power relations. As it was shown, the Nature, 
ecologist discourse, and also indigeneity and indigenous understanding of 
development, are the field of powerful political meanings disputed by different 
forces and actors, among them the state. If previously the indigenous peoples 
in TIPNIS in their majority stood united against the highway project, during 
the six years after the promulgation of Law 180 of TIPNIS protection, in 
great part as a result of constant governmental pressure, the communities have 
divided, taking opposite positions in the conflict. The project for the new 
266 Law was formally presented as prepared by the communities in favour of 
the infrastructural plans. They claimed the annulation of intangible status of 
TIPNIS with the arguments (incorporated officially in the law) derived from 
the indigenous peoples rights framework as established in the international 
legal acts, such as the rights of indigenous peoples for the universal and equal 
access to development, basic services and free movement, access to education, 
health services, eradication of poverty. However, this claim was backed by the 
principles of the self-determination and indigenous autonomous deciding of 
development priorities accordingly to cultural criteria and the principles of 
harmonious coexistence with Mother Earth (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 
2017).
The other side of conflict, the communities worrying about their survival 
due to the negative environmental and development effects of the highway, 
also employ the indigenous rights framework and even similar arguments of 
self-determination and autonomous deciding of their vision and priorities of 
development. Notwithstanding, they emphasise another aspect or angle of 
indigenous rights, underlining rights for protection of indigenous territories, 
their traditional ways of life, their environment and natural resources. Thus, the 
conflict shows not only the difference in interests, but also the competition of 
different though equally important and valid or rightful aspects of indigenous 
rights.
The problem is that the state has never played a neutral role in this 
conflict and has always privileged a particular discourse of indigenous rights 
and particular indigenous groups’ interests, those compatible with its own 
development plans. In this context, the TIPNIS case is an excellent example 
of the ecologist discourse trap. Yet in 2011 when the protesting communities 
in TIPNIS demanded the protection of territory from highway construction 
and settlements by outsiders, they did not understand the ‘intangible status’ 
of the zone as a strict prohibition of any development and commercial 
activities. Since the 1990s when their territorial rights were officially recognised 
and TIPNIS got the double status of national park (declared in 1965) and 
indigenous territory, the inhabitants could use all the renewable resources 
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according to their traditional cultural practices and norms (except in the core 
area, preserved exclusively for biodiversity conservation). The indigenous 
communities were co-managing the natural resources with park authorities, 
under the system of conservation norms, plans of resource management and 
studies of sustainability of biodiversity, all discussed and approved in dialogue 
between inhabitants and authorities, drawing on the environmental knowledge 
of locals. In that model, the communities were permitted to undertake activities 
such as authorised logging, caiman hunting for skin export or commercial 
cocoa and fruit cultivation, all under limits and monitoring. But by declaring 
TIPNIS as an ‘intangible zone’ in 2011, the government purposely took the 
radical interpretation and banned all those economic activities crucial for 
communities’ existence. The intangibility of TIPNIS was used by the state as 
a tool for political pressure. With no opportunities for earning money (it was 
even hard to get fuel for motorboats to transport cocoa or fruit to markets), 
lacking education and health services, many indigenous people abandoned 
their communities and migrated to cities, others slowly withdrawing their 
dissent for the highway. In a few years, under the political and economic 
pressure put by the state on the indigenous peoples, their majority broke down.
With the ongoing conflicts between different indigenous groups and their 
disputes over not only land or resources, but also over the very meaning and 
scope of indigenous rights, and with the state not hesitating to take sides in 
interethnic conflicts according to its own development priorities, it is hard 
to maintain the vision of some unitary ‘indigenous movement’ in Bolivia. 
For Mayorga, the indigenous movement has been deconstructed, since ‘the 
components of this social movement are groups whose collective rights are 
defined territorially; the exercise of these rights requires the establishment of 
agreements between every particular indigenous group with the state, it means 
in specific, particular and separate way’ (Mayorga, 2014, p. 41). He points out 
that paradoxically, the implementation of the principles of the Plurinational 
State seems to lead to the dismantling of ‘the indigenous movement’, whose 
demands had initiated the construction of a new state model (Mayorga, 2014, 
p. 42). This paradoxical outcome is the result of the above-described conflicts 
of interests between different indigenous groups that shape their understanding 
of rights, in accordance with their political strategic needs. But importantly, the 
dismantling of the previously united indigenous movement probably would 
not have happened without the state playing an active role in rights disputes, 
motivated by its interests in imposing one version of the development model 
and the expansion of extractivism.
Moreover, given the situation of unequal power relations and the different 
views of various indigenous groups towards the state’s power, despite the 
existence of the state’s official discourse of indigeneity and the vision of a new 
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unified indianised Bolivian nation, the state still privileges more influential 
groups at the cost of those more vulnerable. As Canessa points out:
we need to explore more systematically the kinds of relationships 
indigenous discourses demand of the state. The Bolivian case points to 
a number of interesting tensions and contradictions which occur when 
indigeneity shifts from being language of opposition to the language 
of governance; from when it moves from articulating the discourses 
of vulnerable minorities to those of national majorities. Discourses of 
indigeneity have as much potential to create hierarchy as to dismantle 
it and the empowerment of some indigenous people may entail the 
disempowerment of others (Canessa, 2012, p. 32).
For this reason, Canessa proposes the ‘conceptual distinction between inclusive 
national indigeneity for the majority, which seeks to co-opt the state, and a 
concept of indigeneity for a minority, which needs protection from the state’ 
(Canessa, 2012, p. 5). This would translate into a division between autochthony 
and indigeneity, as proposed by Geschiere (2009), and would require the 
creation of a new system of rights. If the protection of vulnerable minority 
groups is to be returned to the state, which remains the most important element 
for ensuring compliance with the new rights, this creates a conflict of interests.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown that the Bolivian case proves that the official pro-
indigenous stance does not guarantee indigenous protection from extractivism. 
On the contrary, indigeneity can legitimise the state’s policy. When the state 
claims ownership of the indigenous agenda and its symbolic instruments, 
their original emancipatory potential is removed. The state-managed official 
indigenous discourse masks the existing contradictions and conflicts in the field 
of indigenous rights and the dilemmas of development. The visible discrepancies 
between pro-indigenous rhetoric and the acceleration of extractivism causes 
the Bolivian state to adjust its official discourses in order to legitimise current 
policy and present it as fully coherent with the idealistic principles derived 
from indigenous cosmovisions. This occurs though (or rather because) the 
government is rhetorically pro-indigenous and itself has its roots in organic 
indigenous movements, maintaining its strategic alliance with some of them. 
The Bolivian government presents itself as legitimate incarnation of indigenous 
power and an advocate of indigenous peoples’ interests. However, the state 
appropriates the indigenous agenda as part of state ideology and discursively 
transforms it to fit into its own development and economic priorities. The 
indigenous rights and indigenous agenda are therefore being deformed, 
manipulated and domesticated by the ‘indigenous state’, hindering the ability 
of peoples affected by extractivism to defend their rights.
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The interethnic conflicts also play a pivotal role in weakening indigenous 
challenges to extractivism. There is virtually no unity between previously 
allied groups. Many groups are in favour of expansive development policy. 
The majority of indigenous groups in Bolivia claim they have the right to 
benefit from development projects that were previously controlled by external 
forces. Their version of indigenous rights is about the control of resources by 
the majority, the original Bolivians, rulers of their own territories with equal 
access to higher living standards. This vision does not combine very well with 
the other facet of indigenous rights framework which emphasises the needs of 
minority groups which are affected by the negative effects of development and 
their claim for protection. In an apparently paradoxical way, both sides resort 
to the principle of deciding freely their own vision of development and future, 
but from different power positions and different rights’ angles, strategically 
adopted to back their different interests. The discursive struggles remind us 
that the indigenous peoples’ rights, especially in the environmental and natural 
resource context, are a disputed field of potent political meaning, where 
asymmetrical power relations play a pivotal role and the state remains a crucial 
player. The TIPNIS case is also an example of how the ecological discourse can 
have a double-edged effect on indigenous peoples.
Moreover, even if a legal difference between majority and minority 
indigenous groups’ rights were introduced, the state would remain the last 
and most important element responsible for their incorporation and genuine 
implementation. With the state actively involved in the dominant development 
model, with vital interests in the expansion of extractivism, this seems very 
unlikely.
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3. REDD+ and human rights in Latin America: 
addressing indigenous peoples’ concerns through 
the use of Human Rights Impact Assessments
Malayna Raftopoulos
With greenhouse gas emissions moving beyond the realm of dangerous (Anderson and Bows, 2011), having risen dramatically since pre-industrial times, developing strategies to stabilise atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) has become of global importance. 
Widespread concern about climate-induced ecological collapse has led to a 
‘seismic shift’ in the role of forests in socio-economic development and an 
increased interest in tackling the drivers of deforestation and degradation 
(Sunderlin and Atmadja, 2009, p. 48). The Fourth Assessment Report by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) highlighted the forestry 
sectors contribution to global warming with deforestation, forest degradation, 
forest fires and slash and burn practices making up the majority of carbon 
dioxide emissions. Accounting for around 17 per cent of global greenhouse 
gases, the forestry sector is the second largest source of emissions after the 
energy sector (IPCC, 2007). Furthermore, the publication of the review on 
the economics of climate change by the ex-World Bank economist Sir Nicholas 
Stern stressed the importance of reducing emissions from tropical forests, 
recommending that measures of avoiding deforestation be included in the post-
2012 commitment period under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and emission trading schemes be expanded 
and linked. The report also convinced policy makers that eliminating most 
deforestation would not be expensive compared to other mitigation strategies, 
costing on average US$1–2 per tCO2 (Stern, 2007). 
Despite the US failing to sign the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and to commit 
to significant cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, the insistence of the Clinton 
administration to incorporate carbon trading as a central pillar of international 
climate change policy secured the creation of pollution markets modelled on 
the cap-and-trade system (Kill et al., 2010). Ervine argues that the inclusion 
of carbon trading emerged in part from the North’s desire to minimise the cost 
of complying with the legally binding emissions reduction targets set under 
the Kyoto Protocol and on the premise that the lowering of carbon emissions 
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is much cheaper for some countries than others (Ervine, 2013). Critically, 
Clinton’s incorporation of carbon trading in the Kyoto Protocol created a 
new political and economic identity for carbon dioxide, incorporating it into 
global trade networks and leading to the emergence of a market for the buying 
and selling of greenhouse gases. It also set in motion process of geographical 
differentiation whereby countries in the global South ‘have been integrated 
into the global carbon market primarily as producers and sellers of project-
based carbon credits, called Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), intended 
to aid Northern countries in meeting their mandated reductions’ (Ervine, 
2013, p. 653).
The subsequent emergence of payment for ecosystem (PES) schemes such 
as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation plus 
Conservation and Sustainable Development (REDD+) have been developed to 
promote economic growth alongside the protection of ecosystems by ensuring 
forest conservation is economically more attractive than forest destruction. 
According to Corbera, REDD+ has become the ‘world’s largest experiment 
in Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES)’, designed to create a multi-level 
system that transfers economic resources from carbon offset buyers to sellers 
(2012, p. 612). PES schemes such as REDD+ have become embedded in the 
‘sweeping movement of commodification’ and ‘free market environmentalism’, 
which has ultimately led to the standardisation and quantification of carbon 
(Lohmann, 2010). Under the umbrella of climate change mitigation and green 
economy, REDD+ has ushered in a new era of privatisation of nature never 
seen before which will inevitably be extended to other forms of biodiversity 
and so-called ‘environmental services’. REDD+ has become embroiled in the 
discussion on the conservation of nature as a capitalist project where nature is 
produced and transformed though its conservation (Büscher, 2013). 
Given their widespread reliance on natural resources and ecosystems, 
indigenous peoples and forest-based communities are especially vulnerable to 
policies such as REDD+. As Howell observes, ‘what was originally perceived as 
a straight forward project with technocratic solutions has turned into a highly 
complex “society” project’ (2015, p. 147). Instead of viewing forests as complex 
eco-systems that support wide varieties of life and biological processes, the 
REDD+ framework has redefined the role of forests as carbon sinks. In doing 
so, policy makers have failed to consider and incorporate local ontologies 
and epistemologies into REDD+ initiatives, ignoring the intrinsic link that 
exists between people and their environment and placing forests outside of 
society (Howell, 2015). Concerns regarding the consequences of REDD+ 
initiatives on forest-based and indigenous communities have forced aside this 
‘assumed and unquestioned conceptual division between nature and society’ 
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as environmental and human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
question the impact of REDD+ on local communities (Howell, 2015, p. 147).
While the rights of those local communities affected by REDD+ activities 
have become central to its narrative, there has not, as Howell points out, been 
‘much sign of serious attempts being made within REDD to find out what 
their views actually are’ (2015, p. 154). Furthermore, despite this growing 
recognition that REDD+ will have a significant impact on indigenous people, 
little attention has been given to fully exploring the impact the scheme will 
have on the protection and promotion of their human rights. Therefore, a key 
challenge for the international community will be to ensure that REDD+, in 
addition to delivering emissions reductions as well as the promised co-benefits, 
protects human rights and provides long-term pathways out of poverty for 
forest-based communities. Carrying out human rights impact assessments 
(HRIAs) on REDD+ would have a number of potential benefits. Firstly, in 
addition to increasing the attention focused on those communities connected 
to REDD+ activities, it can help build the political will to compel governments 
and the international community to implement appropriate procedural 
standards, including assessment, monitoring and verification mechanisms, into 
the rhetoric of REDD+. Secondly, it would provide a thorough understanding 
of the human-rights impact of REDD+ activities, the legal duties and safeguards 
placed on national and regional governments with regards to the scheme and 
its potential human rights impacts on future generations. Thirdly, it has the 
potential to act as an early warning system and provide policy makers and 
governments with valuable information, enabling them to take prompt action 
(Raftopoulos, 2016). Fourthly, as Hunter posits, ‘rights-based perspective can 
inform a re-prioritisation of policy responses to climate change away from one 
focused solely on carbon accounting and toward one that considers more fully 
principles of equity, fairness, and the impact on the most vulnerable’ (Hunter, 
2009, pp. 334–5). 
This chapter problematises the common assumption that forest protection 
through REDD+ also protects and promotes the rights of local communities 
and argues that more attention to the human rights dimension is needed in 
the debate. In outlining the case for a series of independent community based 
HRIAs, this article questions the commodification of nature in REDD+ and 
discusses the key areas of concern surrounding the programme. Furthermore, 
in its discussion on why REDD+ necessitates HRIAs, the article explores the 
implications a specific link between human rights and REDD+ would have on 
the promotion and protection of indigenous rights and its potential to change 
the ways in which REDD+ strategies are devised and implemented. In the 
context of the climate change crisis, formulating a specific link between human 
rights and climate change mitigation strategies is highly pertinent if they are 
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to have a positive impact on a local level. Developing appropriate safeguards 
for REDD+ is crucial if indigenous knowledge, law, customs and lands are to 
be protected.1
The REDD+ framework
Incentivising the reduction of emissions from deforestation, forest degradation 
and enhancing forest carbon stocks as well as sustainably managing forests has 
become a key pillar of the international climate change regime. REDD+ has 
proved to be increasingly popular because it is sufficiently broad to accommodate 
different interests and agendas (Brockaus and Angelsen, 2012). In addition to 
being viewed as relatively cost-effective compared to other mitigation strategies 
(Gullison et al., 2007), supporters of REDD+ argue that it has the potential 
to generate co-benefits such as poverty alleviation, biodiversity conservation, 
financial incentives, technical assistance and facilitated technology transfer 
(Pagiola et al., 2005; Venter et al., 2009). 
It was during COP11 in 2005, that the ‘Coalition for Rainforest Nations’ 
via the Papua New Guinea government and the government of Costa Rica 
called upon the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol to take note of present rates 
of deforestation within developing nations, acknowledge the resulting carbon 
emissions, and open up a dialogue to discuss options for reducing emissions 
from deforestation in developing countries. Included as an official negotiation 
item in the Bali Action Plan, the principle of providing financial support 
for addressing reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
was formally introduced onto the international climate agenda in 2007. At 
COP16, parties adopted the Cancun Agreements which agreed the final scope 
of REDD+ and included the adoption of seven non-mandatory safeguards 
for REDD+ activities into Annex 1. However, it was at COP19 in 2013 that 
negotiations on REDD+ were finally concluded. Building on the Cancun 
Agreement on REDD+, the Warsaw Framework included seven decisions on 
the implementation of REDD+. These included national forest monitoring 
systems, REDD+ finance, summary on information on safeguards, forests 
reference emission levels, measuring, reporting and verification forest-related 
emissions (MRV), coordination of support for the implementation of REDD+ 
activities, and the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. Most recently 
at COP21 in 2015, three REDD+ decisions were adopted alongside the Paris 
Outcome relating to safeguards, alternative policy approaches, such as joint 
mitigation and adaptation (JMA) for the integral and sustainable management 
1 This chapter is based on the article: Raftopoulos, M. (2016) ‘REDD+ and human rights: 
addressing the urgent need for a full community-based human rights impact assessment’, 
International Journal of Human Rights, 20 (4): 509–30.
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of forests and non-carbon benefits, marking the end of the negotiations on 
REDD+ methodological issues and guidance (UNFCCC, 2016). 
Recognising the financial value of stored carbon, REDD+ is a broad 
framework that allows tropical countries to be rewarded for their efforts to 
mitigate climate change by reducing net emissions of greenhouse gases through 
enhanced forest management and improved forest carbon stocks. Put simply, 
REDD+ seeks to make trees more valuable standing than felled, by financially 
rewarding governments or forest owners in the South to protect their forests 
through a variety of forest management options. Possible policies include 
governments strengthening law enforcement or changing the law to stop 
large-scale logging and forest conversion activities like establishing protected 
areas or increasing tree plantations (Raftopoulos, 2016). Underlying the 
REDD+ framework is the creation of a strong global partnership based on a 
commitment by developing countries to embark on low-carbon climate resilient 
development and on developed countries providing significant funding as an 
incentive for reduced forest-based carbon emissions (Hall, 2013). Split into 
three phases, REDD+ activities focus on the development of national strategies 
or action plans, policies and measures, and capacity building (phase one); the 
implementation of national policies and measures that could involve further 
capacity building, technology, development and transfer, and results-based 
demonstration activities (phase two) and; results-based actions that should be 
fully measured, reported and verified (phase three) (Parker et al., 2009, p. 97). 
Funding for REDD+ payments can originate from either national funds set up 
by multilateral institutions, major bilateral donor countries or NGOs, or from 
emerging global carbon credit markets (Hall, 2013).
The commodification of nature in REDD+
In recent years REDD+ has faced increasing criticism from forest communities 
and indigenous groups who argue that it has ‘brought an onslaught of global 
and extractive economy measures directly to their doorstep, often resulting 
in ghastly negative environmental consequences for their territories and 
livelihoods’ (Reed, 2011, p. 525). Some critics have even gone as far as to label 
REDD+ as ‘CO2lonialism’ or the ‘REDD menace’, claiming that REDD+ 
benefits the North at the expense of the South (Srivastava, 2011). While 
there is a general consensus that deforestation must be addressed, the climate 
change crisis has provided an opportunity for contemporary capitalism to 
incorporate nature through mainstream neoclassical economics into the global 
economy. Furthermore, world leaders have responded by pushing strategies 
that continue the capitalist tradition of placing profit above the protection 
of nature and turning natural cycles into ‘broken linear processes geared to 
private accumulation’ (Clark and Bellamy Foster, 2010, p. 142). Following 
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the tradition of mainstream economics, current mitigation responses to the 
climate change crisis are centred on the further commodification of nature by 
finding new innovative ways to ‘turn natural resources into natural capital and 
to turn the climate into a market’ (Clark and Bellamy Foster, 2010, p. 153). 
As Moonla remarked, politicians have favoured carbon because it ‘replaces the 
irreducible complexity of global climate dynamics with a digestible concept, 
and by business because it allows the commodification essential to making 
climate tradable’ (2012, p. 1). PES schemes like REDD+ convert forest 
ecosystems into monetary terms and reduce carbon to measurable quantities 
ready to be incorporated into the global economy, reaffirming again ‘the 
reduction of the environment to the status of a commodity and as a mere 
substrate for economic growth’ (Wilkinson, 2014, p. 197). Consequently, 
forest conservation has become a form of what Büscher terms ‘liquid nature’; 
‘nature made fit to circulate in capitalist commodity markets’ (2013, p. 22).
Capitalism’s success as an economic system and mode of production has led 
to the rapid geographical expansion of the capitalist world-ecology and along 
with it, increased opportunities for accumulation by appropriation (Harvey, 
2007). This ‘pairing of plunder and productivity in world accumulation’ has 
resulted in the reorganisation of nature on an increasingly capitalist basis and the 
continual expansion of commodity frontiers (Moore, 2011, p. 30). The endless 
drive for accumulation through constant competition creates a ‘widening gap 
between the accumulation of value and the socio-ecological relations’ (Moore, 
2011, p. 18). Furthermore, it creates a crisis of over-accumulation that requires 
the continual construction of new markets frontiers and commodities as well 
as global expansion in order to overcome exhaustion (Harvey, 2007). The 
ecological crisis and current global discourses such as the neoliberalisation 
of environmental governance and the privatisation of nature have led to the 
reconfiguration of nature. No longer are the earth’s different landscapes and 
species used by humans in such a way that allows for the reproduction of 
nature; instead the division of nature is geared solely towards the accumulation 
of capital, regardless of all other social and natural relationships (Clark and 
Bellamy Foster, 2010). 
The relationship between the economy and nature has moved on from the 
20th-century lexicon of conservation and sustainability to ‘the economy of 
repair’ (Fairhead et al., 2012, p. 242). As a result of the contradiction that 
exists between the global economy and the global environment, nature has 
become more valuable in multiple and new ways. As Fairhead et al. note, ‘it is 
the repair of a damaged nature, and efforts to price the downside of growth, 
that have brought into being and enhanced the value of commodities such 
as carbon, biofuels and offsets of all kinds (whether biodiversity, species or 
climate)’ (2012, p. 242). The incorporation of the ‘economy of repair’ into 
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the rhetoric of sustainability has created a ‘market for different elements of 
valued ecosystems, which in turn creates the opportunity for financialisation, 
creating in turn ‘fictitious conservation’ intimately linked to the circulation 
of capital in new economic systems’ (Fairhead et al., 2012, p. 244). The 
endorsement of the principles behind this new conceptualisation of nature 
by international environmental institutions and negotiations such as the 
UNFCCC has led to the replacement of ontologies of ecology by those of 
natural capital and ecosystem services (Fairhead et al., 2012). Corson and 
MacDonald (2012) argue that these institutions have become critical sites for 
enabling and legitimising new green market opportunities, orchestrating social 
and political relations between state and non-state actors. Furthermore, these 
power structures have minimised the importance of indigenous cosmologies, 
philosophies and worldviews (Goldtooth, 2011). PES schemes such as REDD+ 
are based on the assumption that ‘remuneration will ensure their provision’ 
(Firhead et al., 2012, p. 244) and have created new narratives of landscapes 
whereby ‘forests become marketised “carbon sinks” and not lived-in places, 
with embedded histories and cultures’, and created a new realm for capital 
accumulation (Firhead et al., 2012, p. 251).
As world leaders gathered at COP21 in Paris to negotiate an agreement to 
limit the rise in global temperature to less than two degrees Celsius, a series of 
protests against REDD+ were held by organisations such as Friends of the Earth 
International, the Global Alliance against REDD, Indigenous Environmental 
Network, Grassroots Global Justice and the No REDD+ in Africa Network. 
Indigenous representatives such as Tom Goldtooth and Gloria Ushigua2 openly 
denounced REDD+ as a false solution to climate change, promoted through 
the United Nations climate agreement and pushed by developed nations. 
Goldtooth and Ushigua, among others, have raised concerns that REDD+ will 
lead to the privatisation of air, using forests, agriculture and water in the global 
south as carbon sinks to absorb pollution emitted from industrialised nations. 
Such programmes are resulting in the loss of forest people territories to large 
scale commercial forest operations, the restriction of access and use of natural 
resources by these communities, the lack of equitable benefit-sharing of REDD+ 
activities, exclusion of forest communities from the design and implementation 
of REDD+ policies and the increase in carbon piracy (Espinoza Llanos and 
Feather, 2011; Kelly, 2010; Savaresi, 2013). Furthermore, there are fears that it 
could slow or reverse improvements to forest governance at a national level by 
creating incentives for governments and commercial interests to deny or ignore 
forest dwellers access and control over forest resources (Brown et al., 2008).
2 Tom Goldtooth is the executive director of the Indigenous Environmental Network and 
Gloria Ushigua is the President of the Sapara Women’s Association. 
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With forests overwhelmingly acknowledged as fundamental to global efforts 
to combat climate change and the Paris Accord heavily focused on voluntary 
market-based technological solutions such as forest and conservation offsets, 
indigenous people have reason to be concerned that REDD+ will impact 
negatively on their communities. Hoping to build on the seven non-mandatory 
safeguards for REDD+ activities inserted into Annex 1 in 2010 at COP16,3 
indigenous groups were left increasingly exasperated when indigenous rights 
were removed from the Paris Accord text. Due to concerns from the United 
States, the EU, Australia and other countries that it could create legal liabilities, 
indigenous rights were removed from the main text to the preamble. Despite 
support from the Canadian government to keep the inclusion of indigenous 
rights codified in the operative text as well as highlighting the importance of 
considering indigenous traditional knowledge alongside scientific analysis, 
indigenous rights remain an aspiration and non-binding.
The move towards the ‘universal commodification of nature’ (Corson and 
Macdonald, 2012, p. 266) has been met by fierce opposition from indigenous 
communities. As the indigenous representative Tom Goldtooth pointed out, 
current economic systems ‘objectify, commodify and put a monetary value on 
land, water, forests and air that is antithetical to indigenous understanding’ 
(2011, p. 13). This in turn makes it extremely difficult for indigenous 
communities to ‘reconcile their traditional spiritual beliefs within a climate 
mitigation regime that commodifies the sacredness of air, trees and life’ 
(Goldtooth, 2011, p. 13). Carbon trading and schemes such as REDD+ 
not only turn the sacredness of Mother Earth’s carbon-cycling capacity into 
a commodity but also put at risk the Earth’s capacity to support a climate 
that is conducive to both life and human societies (Goldtooth, 2011). While 
it is clear that climate change will severely impact the enjoyment of human 
rights, it has also become increasingly apparent that this will not be felt equally, 
with the poorest and most politically marginalised communities, in particular 
indigenous communities, affected the most. While these communities are 
important sources of knowledge and understanding on climate change, they 
are also highly vulnerable to impacts, response and adaptation strategies due to 
their subsistence-based lifestyles, reliance upon natural resources as well as the 
configuration of their lands and territories.
Therefore, indigenous opposition to REDD+ extends beyond a critique 
of current economic systems and incorporation of the ‘economy of repair’ 
into the rhetoric of sustainability to one that entails a deep concern for the 
3 The safeguards recommended that REDD+ actions be consistent with objectives of national 
forest programmes and international agreements, have transparent and effective national 
forest governance structures, conserve natural forests and biodiversity, included actions to 
address the risks of reversals and actions to reduce displacement of emissions and respect the 
knowledge, rights and participation of indigenous peoples and local communities.
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epistemological rupture that has taken place between nature and society 
(Acosta, 2015). One key concern of indigenous leaders is the violation of 
their traditional cosmologies, including their spirituality and their sacred 
relationship to Mother Earth, which differs greatly from Western ontology. 
The failure of the REDD+ framework to consider local ontologies and 
epistemologies reflects ‘the forcible and growing dominance in most states of a 
Western, liberal construction of nature’ which has ‘led to the near exclusion of 
indigenous cosmologies and peoples from mainstream law and policy’ (Irons 
Magallanes, 2015, p. 274). For those communities who inhabit the forests 
where REDD+ activities are planned, their spirituality, cultural identity and 
existence cannot be separated from the natural environment. In contrast to 
Western liberal ontology, indigenous cosmologies consider humans to be 
part of nature and reflect humankind’s interdependence with nature (Irons 
Magallones, 2015). In other words, ‘no “nature” exists outside of “society”, 
or vice versa’ (Howell, 2015, p. 162). Mitigation strategies that commodify 
nature such as REDD+ are antithetical to indigenous understanding of nature. 
Indigenous leaders argue that REDD+ does not allow their communities to 
reconcile their traditional spiritual beliefs that allow them to live in and be part 
of the natural world without threatening Mother Earth’s ability and capacity 
to support a climate that is conducive to both life and human societies. Unlike 
Western ontology that now dominates common law and policy, indigenous 
beliefs do not disconnect the spiritual and physical realms from each other. 
Instead they are intertwined, with indigenous spirits and gods inhabiting the 
natural world through its mountains, rivers, landscapes, plants and animals 
(Irons Magallones, 2015). As Irons Magallones notes, ‘the indigenous 
construction of nature effectively reverses the Western hierarchy: humans are 
not seen as having any right or even ability to completely dominate nature and 
are instead seen as its guardians’ (2015, p. 281). These contrasting views on the 
construction of the relationship between human kind and the natural world 
have led to increased tensions between indigenous people and the nation states 
in which they live.
The frustrations of indigenous communities over the dominance of liberal 
ontology and its lack of consideration of the responsibilities of human kind to 
the natural world accumulated in the adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
the Rights of Mother Earth in 2010 in Bolivia. The declaration outlines the 
principles for making a shift away from euromodernity and modern ontology 
towards a more integral model that includes the idea of nature as an object of 
rights. Recognising Mother Earth as a living being with rights to life, to exist 
and to continue her vital cycles and processes free from human disruptions, 
it acknowledges that the Earth and Nature have inherent rights that need 
to be protected rather than exploited and commodified as ‘natural capital’. 
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Within Latin America, indigenous conceptions such as Buen Vivir (“live well”), 
which incorporate strong environmental and intercultural components into its 
relational ontology, have been drawn into the post-development debate and 
have become an integral part of public discourse in countries such as Bolivia 
and Ecuador. As Gudynas notes, ‘Buen Vivir moves away from the prevalence 
of instrumental and manipulative rationality. It rejects the modern stance 
that almost everything should be dominated and controlled, either persons 
or Nature, so as to become a means to our ends’ (Gudynas, 2011, p. 445). 
REDD+, in keeping with western liberal ontology, has a ‘conceptual apparatus 
of domination and exploitation, which subverts the extent to which they will 
be ever able to protect both vulnerable elements of forest ecosystems and 
marginalised communities’ (Wilkinson, 2014, p. 171). Moreover, PES schemes 
assume the most practical and efficient means of preventing deforestation and 
forest degradation is through the incorporation of marginalised communities 
into the market economy and that the social benefits of these schemes can be 
measured in monetary terms (Wilkinson, 2014, p. 184).
In line with this cognitive and epistemic shift that has taken place in 
Latin America and the subsequent adoption of original epistemological and 
ontological narratives, indigenous leaders have been highly critical of REDD+. 
During the International Tribunal for the Rights of Nature held at COP 20 and 
COP21, civil society groups such as the Indigenous Environmental Network 
argued that REDD+ is nature destructive. Furthermore, they laid out how 
REDD+ inherently violates the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother 
Earth in a number of ways. Firstly, with regards to article 1 on Mother Earth, 
REDD+ violates the following clauses:
• Clause 2 – Mother Earth is a unique, indivisible, self-regulating 
community of interrelated beings that sustains, contains and reproduces 
all beings; 
• Clause 3 – Each being is defined by its relationships as an integral part 
of Mother Earth; 
• Clause 4 – The inherent rights of Mother Earth are inalienable in that 
they arise from the same source as existence;
• Clause 6 – Just as human beings have human rights, all other beings also 
have rights which are specific to their species or kind and appropriate 
for their role and function within the communities within which they 
exist.
• Clause 7 – The rights of each being are limited by the rights of other 
beings and any conflict between their rights must be resolved in a way 
that maintains the integrity, balance and health of Mother Earth.
With regards to article 2 of the Declaration on the inherent rights of Mother 
Earth, REDD+ breaches:
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• Clause A – Mother Earth’s right to life and to exist;
• Clause B – Mother Earth’s right to be respected 
• Clause C – Mother Earth’s right to continue its vital cycles and processes 
free from human disruption.
Finally, with regards to article 3 of the Declaration on the obligations of human 
beings, states and all public and private institutions to Mother Earth, REDD+ 
violates:
• Clause E – Establish and apply effective norms and laws for the defence, 
protection and conservation of the rights of Mother Earth;
• Clause F – Respect, protect, conserve and where necessary, restore the 
integrity, of the vital ecological cycles, processes and balances of Mother 
Earth;
• Clause G – Guarantee that the damages caused by human violations of 
the inherent rights recognised in this Declaration are rectified and that 
those responsible are held accountable for restoring the integrity and 
health of Mother Earth.
In making a prima facie case for carrying out an impartial HRIA of REDD+ 
based on substantial empirical data, this chapter argues that many of the 
negative effects of REDD+ activities revolve around four key issues. Each of 
these four issues have a legal basis in human rights and would provide key 
indicator data if a HRIA was carried out. These are: land grabs, land conflicts 
and violation of customary land rights; exploitative carbon contracts and 
corruption; the marginalisation of indigenous peoples and forest dwellers; and 
increased poverty and disruption of traditional forest-based lifestyles. 
Land grabs, land conflicts and violation of customary 
land rights
Human rights concerns associated with REDD+ activities focus on the 
infringement of forest communities’ substantive rights through the appropriation 
of lands and territories through dispossession, forced displacement, or the 
permanent leasing of land by indigenous communities (Lemaitre, 2011). In 
2012, Vía Campesina declared its opposition to REDD+ activities taking place 
in the Lacandón jungle in Chiapas, Mexico, on the grounds that it is leading 
to the appropriation, commodification and control of the natural resources on 
indigenous lands. Ana Valadez, a legal specialist on environmental issues at Via 
Campesina, maintains that the Chiapas government violated inhabitants’ rights 
by signing an agreement with the Californian state government, led by Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, without providing prior information to the populace (REDD 
Monitor, 2012). Moreover, strict rules on forest conservation are also leading 
to large-scale evictions of indigenous and other communities from so-called 
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‘carbon protected areas’ and the permanent loss of their rights over their land 
and resources together with the right to practice their traditional livelihood 
(Lawlor and Huberman, 2009). Ignoring the customary rights of indigenous 
peoples, new land use zoning exercises undertaken by the state to capitalise 
on forest carbon revenues are further marginalising forest-based communities 
and stalling or reversing the recent trends of decentralising forest ownership 
and management responsibilities to communities. In the department of San 
Martin in northern Peru, there are already reports that community land is 
being restricted. Indigenous people are now forced to hunt in allocated 
areas, prohibited from implementing their traditional system of rotational 
agriculture and from entering the forests without the permission of the regional 
government. Furthermore, land titles are only being given to the area around the 
community’s homes (Forest Peoples Programme, 2012). Subnational projects 
are placing increasing pressure on land tenure and resource governments and 
failing to recognise internationally recognised indigenous peoples’ rights. 
REDD+ projects are violating numerous rights laid out in both the ILO 
169 and UNDRIP. For example, Article 14 of the Convention acknowledges 
indigenous peoples’ rights to ownership and possession of land which has been 
traditionally occupied or used for their subsistence and traditional activities. 
Also relevant are Article 13, which stipulates that governments shall respect the 
special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of their relationship with 
their lands and territories, and Article 16, which states that indigenous people 
shall not be removed from the lands which they occupy and where relocation 
is considered necessary as an exceptional measure, it can only take place with 
their free and prior informed consent. The UNDRIP Declaration recognises 
indigenous peoples’ right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual 
relationship with their lands (Article 25), their right to land, territories and 
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or used and the right 
to own, use, develop and control their lands, territories and resources by reason 
of traditional ownership (Article 26). Moreover, REDD+ is jeopardising the 
right to property as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) due to insecure, informal and unclear land tenure rights in many 
developing countries. While REDD+ has the potential to secure land tenure 
rights for many indigenous and forest-based communities, the failure of 
governments to take into account traditional and customary land rights with 
regards to land-use zoning and forest management has meant that it has instead 
become a real threat. 
Exploitative carbon contracts and corruption
The failure of REDD+ to clarify the nature of ‘carbon rights’ in legal terms has 
raised questions regarding who holds the rights to emissions reductions and 
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the associated benefits. The links between stored carbon and the ownership or 
management of land and forests has raised the issue of whether carbon rights 
should be considered as a land interest separate from the land upon which it 
is situated. This questions the established common-law presumption that the 
carbon contained within those trees is a natural part of the land and therefore 
belongs to the landowner (Karsenty et al., 2014). The lack of national guidelines 
has resulted in an explosion of carbon piracy and the emergence of unregulated 
subnational projects in indigenous territories. As project developers rush to 
snap up the legal rights to trade carbon, indigenous communities are being 
convinced to sign away their rights to land and carbon under terms that are 
highly favourable to commercial interests. Indigenous communities are signing 
long-term or indefinite contracts with little or no space for renegotiation of 
terms that grant considerable control and power to the project developers 
over financial and project administration as well as to intellectual property. 
The contract terms undervalue the true opportunity costs of land use foregone 
and offer little or no guarantee for the protection of indigenous and forest-
dwellers rights, including their right to use and access natural resources and 
the principle of FPIC (Espinoza Llanos and Feather, 2011). With incidents 
occurring such as the two recently documented cases of carbon piracy in the 
Loreto region of the Peruvian Amazon, concern over how to reconcile forest 
carbon sequestration with the protection of forest people’s rights is now 
dominating the discussion of REDD+ activities (de Jong et al., 2014). REDD+ 
projects have not only opened up a discussion on the need to clarify new rights, 
in particular, the right to benefit from carbon transactions, but have also placed 
increasing pressure on existing human rights. For example, Article 15 of ILO 
169 recognises indigenous peoples’ rights to the natural resources pertaining to 
their lands, including their right to use, manage and conserve these resources. 
Thus, answering the question of who has ‘the right to the legal or economic 
benefit from carbon emission reductions and removals’ has become of great 
importance to those countries and communities involved in REDD+ projects 
(O’Brien, 2012, p. 20). Countries will need to consider whether to nationalise 
carbon rights or incorporate them into existing land and forest ownership 
rights. Furthermore, a decision will need to be taken on whether third parties 
(logging companies, REDD+ project developers and carbon brokers) can hold 
or own forest carbon rights (O’Brien, 2012, p. 21). However, even if carbon 
rights are clarified, there is still the risk that vulnerable rights holders such as 
indigenous communities will be targeted by private buyers to sell their rights 
without understanding the full implication of the transaction. 
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Marginalisation of indigenous peoples and forest 
dwellers
Opponents of REDD+ such as Friends of the Earth have criticised REDD+ 
for its failure to include and involve forest communities as well as its lack 
of transparency, reporting instances of closed meetings and the issuing of 
invitations so late that the relevant stakeholders were unable to make travel 
arrangements in time (Hall, 2012). Underlying the exclusion of these 
marginalised groups is the ‘interaction between socio-cultural inequalities, 
class and economic disempowerment’ that accompanies the neoliberal order 
and capitalist model of production (Wilkinson, 2014, p. 186). Forest dwellers 
are increasingly being sidelined in negotiations as governments seek to push 
through their national REDD+ strategies. The issue of participation and 
the exclusion of local communities in REDD+ has become a real bone of 
contention for indigenous and human rights organisations. In 2013, indigenous 
peoples’ organisations in Panama withdrew from the UN-REDD National 
Joint Programme (NJP)  due to inadequate attention to rights issues by the 
government and UN agencies and the lack of full and effective consultations 
with indigenous peoples during the various stages and implementation of the 
programme (Forest Peoples Programme, 2013). The inadequate involvement 
of those affected by REDD+ policies and practices in the decision-making 
process is leading to the infringement of indigenous rights. These rights include 
the violation of Article 6 and 7 of ILO 169 which stipulate that governments 
should establish appropriate and effective mechanism for the consultation and 
participation of indigenous and tribal people at all levels of decision-making 
regarding issues that affect and concern them. Also, Articles 18 and 19 of the 
UNDRIP declaration which state that indigenous peoples have the right to 
participate in decision-making whenever the matter at hand affects their rights. 
Furthermore, states shall consult and cooperate with indigenous people through 
their own representative institutions to obtain their FPIC before adopting and 
implementing any legislative or administrative measures that would affect 
them. According to the UN Development Group Guidelines on Indigenous 
Peoples’ Issues, ‘free’ should imply no coercion, intimidation or manipulation 
and ‘prior’ should imply that consent has been sought sufficiently in advance to 
the authorisation or the beginning of activities and that the time requirements 
for indigenous consultation processes to occur have been respected. ‘Informed’ 
should imply that the information provided covers (at a minimum) the 
nature, size, pace reversibility and scope of the proposed project or activity, 
the reason(s) or purpose and duration of the proposed project or activity, the 
areas that would be affected, those who are likely to be involved, the procedures 
the project or activity may entail and ‘a preliminary assessment of the likely 
73REDD+ AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA
economic, social, cultural and environmental impact, including potential 
risks and fair and equitable benefit sharing in a context that respects the 
precautionary principle’ (UNDG, 2008, p. 28). The REDD+ programme has 
highlighted the lack of respect for FPIC across the forestry sector, undermining 
the right of indigenous people to self-determination which is also recognised 
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). As Pham et al. note, ‘there is so far no common understanding on 
how to integrate all parts of FPIC: the elements of free, prior and informed 
consent; the links between processes and outcomes; and the requirement that 
FPIC is employed at certain points in time during a REDD+ activity’ (2015, p. 
2407). Increasing evidence demonstrates the lack of effective actions to ensure 
the participation of indigenous people in the planning and implementation of 
REDD+ projects as well as lack of consent for its implementation during the 
various stages of the REDD+ process. 
Increased poverty and disruption of traditional forest-
based lifestyles
The implementation of REDD+ will involve large areas of forests, often situated 
on indigenous lands and territories. Given that indigenous communities rely 
heavily on the forests for shelter, food and all other aspects of their livelihoods 
they are particularly vulnerable to policies like REDD+. There are concerns 
that the programme could lead to an increase in rural poverty and undermine 
some of the ecosystem services that local people depend on to survive, resulting 
in decreasing local food production and creating food security risks. Decreased 
food production through the large-scale implementation of REDD+ could also 
lead to higher food prices as farmers dedicate their time, labour and land to trees 
instead of farming and may also affect local commodity prices such as the price 
of land and the availability of non-timber products. Without efficient and open 
forest governance and effective systems in place, benefits of REDD+ such as 
the payments of compensation will not reach the communities and will instead 
be captured by national elites or unscrupulous foreign investors, leaving local 
communities without a sustainable income (Lawler and Huberman, 2009; 
Roht-Arriaza, 2010). Furthermore, under REDD+, traditional forms of land use 
practiced by indigenous people such as the collection of fuel wood, controlled 
burning of forests to improve habitat diversity and shifting cultivation (despite 
sustainable rotational agriculture and agroforestry systems being protected 
under international environmental and human rights laws) are now considered 
to be forms of ‘forest degradation’. The REDD+ mechanism fails to distinguish 
between permanent and temporary forest loss and fails to acknowledge that 
many of the traditional practices used by forest-based communities are often 
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carbon neutral. The inclusion of these activities as forms of forest degradation 
will have a severe impact on forest-based communities’ ways of life and their 
livelihoods. In Brazil, a local farmer was arrested at gunpoint and thrown in jail 
for 11 days by Força Verde, the armed guards of Chevron’s REDD+ project in 
Brazil, for cutting down a tree to repair his mother’s leaky roof (Climate and 
Capitalism, 2012). Given the threat that REDD+ poses to those communities 
who live and depend on the forests, there is a real risk that prevented from 
carrying out their traditional productive activities, forest-based communities 
will be forced to migrate to cities (Griffiths, 2009). Current REDD+ practices 
jeopardise a number of provisions set out in the legally binding treaties of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 
ICESCR. These include: the inherent right to life when traditional indigenous 
life styles are shown to be impaired; the prohibition of arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with privacy, family home or correspondence; the right to adequate 
food and housing which includes being able to live directly off the land or 
other natural resources and a degree of security with regards to land tenure to 
ensure against forced eviction; the right of freedom of movement and freedom 
to choose a place of residence; the right to an adequate standard of living and 
the right to participate in a cultural life. There is a likelihood that given the 
top-down nature of REDD+ projects, with most likely to be coordinated at 
the national level, and the financial incentives associated with the programme, 
recognition and clarification of rights will be overlooked or downplayed by 
national governments. Unless rights are assured, REDD+ could seriously harm 
indigenous communities, traditional livelihoods and subsistence methods, as 
well as indigenous knowledge, cultures and spiritual values. 
A need for human rights impact assessment
The last ten years has seen a growth in HRIAs as a policy tool and they have 
been developed by a variety of actors as an extension of, or improvement on, 
Social Impact Assessments (SIAs) and Health Impact Assessments (HIAs). 
HRIAs have become an important tool to measure human rights impacts, 
particularly with regards to the influence of policy and practice. As Harrison 
and Stephenson note, ‘at the heart of an impact assessment is the idea that it 
might have a transformational power to change policies and make peoples’ 
lives better’ (2010, p. 16). Considering the impact of REDD+ in human rights 
terms would allow indigenous people to make a human rights-based argument 
centred on their fundamental critiques and bring to light the human rights 
effects of current climate change policies. If carried out properly, an HRIA 
would help indigenous people demonstrate the cause and effect relationship 
between REDD+ and the promotion and protection of human rights in 
a structured way, allowing them to challenge the current framework of the 
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mitigation scheme and make the argument that marginalised, disadvantaged 
and vulnerable groups should be better protected. Moreover, the participatory 
nature of an HRIA encourages key rights-holders, such as indigenous people, 
to substantively and meaningfully participate in climate change mitigation 
policy debates. One of the key advantages of carrying out an impact assessment 
based on human rights is that the international legal framework of human 
rights has become increasingly embedded within states’ practices and adopted 
into national and international constitutions and agreements. By measuring 
the impact of policies in terms of codified legal human rights standards, HRIAs 
fundamentally ground their analysis and evaluation in human rights norms 
and standards. In order to avoid turning HRIAs into a tick-box exercise, 
which ultimately acts merely as window-dressing or is used to justify a decision 
that has already been taken, and to maximise their potential to address the 
real human rights issues, a detailed evidence-based analysis centred on key 
indicators is needed to ascertain if a particular right has been violated. As 
Harrison and Stephenson suggest, the indicators selected will be content-
specific to the human rights framework employed and used as the basis of 
the analysis. For example, ‘indicators relating to economic, social and cultural 
rights will utilise indicators based on those frameworks (e.g. minimum core 
obligations, progressive realisation, availability, accessibility, acceptability, 
quality)’ (2010, p. 54). Critical to the success of the use of indicators is their 
translation into a language that can be understood and used effectively by non-
legal specialists undertaking the HRIA (2010, p. 54). Moreover, barriers to 
effective participation and consultation, such as language, literacy, lack of time, 
access issues, lack of awareness and lack of faith, all need to be addressed if key 
rights-holders are to be consulted (2010, p. 52).
The human rights framework offers not just an important means of 
analysing REDD+ and its impact on forest-based communities but also 
provides the tools for acting on that analysis. Adopting a rights-based approach 
can potentially ‘provide useful guidance to inform and strengthen international 
and national law and policy making on REDD+’ (Savaresi, 2013, p. 5). Given 
that it is the world’s poorest people and nations that disproportionately bear the 
social costs of these socio-economic disparities, ‘including the toxic social and 
environmental fallouts now manifesting as climate crisis, human rights must 
play a critical role in any response to the climate change crisis’ (Grear, 2014, 
p. 120). Taking a human rights approach to climate change mitigation can 
also help change perceptions that it is solely a scientific problem and improve 
our understanding of its impact on an individual’s human rights and interests 
(Knox, 2014). 
A rights-based analysis is particularly useful as leverage to build 
more effective political coalitions and pressure for action, especially for 
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS76
marginalised groups such as indigenous people who are increasingly looking 
to both international human rights and international environmental law for 
protection. Since the Convention on Biological Diversity came into force 
in 1993 and later UNDRIP in 2007, indigenous and minority groups have 
begun to make to the critical link between the right to self-determination 
and environmental conservation, demanding legal recognition of their role as 
guardians of the earth’s ecosystems and the rights to ecological stewardship. 
Biodiversity conservation is increasingly being linked to securing indigenous 
and forest people’s bio-cultural rights and the protection of their way of life, 
culture and customary manner of decision-making (Knox, 2014). With many 
environmentally destructive development practices taking place on traditional 
lands and severely impacting on native and indigenous communities’ cultures, 
the struggle to conserve the environment is very often intertwined with their 
struggle for protection. Factors like geographical location, natural resource 
dependency, historical marginalisation from decision-making and public 
policies, insecurity of rights to lands, territories and resources, low income, and 
institutions and customary laws that are not respected by dominant governance 
systems, make indigenous people and forest communities highly vulnerable to 
climate change mitigation strategies such as REDD+. As the most universally 
accepted ethics system in the world, a human rights approach helps focus 
attention on these situations as well as increasingly detailed legal obligations 
(Knox, 2014). Moreover, the inclusion of explicit human rights language in 
current and future climate change policy would serve as a ‘bridge’ between the 
climate change regime and international human rights law, prompting states 
to consider their human rights commitments when implementing relevant 
mitigation and adaptation policies (Roht-Arriaza, 2010). 
HRIAs involve the assessment of ‘activities which directly and intentionally 
aim at changing a human rights situation (such as the activities of a human rights 
NGO) or activities which may have unintended human rights consequences 
(such as the activities of a multinational company)’ (Bavikatte and Bennett, 
2015, p. 166). By calling on the participation of all stakeholders involved in 
REDD+, the assessment seeks to identify the rights that are not respected, or 
indications that they might not be respected in the future, so that satisfactory 
solutions can be found whilst assisting forest-based communities to document 
the human rights impacts of REDD+ activities as they are experienced. 
Moreover, HRIAs provide people with an opportunity to contribute to their 
own development and strengthen direct democracy by giving those affected 
a platform to express their concerns regarding policies that affect them. The 
HRIA approach provides a conceptual framework that is normatively based on 
international human rights standards and operationally engaged in promoting 
and protecting human rights. This normative framework is built on the UDHR, 
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the ICCPR, and the ICESCR. In terms of its methodological focus, an HRIA 
is an evidence-based evaluation of international human rights norms which 
according to Harrison can be carried out in eight steps: screening; scoping; 
evidence gathering; consultation; analysis; conclusions and recommendations; 
publication; and lastly monitoring and review. Importantly, HRIAs can occur 
before an activity has taken place (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) (Harrison, 2011).
Stages one and two – screening and scoping – frame the assessment by 
identifying the legal, political and cultural context of REDD+, as well as the 
affected populations, enabling the identification of possible human rights 
impacts and the development of key indicators. Stages three and four focus on 
evidence gathering and consultation. For the study to yield sufficient quality 
data, significant community-based research should take place in countries 
where REDD+ activities are taking place in indigenous or forest peoples’ 
territories. Furthermore, HRIAs should be carried out at a number of different 
sites per country given that the impacts of REDD+ activities will vary among 
the different communities and indigenous territories. It is also important that 
HRIAs are not solely aimed at indigenous communities but instead at forest-
based communities, given that there are many members of forest-dependent 
communities who are not technically considered to be indigenous. Stage five 
involves analysis and assessment of human rights impacts. A key strength 
of utilising a human rights lens as an analytical tool for impact assessment 
is that impacts are evaluated against codified legal standards, international 
norms and governmental obligations. Stage six involves the development of 
clear conclusions and recommendations and where necessary, a series of policy 
alternatives. The aim of carrying out an HRIA on REDD+ is to have an effect 
on actual policy and practice by formulating conclusions and recommendations 
that decision-makers can act upon. Stage seven and eight of a HRIA involves 
publishing the results and monitoring. This is a critical part of the impact 
assessment process as it ensures that those undertaking the assessment can be 
held to account by rights-holders and other interested parties. HRIAs should 
not be a one-off event but rather an ongoing process that documents human 
rights progress over time (Harrison, 2014).
Conducting a HRIA makes a number of potentially important contributions 
to promoting and protecting the human rights of forest-based communities. 
Firstly, the HRIA methodology is particularly useful as it uses a set of norms 
and standards that are based on shared values and, therefore, represent a solid 
normative foundation on which to base an impact assessment (Walker, 2009). 
Since the adoption of the UDHR in 1948, the United Nations has constantly 
reaffirmed the importance of human rights and it has become the most 
universally accepted ethical system in the world due to its ability to continually 
adapt to new circumstances without compromising its principles (Knox, 2014). 
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Recent UN-based developments regarding the human rights of indigenous and 
tribal peoples such as UNDRIP and ILO 169, as well as other international 
human rights instruments such as the ICCPR and the ICESCR, are particularly 
relevant to REDD+. For example, both ILO 169 and UNDRIP provide a 
strong framework for indigenous people to assert their rights regarding activity 
on their customary lands. In particular, the right to exercise control over their 
own economic, social and cultural development by giving their free prior and 
informed consent for any activities on, or their resettlement from, their lands 
and their right legally titled land. While both ILO 169 and UNDRIP impose 
significant obligations on states, ‘it cannot be read as requiring them to obtain 
the consent of indigenous peoples before implementing development projects 
affecting their lands’ (Barelli, 2012, p. 16). Unlike the Rio Declaration and the 
Biodiversity Convention that suggest that development projects which do not 
have the support of the indigenous peoples concerned should not be allowed, 
ILO 169 takes a more pragmatic approach, ‘seeking to empower indigenous 
peoples without, however, going as far as granting them a veto power’ 
(Barelli, 2012, p. 16). Nonetheless, the authoritativeness and legitimacy that 
accompanies these human rights instruments has guaranteed their prominence 
(Barelli, 2012, p. 17). Secondly, given that many human rights norms are 
incorporated into states legal obligations, HRIAs may compel duty-bearers to 
act to protect the rights of rights-holders (Harrison, 2014; De Beco, 2009). 
The legal codification of human rights has led to an increasingly large and 
detailed body of jurisprudence that outlines human rights obligations and also 
allows courts and other institutions to apply these norms to a wide range of 
issues. Significantly, almost every state belongs to at least one human rights 
treaty whilst more than 160 states belong to both the ICCPR and the ICESCR 
(Knox, 2014). Thirdly, HRIAs require a disaggregation of impacts to ensure 
that the effects on vulnerable groups, such as indigenous peoples, are identified. 
Lastly, the human rights approach encourages respect for stakeholder rights to 
information, participation, transparency and accountability as well as a firm 
commitment to the improvement of lives and a desire to influence policy and 
practice (MacNaughton and Hunt, 2009).
Carrying out an evidence-led HRIA on REDD+ would therefore allow for:4 
• A clear scientific examination of human rights-impacting activities 
connected to REDD+;
• An in-depth analysis of the legal duties and safeguards placed on 
national and regional governments with regard to REDD+;
• A thorough and thoughtful human-rights based assessment of the 
balance of public interest with regard to the uncertain economic 
4 Adapted from the methodology utilised by Damien Short et al., ‘Extreme energy, “fracking” 
and human rights’, via correspondence on file with the author.
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benefits of REDD+ and the potential risk of serious and irreversible 
human and environmental damage;
• A thorough analysis of the potential human rights impacts of REDD+ 
on future generations.
The outcomes of the HRIA can potentially make an important contribution 
to the debates surrounding REDD+. The final report and recommendations 
will provide those stakeholders involved with the opportunity to engage in a 
dialogue with various people, agencies and organisations involved in REDD+ 
both during and after the assessment has been completed. HRIA has the 
potential to shape how REDD+ safeguards should be measured, reported and 
verified and help mitigate against the negative impacts of REDD+ on forest-
based communities. Furthermore, it can help increase the attention focused 
on indigenous and forest-based communities who are connected to REDD+ 
activities and build political will to compel governments and the international 
community to implement appropriate procedural standards, including 
assessment, monitoring and verification mechanisms, into the rhetoric of 
REDD+. Importantly, the published results can act as an early warning system 
and provide policy makers and governments with valuable information, 
enabling them to take prompt action. HRIAs could be potentially used as 
a tool for strengthening human rights in the countries REDD+ operates in 
by imposing obligations upon states and incorporating them into the design 
criteria. One such requirement should be that before participating in any 
REDD+ activities, HRIAs should be carried out at a number of sites within 
the proposed country by academics or independent think tanks in order to 
assess the potential impacts of such activities on local communities. An explicit 
link between human rights and the REDD+ mechanism would allow forest-
based communities to rely on the law and guidance developed by human rights 
bodies as well as provide a legal avenue for action against any violations. It 
would also enable state parties to identify the relevant measures in the domestic 
legal order and to build appropriate links between the two. Lastly, an explicit 
reference to human rights would enable parties to rely on the relevant capacity 
for monitoring and evaluating REDD+ (Savaresi, 2013).
Conclusion
Although it is still unclear how deforestation will ultimately be addressed in 
the international climate change regime, REDD+ will undoubtedly play an 
important role. If designed and governed well, REDD+ has the potential to 
affect the livelihoods of indigenous communities, most notably by encouraging 
governments to secure and formalise land tenure, generate revenue that 
could be used to provide social services in rural areas, create new income 
opportunities for forest dwellers and maintain forests (Lawlor and Huberman, 
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2009). However, how REDD+ works in practice is proving controversial, 
raising complex and emotive issues of national sovereignty, human rights 
and corruption. Many REDD+ initiatives are at risk of being managed and 
administered by governments, carbon finance companies and large conservation 
NGOs, resulting in a top-down approach that would exclude indigenous 
communities from directly participating in the design and implementation of 
REDD+ activities as well as from sharing in its benefits. Considerable evidence 
is emerging regarding the violation of indigenous communities’ rights and 
it is likely that these violations will increase and be felt more acutely as the 
UNFCCC continues to push REDD+ and the buying and selling of carbon 
as a climate mitigation strategy. The offset market has undoubtedly created a 
new class of ‘green’ human rights abuses, and although as Klein points out, 
these incidents are increasingly being reported, ‘there is no comprehensive data 
available about these abuses’ (2014, p. 222). Only by conducting more research 
into the actual impact of REDD+ on human rights can these violations be fully 
identified and rectified.
The reconfiguration of the role of forests as carbon sinks, and the universal 
commodification of nature through the incorporation of the ‘economy of 
repair’ into the rhetoric of sustainability, has had a profound impact on the 
relationship between the economy and nature. The legitimisation of new 
green market opportunities, such as REDD+, has created new narratives of 
landscapes and further diminished the importance of indigenous cosmologies, 
philosophies and worldviews, creating tensions between indigenous peoples 
and pro-extractivist interests. Instead of viewing forests as complex lived-in eco-
systems that support wide varieties of life and biological processes, entrenched 
in history and culture, the REDD+ framework has reduced forests to marketised 
carbon sinks. Indigenous opposition of REDD+ has raised questions regarding 
the Cartesian philosophy, which has dominated humankind’s relationship 
with the non-human world, whereby the environment is objectified as the 
‘other’. These questions move beyond concern for the general disregard for the 
wellbeing of the non-human world and the vulnerability the environment faces 
as a consequence of human exploitation to include the revaluation of Western 
ontology and the liberal construction of nature as well as the questioning 
of Western liberal approaches to human rights and the incorporation of 
intercultural perspectives. Although indigenous movements are playing 
a critical role in moving human rights up the climate change agenda, the 
division between nature and society, whereby humanity and the environment 
are separate and nature does not have inalienable rights, remains unaddressed. 
Moreover, there has been little effort made to understand the human rights 
impact of REDD+ on indigenous communities and their views regarding 
the programme. Further research into these two areas is needed in order to 
81REDD+ AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA
fully understand the complex nature of the social-environmental conflicts 
surrounding climate change policies and also to develop appropriate safeguards 
that protect and support indigenous communities in forest governance. 
Carrying out an HRIA would highlight the fundamental critiques developed 
by indigenous groups, in particular the effects, impacts and changes brought 
about by REDD+ activities on indigenous communities’ interests, rights and 
traditional knowledges. Considering the impact of REDD+ in human rights 
terms would allow indigenous people to make a human rights-based argument 
centred on their fundamental critiques and bring to light the human rights 
effects of current climate change policies. An HRIA would help indigenous 
people demonstrate the cause and effect relationship between REDD+ and 
the promotion and protection of human rights in a structured way, allowing 
them to challenge the current framework of the mitigation scheme and lobby 
for marginalised, disadvantaged and vulnerable groups to be better protected. 
The process of identifying and documenting human rights violations also 
brings with it the possibility of holding those who violate indigenous rights 
responsible and accountable. Furthermore, one of the main critiques of 
indigenous people has been the lack of consultation and participation in the 
REDD+ process. Given that consultation and participation of key stakeholders 
are at the centre of HRIA’s and emphasis is placed on engagement with affected 
people, important lessons can be learned from the carrying out of an HRIA 
and that can be applied to implementing FPIC in the context of REDD+. 
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4. Violence in the actions of indigenous 
peoples from the Amazon region as a 
result of environmental conflicts1
Magdalena Krysińska-Kałużna
Over recent decades, extractive activities in the Amazon region have drastically intensified. The region is not terra nullius, therefore, the rights of people living there should be protected under national 
and international law. However, in many cases human rights are not being 
protected and citizens living in the Amazon are increasingly defenceless against 
large mining interests. This chapter discusses the situation and reaction of 
indigenous peoples in the Amazon in response to extractive activities carried 
out without compliance with international human rights law. Moreover, it 
focuses on the reasons behind the violent actions of and against indigenous 
peoples from the Amazon region to natural resource extraction projects taking 
place in their territories. A requirement to act within the boundaries of the 
existing legal regulations and without using violent means is imposed on 
minorities dominated by the national society; on the other hand, these same 
minorities encounter structural, institutional, cultural and physical violence 
on a daily basis at the hands of the dominant society. Therefore, the chapter 
sets out to address whether such actions undertaken by indigenous peoples 
means a rejection of ‘Western’ ways of doing things, or the opposite – their 
appropriation? Furthermore, is violence, used by the dominated minority – 
in this situation – an expression of strength or powerlessness in the face of 
imposed structures? 
The expansion of extractive activities is exerting increasing pressure on 
uncontacted indigenous groups in the Amazon region. However, what is known 
about the cultures of these groups is very limited. Thus, the analytical categories 
used in the later part of this paper that indicate cultural determinants of certain 
behaviours in Amazonian communities can only have a very limited use in the 
case of isolated groups. However, despite the small amount of data explaining 
the motives of these isolated societies’ actions, given that these groups are 
1 Parts of the text are reworked fragments of an article published in 2011 in Polish but have 
never been published in English.
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facing not only cultural but also physical extinction, their behaviours should 
be subjected to close analysis in hope of improving their situation.
Isolated indigenous groups, violence and law
There are two kinds of indigenous groups in the Amazon: peoples who are in 
contact with wider national society and so called uncontacted groups which 
remain in isolation. There are around a hundred such isolated groups in South 
America – most of them are found in Brazil, with approximately 15 groups 
living in Peru. Little is known about these isolated groups, although more 
information is being gathered as they begin to emerge from the rainforest 
and attempt to contact other indigenous groups or initiate attacks against 
indigenous people or ‘white’ people. Such situations have occurred recently 
in the Madre de Dios region in south-eastern Peru. In December 2014, 
newspapers reported that an isolated group called the Mashco-Piro2 raided the 
remote community of Monte Salvado which sits on the Piedras River. The 
community had 50 inhabitants, the majority of whom were absent during the 
time of the raid, while those who were present ran away and took refuge in a 
guard post. In their absence, the Mashco-Piro killed the community’s animals, 
destroyed their possessions and stole food. 
This was not the first violent incursion carried out by members of this 
isolated group towards local people in the Madre de Dios region. In December 
2011, a Machiguenga man, Shaco Flores, who was from the Diamante 
village, was killed by the Mashco-Piro, while several other members of the 
community were injured during the attack. Shaco Flores, who was fluent in 
the Piro language, had attempted to pacify and contact the Mashco-Piro since 
the 1980s. He had developed a certain level of communication with the group, 
though always at a distance, and even obtained a few objects of Mashco-Piro 
material culture including a necklace, a rustic arrow-sharpener made from an 
agouti tooth and a rubber sphere used in their characteristic head-ball game. 
However in December 2011, he was killed by a single arrow fired by a Mashco-
Piro bowman in the small garden where he had been letting the Mashco-Piro eat 
crops, and where he had previously interacted peacefully with them (Milanez 
and Shepard, 2014c). Later in May 2015, the isolated Mashco-Piro tribe also 
killed a young Machiguenga man from the Shipetiari native community with 
an arrow (El Comercio Perú, 2015).
The Mashco-Piro have been openly hostile towards outsiders on various other 
occasions. For example, when a group of Machiguenga fishermen encountered 
the Mashco-Piro crossing the Manu River they ‘tried to approach and show 
2 Their language belongs to the Arawak family and is currently classified as belonging to the 
Southern Arawak sub-family. The group that is linguistically and culturally most closely 
related to them are most likely the Piro (Yiné) from the Urubamba River).
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their friendly intentions, but the Mashco-Piro repelled them with a shower of 
arrows. When they ran out of arrows, they used signs to communicate to them 
that even though they were out of arrows, if the Machiguenga came any closer, 
they would use rocks to break their bones’ (Milanez and Shepard, 2014c). 
Such violent events have occurred more frequently during the last few years, 
and even tourist boats and park rangers have had arrows shot at them by the 
isolated tribe.3
The Mashco-Piro are considered to be a subgroup of the Piro indigenous 
tribe who have lived in isolation since the rubber boom. It is thought that the 
majority of isolated groups are direct descendants of those indigenous tribes 
who fled and hid in inaccessible areas in the jungle to escape the ‘white’ people 
and enslavement during the rubber boom era. In 1896, the rubber baron 
Fitzcarrald and his labourers sailed a steamship across an isthmus connecting 
the Mishagua and Manu Rivers. Accompanied by a small group of Campa 
and Piro guides in canoes, they were attacked by native inhabitants known as 
‘Mascho’. In retaliation, Fitzcarrald and his crew are said to have killed more 
than three hundred Mashco, burning their houses and crops to the ground and 
sinking their canoes. A rubber tapper who witnessed the fierce battle described 
the carnage: ‘You could no longer drink the water from the river because it was 
so full of the corpses of Mashcos and rubber tappers, because the fight was to 
the death’ (Reyna, 1941, cited in MacQuarrie 1992, p. 59, cited in Shepard, 
1999).
For the Mashco-Piro, little has changed since the time of Fitzcarrald. They 
continue to live in an area under threat but this time from illegal drug traffickers 
and loggers. When disturbing these illegal activities, indigenous groups are 
being pushed off the land or killed. They are also victims of the so-called 
correrías (invasions/chases) carried out by forestry workers. Loggers, working 
deep within the forests in areas inhabitated by uncontacted groups, often seek 
revenge for items stolen from them by indigenous tribes. Correrías – as they 
are known by the residents of border communities – often end in the death of 
the hunted Indians (Huertas Castillo, 2002; Wahl, 2001). National reserves, 
established by the state and which should in theory protect these isolated 
groups, are not in practice fulfilling their role and purpose.4 ‘On the contrary, 
the potential the territories have in the form of their natural resources, especially 
mahogany, cedar, gas and oil, and in addition – isolated populations – are 
all factors that attract a variety of industrial sectors and missionaries exposing 
indigenous population at risk of contact, which in many cases turns out to 
3 Alberto Cherif and Pedro García Hierro indicate that apart from the Parque Nacional 
del Manú, the Reserva Territorial Mashco-Piro, Parque Nacional Alto Purus and Reserva 
Territorial Madre de Dios – a territory bordering with Brazil – are all areas across which the 
Mashco-Piro tend to wander (2007).
4 There are five territorial reserves in Peru.
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be fatal’ (Huertas Castillo, 2002, p. 111). The anthropologists Felipe Milanez 
and Glenn Shepard documented the story of the survivors from the isolated 
tribe of Chitonahua (Xitonawa in Brazilian) who fled to Simpatia, a settled 
Asháninka indigenous village in Brazil’s western Amazon rainforest close to 
the border with Peru, to seek refuge. With the help of Yaminahua interpreters, 
the survivors told the story of how their community was massacred, which was 
then repeated by Asháninka to the anthropologists: ‘Gunshots, many dead. 
A tall, bald man leading a murderous group of white men, presumably drug 
traffickers.5 Survivors escaping into the jungle while elders and children were 
slaughtered’ (Milanez and Shepard, 2014a). 
The Asháninka, together with other indigenous peoples, are actively 
involved in denuncing illegal logging and other criminal activities in the area. 
Four of their leaders, including a well-known opponent of illegal logging, were 
murdered in September 2014 by men who intruded onto their land (Andean Air 
Mail, 2015). Illegal loggers and other criminals are killing indigenous people, 
who have been in contact with national society for a significant period of time 
and – theoretically – could request help from state or civil society organisations 
or, at least, inform them of the situation, with impunity. Isolated groups, 
however, do not have such options at their disposal (Milanez and Shepard, 
2014d). The situation has become so tense that even personnel from FUNAI 
(the National Indian Foundation), a Brazilian government agency operating 
the Upper Envira River Ethno-Environmental Protection Front, abandoned 
their outpost following an attack by drug traffickers in 2011. ‘It’s like walking 
a razor’s edge’, said CIMI reporter Renato Santana, describing an atmosphere 
of fear in the native communities of the Upper Envira River on the Brazilian 
side of the border. People are afraid of incursions by organised criminal groups 
and increasingly violent clashes with the isolated groups (Wallace, 2014). In 
addition, the road being built by the Brazilian Acre state government through 
these remote areas is contributing to the increasingly frequent sightings of 
isolated groups. It is being built without any prior consultation with local 
5 ‘The massacre of the Xatanawa on the upper Envira may be connected with the drug 
trafficking operations of a Peruvian drug lord named Joaquim Antônio Custódio Fadista. 
Fadista has been arrested twice in Brazil for invading territories occupied by isolated 
indigenous groups. He was arrested in March 2001, put in jail and then released. He was 
arrested again in November 2011 by Federal Police, but again freed. He has been charged 
with drug trafficking in different states in Brazil and also in Luxembourg. The attack 
described by the Xatanawa emissaries, speaking through Yaminawa interpreters, matches 
Fadista’s modus operandi. Furthermore, when Fadista was arrested in 2011, Federal Police 
found part of an indigenous arrow in his bag, and Travassos, who examined the arrow, said 
that it probably belonged to one of the isolated groups in the region. At the time, he said 
he “feared the worst,” and claimed that the arrow was “proof of genocide”. Since this arrest 
was made, however, no further investigations have been carried out by Brazilian or Peruvian 
police. The new testimonies of the Xatanawa should provide pressure to re-open these 
investigations’ (Milanez and Shepard, 2014b).
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interests groups or with FUNAI. This road puts indigenous communities living 
in this region at grave risk.6 Furthermore, the state oil company Petrobras is 
prospecting for gas in the state of Acre. Both activities are provoking significant 
tensions among indigenous peoples. 
There is evidence to indicate that uncontacted tribes like the Kawahiva 
isolated group in Mato Grosso view all non-natives as mortal enemies (Wallace, 
2014). It is also more than likely that isolated groups on the Peru-Brazil border 
share the same attitude. These isolated groups are not familiar with the universal 
codes which operate within the framework of national societies. They are 
however accustomed to the behaviours of certain segments of said society – and 
these segments use violence as a primary tool during contact. Representatives of 
these segments require indigenous territories and resources, whereas natives are 
treated by them like an obstacle which should be eliminated. For these natives 
it is their first contact with the national community and for some people from 
isolated groups, the last one. The only types of behaviour of people from the 
dominant society they have come into contact with are based on violence. We 
do not know the cultures of isolated societies but it is reasonable to assume that 
they act violently during contacts with the outside world because of the way 
relationships have been established with them by loggers and drug traffickers, 
especially when we recall the stories regarding contacts with isolated groups 
(see Hemming, 2003).
As previously mentioned, there are reserves in Peru established to protect 
isolated indigenous groups from threats from the outside world and agents 
of the national society. This is in accordance with Convention 169 of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO 169), one of the most important 
legal instruments of indigenous peoples, which was ratified in Peru in 1994. 
The right to land is one of the fundamental rights that Convention 169 is 
dedicated to. It recognises the right to ownership of traditionally occupied land 
by indigenous peoples, and to use lands to which they have traditionally had 
access for their subsistence and traditional activities, even if these lands are 
not exclusively occupied by them. ILO 169 also contains provisions regarding 
indigenous peoples’ rights to natural resources located in their territories and 
the requirement for prior consultation with regards to the exploration and 
exploitation of minerals in these areas. Although the Convention does not 
directly refer to indigenous peoples living in isolation, Article 14 states that 
governments should pay special attention to the situation of nomadic peoples 
6 ‘According to FUNAI agent Antentor Vaz, 114 of the projects currently slated within the 
Brazilian governments PAC infrastructure development plan will affect regions inhabited 
by groups in voluntary isolation or recent contact. In all, 33 locations where isolated groups 
have been registered—nearly half of the 69 registers—are at risk of being affected by these 
big government projects. FUNAI has established so far a total of 12 Ethno-Environmental 
Protection Fronts to protect territories with isolated populations’ (Milanes and Shepard, 
2014b).
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and shifting cultivators in this respect, a characteristic that also applies to the 
isolated indigenous groups (Zarzar, 2000, p. 51). Interpreting Convention 169 
in the context of the rights of these groups, Christian Ramos Veloz posits that, 
‘in the case of isolated peoples (...) governments should establish and designate 
territories where these peoples have lived for centuries, in order to effectively 
guarantee their protection and – finally – their survival as peoples’ (Ramos 
Veloz, 2007, p. 318).
In 2006 in Peru, the Act (No. 28736) on the Protection of Indigenous or 
Aboriginal Peoples in a Situation of Isolation or Initial Contact (Ley para la 
Protección de los Pueblos Indígenas u Originarios en Situación de aislamiento y en 
Situación de Contacto Inicial) was passed. Designed to protect indigenous groups, 
the act defines those living in isolation as well as those peoples in the situation 
of initial contact under Peruvian law. However, it also allows mining activities 
to take place in areas inhabited by isolated peoples, reduces their land rights 
and makes procedures aimed at proving the existence of isolated groups, their 
identity, and numbers more difficult to carry out (Huertas Castillo, 2007, pp. 
52–3). The document finally approved by Congress significantly differed from 
the proposals submitted by non-governmental organisations, and included the 
allowance for mining activities ‘under certain conditions’ and/or ‘in the interest 
of the nation’.7 The term ‘interest of the nation’, being a very broad and hard 
to define concept, allows for the continued expansion of extractivist activities 
and has become a tool for justifying violations of the provisions of ILO 169. 
Although indigenous groups living in voluntary isolation and their territories 
should be protected by the state because they cannot advocate their own rights 
and are highly vulnerable, this is currently not happening. With the state not 
fulfilling its obligations to these indigenous tribes, violence is becoming a 
commonplace within isolated societies. Furthermore, evidence indicates that 
their violent actions toward the ‘other’ are a result of the relationship type 
established with them by the national society and its agents.
7 The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, in his report 
‘The situation of indigenous peoples’ rights in Peru with regard to the extractive industries’, 
published in 2014, states: ‘Official policy must be in principle opposed to extractive activity 
in territories inhabited by indigenous peoples in a situation of isolation or initial contact, 
and must ensure that extractive activity is permitted in such territories only in exceptional 
cases, where there is clear evidence of a justification founded on strong public interest, and 
only in conditions in which the rights and well-being of these peoples are safeguarded. For 
such exceptional cases, the Government must strengthen the application of its protection 
system through the development of suitable plans, data bases and monitoring mechanisms. 
While the Government should adhere to the principle of no contact in relation to groups 
in isolation that reject contact, it should develop special protocols for the consultation of 
indigenous groups seeking initial contact who might be affected by the extractive industries, 
in order to ensure that these groups enjoy their rights of participation and self-determination 
in relation to the territories they inhabit; and such special consultation protocols should be 
adjusted to the particular circumstances of each group’ (UNHRC, 2014, p. 20).
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Habitus and different aspects of violence 
The second type of indigenous groups found in the Amazon are those that 
have been in contact with the national society. These indigenous groups have 
also carried out violence involving the killing of people in conflicts over land 
and resources. When seeking answers as to why these violent acts occur, it 
is important to remember that this second type of indigenous groups have 
remained in contact with national society and form a part of society. Therefore, 
unlike uncontacted indigenous groups, these indigenous communities are 
aware – to various extents – of the law and court system of the country in 
which they reside. In trying to understand the reasons that determine such 
dramatic action, I focus on two cases: the Awajún and Wampis from Peru and 
the Cintas Largas Brazil.
The first case study examines the massacre of a group of indigenous 
protestors in northern Peru. Over 50 days of peaceful protests and blockades 
initiated by indigenous peoples on the highway near the town of Bagua in the 
department of Amazonas in Peru ended in June 2009 after the police started 
shooting at demonstrators, resulting in the death of 33 people. Ten civilians 
were killed alongside 23 policemen, while about two hundred people were 
injured in these events. Among the dead policemen were 11 hostages being 
held by the protesters at Outpost No. 6 in Imaza. The second case is the attack 
carried out in 2004 by the Cintas Largas indigenous people from the western 
Amazon basin in Brazil on a group of illegal diamond prospectors operating in 
their territory, resulting in the death of 29 people. It is my opinion that these 
events can be better understood by using two sociological categories: cultural 
violence and habitus.
Johan Galtung, a Norwegian sociologist, dealing with the analysis of the 
causes of violence in societies states that direct, physical violence, is only the 
tip of the iceberg, with the foundation being cultural violence and structural 
violence. Cultural violence is associated with a specific cultural paradigm 
which regulates socially expected behaviours. This adjustment is carried out 
directly when these patterns are conscious or in alternative way when they are 
not. A culture in which attacking ‘the other’ is seen as the norm will allow for 
the existence of structural and physical violence. Structural violence, in turn, 
is the sort of violence, which, with the use of social institutions or structures, 
prevents certain groups from satisfying their basic needs. Direct violence 
– Galtung writes – is an event; structural violence is a process of changing 
intensity; cultural violence is a constant, an invariant. It remains virtually 
unchanged for long periods of time, due to the slow transformation within 
a given culture. ‘By “cultural violence”’ we mean those aspects of culture, 
the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, 
language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – 
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that can be used to justify or legitimate direct or structural violence’ (Galtung, 
1990, p. 291; 2004).
According to Galtung, conflict is something natural for societies, but if it is 
not transformed it results in violence. ‘Peace’ often means a period of ‘ceasefire’; 
an interval between periods of violence. Such interruptions do not mean real 
peace. I am of the opinion that this is what is happening in many parts of Latin 
America, including Peru. Galtung’s concept might be useful in explaining the 
events taking place there, for instance the occurrences in Bagua. ‘In a conflict, 
the use of force as a mechanism to solve incompatibilities between the parties 
involved should be avoided, since it may only lead to violence’ (Horovitz 
Rosenblum, 2006, p. 4). To ensure peace, the best and most effective tool is to 
prevent violence through the use of social and legal mechanisms and support 
of institutions. As Galtung argues: ‘If we limit ourselves to simple conflicts 
with only two goals, held by the same party or by different parties A and B, 
then there are always five possible outcomes, central to the TRANSCEND 
approach:
[1] A gets all, B gets nothing (victory/defeat)
[2] B gets all, A gets nothing (defeat/victory)
[3] A gets some, B gets some (compromise)
[4] A gets all, B gets all (positive transcendence).
[5] A gets nothing, B gets nothing (withdrawal, but it could also be 
negative transcendence, going beyond the contradiction)’ (Galtung, 2002, 
p. 8). 
In my opinion the Cintas Largas from Brazil and the Awajún who protested 
in Bagua, Peru, hoped that they would have ‘received something’ during the 
lengthy process of conflict resolution (preceding the violence which later broke 
out) however, what occurred was more like the situation where ‘A gets all and 
B gets nothing’. 
Another concept which could prove helpful in understanding the occurrences 
I referred to is the notion of habitus developed by Pierre Bourdieu. Habitus is ‘a 
system of acquired dispositions functioning on the practical level as categories 
of perception and assessment or as classificatory principles as well as being the 
organising principles of action’ (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 12–13). It is an adaptive 
mechanism, acquired during the course of socialisation. Its formation is based 
on implementing the external environmental structures (Jacyno, 1993, pp. 
17–29). It becomes the matrix of perception, thought and action (Bourdieu, 
2004, p. 45), and consists of cognitive resources, operational expertise and 
motivational systems. ‘Acquired through experience, cognitive schemata are 
organising all the processes which determine the perception and subjective view 
of the world’ (Jacyno, 1997, p. 28). Habitus is therefore both structured and 
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structuring. It is historically conditioned and deeply internalised. As second 
nature and as such forgotten as part of history, it is the active presence of the 
whole past of which it is the product. Habitus is – according to Bourdieu – the 
principle generating strategies of the subjects. It is practical rationality; it is 
creative and inventive, but only within its structures (Jacyno, 1997, p. 22). It is 
a society written into the biological body of the individual (Bourdieu, 1990).
Bourdieu uses the concept of habitus for explaining reproduction and 
change in society. He asks how the social order is possible and comes to the 
conclusion that every order is produced and supported by daily practice of 
illusion. Illusion is a category defining the effect of practices that makes the 
world commonly shared which means that everything is an ideology. Habitus 
shapes the experience of the obviousness of the social world. It comes from 
adjustment of the cherished hopes and the chances for success of the undertaken 
measures. With the help of habitus, we can determine the conditions for the 
creation of compatibility between the objective possibilities of action and the 
subjective aspirations (Jacyno, 1997). 
Yet, a shift between objective and subjective structures may happen. It 
deprives participants of the possibility of a smooth move in the world and 
leads to alienation. And this – according to Bourdieu – may happen to whole 
societies. The past continues actively in the present and social life is a game 
in which we have specific competencies – habitus. If our competences are 
not adequate we can be excluded from the game. ‘Educated disposal system, 
which was previously efficient, becomes the basis of inadequacy and sentences 
to life beyond the prescribed social order identified by Bourdieu as necessity 
of duration and acting in accordance with a certain rhythm’ (Jacyno, 1997, p. 
36). Conflict of different rhythms of time applies in particular to the societies 
that experienced a confrontation with modernisation. The sense of actions 
becomes like a dead, forgotten language (Jacyno, 1997, p. 36). Habitus, 
which was used for immediate decoding, cannot comply with its role. But this 
does not mean that it cannot be used, especially when efforts to adapt to new 
objective structures fail. I argue that the concepts of Galtung and Bourdieu are 
usfeul in analysing the tragic deaths of the garimpeiros in the Reserva Indígena 
Roosevelt, Brazil and provide a better understanding as to what happened in 
Bagua, Peru. 
Drama in Bagua 
On 5 June 2009, the police attack on the highway stretch known as the Devil’s 
Curve ouside the town of Bagua ended the road blockade by the Awajún 
(Aguaruna) and the Wampís. The blockade was a continuation of protests 
which were organised by the indigenous organisation AIDESEP (Asociación 
Interétnica Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana) against the Peruvian government 
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and began in 2008. The indigenous groups involved in the blockade 
were frustrated by the government’s decision to open up the Amazon to 
multinational corporations and were worried about the environmental impact 
of such measures. Feeling ignored and not listened to, protestors took action 
and set up a roadblock to cut off access to the Amazon jungle.
The area occupied by the Jivaro indigenous people is found in the headwaters 
of the Marañon River and its tributories, divided by the Cordillera del Condor 
moutains. Part of the Jivaro people, both the Wampis and the Awajún tribes 
have ancestral lands in this area. In 1995, a brief conflict broke out between 
Ecuador and Peru over the Cenepa River. A peace treaty signed between 
the two countries in 1998 agreed on the creation of areas of environmental 
protection on both sides of the border. There was a plan to create a national 
park on the Peruvian side. The natives agreed to this proposition, even though 
the creation of the park meant giving up the possibility to obtain legal title 
to parts of traditionally used lands. They agreed after taking into account the 
national interest and under the condition that these areas will indeed become 
a protected zone, whilst the community would receive legal titles to other areas 
situated on their traditional lands.8 The authorities promised such measures, 
but failed to follow through on their word by issuing licenses for gold mining 
on traditional indigenous territories, which, according to the agreement, were 
to be protected. As it turned out, authorities had been discussing mining 
operations in the area even during the peace talks between Ecuador and Peru 
(Equipo de Investigación de ODECOFROC, 2009).
On 28 November 2005, ODECOFROC (Organización de Desarrollo de 
las Comunidades Nativas Fronterizas del Cenepa) sent a letter to the Minister 
of Energy and Mines stating that the Awajún and the Wampís did not want 
minerals or gold found in their territories exploited (cualquier aprovechamiento) 
because of the environmental impact – the contamination of water, soil, forest 
– and health implications for people living there:
We inform that the Awajún-Wampis people from the Cenepa have 
8 It is interesting to read what Galtung wrote about this conflict recalling five possible 
outcomes of conflict (as previously discussed): ‘An example: Ecuador and Peru have a conflict 
over a zone in the Andes. To obtain [1] or [2] a war is a classical instrument. To obtain [3], 
dividing by drawing a border, international law or war can be used (border=cease-fire line). 
[4] could be to do nothing (which they had done for a large part of 54 years), or to give the 
zone to the indigenous or an intergovernmental organisations, like the UN, the OEA. And 
[5] could be a “binational zone with natural park” (as proposed by this author, the outcome 
in 1998). The first two outcomes are extremist, privileging one party only, often associated 
with violence. The next three outcomes are symmetric, giving nothing, something or 
everything to both. They can often be combined in a “peace diagonal”. The other diagonal, 
Compromise, or else Fight it out! (the “war diagonal”) is frequently encountered. The listing 
above has five possible outcomes, and they can be combined. Many people (including 
politicians), however, may have none of them on their mind. The whole conflict landscape is 
foggy, no points, no paths. Only A and B. And violence erupts’ (Galtung, 2002, p. 8).
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accepted and continue to work with the Peruvian state to create the 
National Park in the Cordillera del Condor and for that we have discussed 
for more than two years in the participatory process working together with 
INRENA and Conservation International primarily because we believe 
that it is only consensual way to ensure the intangible conservation of this 
area known as ‘Ichigkat Muja’ National Park which is considered by us as 
a sacred place and a part of our culture alive, so the idea to exploitation 
of gold in the Cordillera del Condor represents not only an act of offense 
but is also sacrilege for us (Equipo de Investigación de ODECOFROC, 
2005).9
However, the letter failed to have an impact on the Ministry’s decision to 
mine for gold in Awajún-Wampis territory. Such was the determination of 
the government to proceed that INRENA (the Peruvian National Institute of 
Natural Resources), which had stated in 2005 that mining in the Cordillera del 
Condor was incompatible with Peruvian law, was forced to amend its technical 
opinion in favour of the mining project by the Ministry of Energy and Mines, 
Joint Command of the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence and the Foreign 
Ministry (Equipo de Investigación de ODECOFROC, 2009, p. 32).
The situation deteriorated rapidly in 2008 as the government ceased 
dialogue with the protestors and as President Alan García, following the 
signing of the free trade agreement between Peru and the United States, passed 
a number of new regulations allowing US companies access to the Amazon 
to develop natural resources. The decrees implemented violated the rights of 
indigenous people established both under the 1993 Peruvian Constitution 
and also under treaties, such as ILO 169, which Peru had signed guaranteeing 
prior informed consent by indigenous communities on projects involving 
their land, and the safeguarding of natural resources on indigenous lands. 
One of the most contested decrees was No. 1015 which faciliated the sale of 
indigenous communal lands by reducing the quorum required for agreement 
on the expropriation of land from two thirds to half the votes of community 
members. James Anaya in his report stated that: 
the constitutionality of some of the decrees and/or their compatibility 
with the International Labour Organization (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), which has been ratified by Peru, 
has been called into question by various parties, including the Office of 
the Ombudswoman, the Multi-Party Committee, the sub-working group 
of the Congressional Agriculture Committee set up to consider legislative 
decrees relating to the agricultural sector, Constitutional Committee of 
Congress and a number of non-governmental organizations (UNHRC, 
2014, p. 5). 
9 I received the email with the text of the letter to the Minister of Energy and Mines through 
the Ashaninka mailing list.
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The Awajún and the Wampís belong to the wider ‘block’ of the Jivaro culture 
from Ecuador and Peru. They were best known from the tsantsa ritual – the 
shrinking of slain enemies’ heads. Jivaro traditionally conducted two types of 
war –‘intratribal’ and ‘intertribal’. Philippe Descola claims that during the years 
1950–70 the war of the northern Achuar, who also belong to the Jivaro and 
live between Peru and Ecuador, was the cause of death of every other man and 
one in eight women, probably the highest possible rate in societies of this type 
(Descola, 2006, pp. 273–302). As late as the 1960s the Achuar people were still 
victims of head hunting. The exact description of the principles that governed 
the Jivaro war is outside the scope of this paper, but it is important to note that, 
according to Descola, the beginning of the conflict in the Jivaro culture stems 
from the breaking of the alliance (Descola, 2006, p. 287). Violent exchanges 
were the normal method of intratribal dispute settlement (associated with the 
exchange of goods, women and the need for revenge in the event of the death 
of a relative). In addition to the aforementioned conditions an important role 
is played by the ideal of masculinity which celebrates the virtues of a warrior. 
As Descola writes, ‘a man announces the death of one of the family members in 
the following words: “X killed me in such and such circumstances”’ (Descola, 
2006, p. 290).
The Awajún and Wampis warlike behaviour was exploited by the Peruvian 
state and both groups were assigned to guard the border between Peru and 
Ecuador. Territories inhabited by these groups – the Cenepa river valley – were 
up until the signing of a peace accord in 1998 an area of contention between 
Peru and Ecuador. Difficult access to the Cordillera del Condor meant that 
the assistance of the local population was of crucial importance to the army. 
During the conflict of the Cenepa in 1995, a military branch called Los Yahis 
was created, comprising men from the Awajún and Shuar Wampís tribes. One 
of the commanders wrote, ‘with their invaluable assistance in the logistical 
activities of our troops they contributed to the final victory, for which many 
of them have devoted their life’ (Equipo de Investigación de ODECOFROC, 
2009, p. 35). The most invaluable role of the indigenous people during the war 
of the Cenepa was to detect mines and the presence of enemy soldiers and also 
to identify poisoned water sources.
The 20-year civil war was a particularly violent experience that impacted 
on all Peruvians, including indigenous peoples. One of the outcomes of the 
conflict was the formulation of so-called self-defence forces, or rondas. Ronderos, 
who formed the Sierra de Cajamarca troops to fight cattle thieves, among 
other things, supported the colonists on Awajún lands. The settlers did not 
want to leave these areas, despite court rulings (including those made by the 
Supreme Court) ordering them to leave the territory belonging to indigenous 
communities. In May 2001 a massacre occured in the community of Flor de la 
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Frontera when 150 Awajún attacked a settlement of illegal settlers located on 
their land, killing eight adults and seven children. According to the available 
information, the Awajún elders of the San Jose village organised the massacre. 
They had previously ridiculed the younger leaders for their ‘ineffective methods’ 
to remove the colonists through the aid of courts and police. 
Prior to these events taking place the Awajún could not count on the support 
of the Peruvian authorities. In the mid 1980s in Chamikar, a settlement on the 
river Nieva, a colonist invasion took place with the support of the army. The 
settlers declared that the areas adjacent to the road going through the Awajún 
territories belonged to them. What constituted where the ‘adjacent areas’ ended 
was loosely determined by the settlers. Although the administrative authorities 
confirmed that the land belonged to the Awajún, they did nothing to remove 
the colonists. In response the Awajún destroyed around 60 houses. During these 
incidents, many people, both colonists and indigenous people, were wounded. 
The Awajún leader Damián Tibijan was sent to prison for the massacre; 
however, after serving his sentence he was murdered shortly after his release 
(Chirif and García Hierro, 2007, p. 144). These, and similar events, certainly 
did not help strengthen the Wampis and Awajún faith in the effectiveness of 
Peruvian law. It can be assumed that these doubts about the effectiveness of the 
new habitus and repeated betrayals (it should be remembered that betrayal is 
the main cause of revenge in the framework of values which operated in the 
traditional culture of the Jivaro) underpinned the events of June 2009. The 
Bagua protest was the culmination of a long-running conflict over land and 
resources (Krysińska-Kałużna, 2011).
The Cinta Larga and garimpeiros
The Cinta Larga (in Portuguese: Broad Belt; endoethnonym: Matetamãe) 
inhabit the states of Mato Grosso and Rondônia. The first peaceful contact with 
them was initiated in 1968. Before that they had experienced extraordinary – 
even for those times and that region – cruelty from the hands of the nation. 
During the World War II the acquisition of rubber tree plantations in Malaya 
by Japan was the cause of an endless circle of violence in the western part of 
Rondônia. The area was extensively explored by rubber prospectors, companies 
importing colonists and adventurers of all kinds. ‘Hundreds of seringueiros 
were brought from north-east Brazil. Known as “Rubber-Soldiers”’, many 
of them tried to build their own, private rubber empires (Hemming, 2003, 
pp. 297 and 299). A further illustration of this prevailing relationship can be 
found in the history of a seringueiro, who in 1963 set off on an expedition to 
seek retaliation and revenge against the indigenous groups who had assaulted 
‘his Indians’. An attack on an indigenous village killed nine of its inhabitants, 
mostly women and children. The three surviving women and four children 
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were forced to sit in a row and were subsequently killed so not to leave any 
witnesses of the massacre. Another rubber collector – pretending to be part of 
the Indian Protection Service (SPI) and using its method of initiating contact 
with indigenous populaces – left presents out for the Uru-eu-waw-waw group. 
When they came, he shot them from his hiding place. 20 Orion people were 
also murdered this way at a place where Indian Protection Service employees 
usually left gifts for them (Hemming, 2003). John Hemming quotes an 
assistant inspector of the SPI who said that rubber-tappers ‘gouged out the eyes 
of the Indian children and then left them abandoned in the forest’ (Hemming, 
2003, p. 298). 
Among the neighbours of the above-mentioned indigenous groups were the 
Cintas Largas. In 1963, a member of the rubber gatherers company Arruda 
e Junqueira rented a helicopter and dropped bags filled with sugar into a 
Cintas Largas village. When the Indians opened the packages, the helicopter 
flew in again, this time dropping dynamite. The village was destroyed. Soon 
after another massacre took place. ‘This bombing was followed by a land raid 
to exterminate another Cinta Larga village. One gunman, Ataíde Pereira, 
was bitter because he was not paid his promised $15 fee for the raid. He 
confessed to the Jesuit missionary Father Rdgar Schmidt, who tape-recorded 
the chilling testimony and gave it to the SPI’ (Hemming, 2003, p. 128). Six 
white men attacked another village of the Cintas Largas. Only two or three 
Indians managed to escape and the rest were murdered. Many atrocities were 
committed during this attack. As Pereira testified:
He tied the Indian girl up and hung her head-downwards from a tree, legs 
apart, and chopped her in half right down the middle with his machete. 
Almost with a single stroke I’d say. The village was like a slaughter-house. 
He calmed down after he’d cut the woman up, and told us to burn down 
all the huts and throw the bodies into the [Aripuanã] river (Hemming, 
2003, p. 228).
In 1967 the Minister of the Interior appointed a commission headed by the 
Attorney-General to investigate irregularities in the Indian Protection Service 
(SPI). Over a year of work resulted in a detailed report, and by the end of 
the 1960s a court trial was held against several SPI officials. After the facts 
and information hidden by the Service about what had actually happened to 
the indigenous groups in the interior of Brazil came to light, the attorney-
general Jader Figueiredo was reported as saying that ‘more shameful than the 
corruption is the fact that Indians have suffered tortures similar to those of the 
[Nazi concentration] camps of Treblinka and Dachau’ (Hemming, 2003, p. 
227). 
However, the report was believed to have been destroyed by a fire shortly 
after its release, with most of the document only recently being rediscovered. 
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It is currently being examined by the National Truth Commission (which is 
investigating human rights violations between 1947 and 1988). ‘Although 
the document has not been made public since its rediscovery, the Guardian 
has seen a scanned copy in which Figueiredo describes the enslavement of 
indigenous people, torture of children and theft of land’ – Jonathan Watts and 
Jan Rocha write (Watts and Rocha, 2013). Journalists comment that torture 
was commonplace. The most widely used technique was ‘the trunk’, which was 
used to slowly crush the ankles of its victims. The Guardian quotes Marcelo 
Zelic, a human rights lawyer who discovered the document: 
This documentation, which was hidden for many decades, sheds light on 
conflict situations that endure today. For states like Mato Grosso do Sul, 
Paraná, Bahia and Amazonas, it contains lots of information that can help 
reveal once and for all the truth behind many forms of violence against 
Indians today and provide an insight into the real owners of the land in 
dispute. (Watts and Rocha, 2013).
By the time peaceful contact with the Cintas Largas was established, they had 
faced multiple invasions by white settlers. Initially these settlers came to obtain 
mahogany and later, when it was discovered that the Roosevelt reserve areas 
inhabited by the Cintas Largas had rich deposits of diamonds, they came to 
mine. In 2003, representatives of the Commission on Human Rights of the 
Brazilian parliament came to visit the Terra Indigena Roosevelt. The situation 
they discovered was critical. Not only was the cultural survival of the Cintas 
Largas threatened, but also their physical survival. After intensive contact with 
loggers and garimpeiros (wildcat prospectors), they became addicted to the 
goods of ‘white people’. In exchange for allowing garimpeiros to enter their 
reserve, they had received money and other gifts that gave them the external 
appearance of living in prosperity: cell phones, satellite dishes and all kinds of 
electronic equipment. They also had extensive access to firearms. Within the 
reserve helicopters were found as well as drugs and alcohol. Traditionally, men 
in this culture can have more than one wife, thus Cintas Largas sought partners 
in the cities, where – often drunk – they were attacked and sometimes killed. 
Many of them also died in car accidents.10
At the beginning of the 21st century the Cintas Largas leaders realised 
that their group was beginning to disappear. Therefore they decided – with 
the help of the government agency FUNAI – to throw diamond prospectors 
off their land. Unfortunately, this turned out to be impossible. Garimpeiros 
could count on the help of the governor and local authorities, while police and 
other services were corrupt. Community members were often sent to prison 
10 Report of the Human Rights Commission of the Brazilian Parliament ‘Conflitos em terras 
indígenas, Relatorio das visitas a terras indígenas e audiências públicas realizadas nos estados 
de Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Rondonia, Roraima, Pernambuco, Bahia e Santa 
Catarina’, 7–17 October 2003.
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for offences against ‘whites’, but no ‘white’ was ever imprisoned for similar 
offences against them. The Cintas Largas received significantly higher penalties 
for the same offences for which ‘whites’ were treated much more leniently. For 
example, for the illegal possession of firearms indigenous people were forced 
to pay fines up to 10 times higher than those paid by ‘whites’. In 2004, there 
were about 1,400 Cintas Largas on the reserve and around 5,000 illegal miners. 
That same year the Cintas Largas attacked a group of them and subsequently 
killed 29 people.
Conclusion
Peace has never been established between the ‘whites’ and the Cintas Largas 
in Brazil and the Awajún and Wampís in Peru. At best the situation could 
be described as a truce. In the case of isolated groups not many details are 
known, but what is certain is that their rights are not protected, they live in a 
constant danger from the agents of national society and that the risk of direct 
violence has become the norm. When an isolated group establishes contact 
with a national society, although this occurs rarely, a huge functional change 
occurs within that group. The indigenous societies need a ‘key’ to understand 
principles on which the functioning of the ‘new world’ is based. ‘Answers’ to 
the question on how it functions are provided by national societies through 
agents of contact. However, these vary greatly, depending on the nature of 
the ‘messenger’ transmitting a response. When such ‘messengers’ use ruthless 
and brutal physical violence, including the murder of autochthons, it can be 
expected that the response from the isolated group is also going to be violent.
In the case of the indigenous groups discussed in this chapter, the conflict 
has never been transformed, thus giving rise to more potential tragedies. The 
Cintas Largas, for example, have been victims of cultural violence on the part 
of the national society. Building up the tension between garimpeiros and the 
natives, local newspapers wrote that they were once cannibals and printed out 
the old photos that would suggest that little had changed since that time period. 
The Cintas Largas have also been targets of physical violence, albeit not on a 
scale comparable to what was taking place 40 years earlier. However, it was the 
everyday experience of members of this ethnic group whenever they appeared 
in the towns (Krysińska-Kałużna, 2011). In the case of both the Cintas Largas, 
and the Awajun and Wampís, the government cared little whether the conflict 
escalated into direct violence or not. Moreover, in both cases the courts 
favoured the ‘whites’. In Brazil nobody protected the indigenous communities 
from the invasion of the garimpeiros (FUNAI officers were powerless), whereas 
in Peru, the army helped the illegal settlers while the Peruvian administration 
failed to observe any judgements that were in favour of indigenous groups. 
All these activities of the agents of dominant society were related to different 
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aspects and dimensions of violence. The alliance between the Jivaro and the 
government, agreed during the war between Ecuador and Peru, provided the 
first opportunity to end the conflict with a win-win situation ‘when A gets 
some and B gets some’. However, the promise of ‘getting something’ turned 
out to be false.
National societies require indigenous groups to adapt to the predominant 
standards of civilisation. Such a standard is – in theory – non-violent resolution 
of conflicts and respect for human rights. But this is only in theory. Practice 
– as is the ‘traditional pattern’ of some cultures of the Amazon – involves the 
use of violence. Before contact was initiated with the Cintas Largas, they were 
a people who had been involved in numerous wars with their neighbours. As 
we know, the Awajún and the Wampís were in a similar situation. When the 
new ‘adaptive mechanism’ fails, any attempts to act based on the application 
of rules imposed by the new culture proves to be irrational because they 
remain completely ineffective. It can therefore be assumed that the murder of 
garimpeiros, who were perceived as intruders on the Cintas Largas territories, 
was a return to their previous habitus, which is a matrix of perception and 
of action. Dichotomy between what appears to be possible and what appears 
to be impossible is a rule in a subjective representation of the social order. 
When our habitus ceases to prompt us with the right answers and actions, we 
cannot accept the challenge and then we are excluded from the game, and this 
is equivalent to social non-existence. When there are no possibilities of reaction 
and response, this means the ‘loss of the world’ (Jacyno, 1997, pp. 29–30). The 
Cintas Largas did not want to be ‘excluded from the game’ in the same way as 
Jivaro did not want. Both societies were powerless. It seems that they faced the 
dilemma which Bourdieu calls the dilemma of Don Quixote – ‘a life without 
dignity or the dignity of non-life’ (Jacyno, 1997, p. 37).
Amazonian indigenous groups have experienced violence and been subject 
to systemic betrayal by the authorities, army, police and courts. They tried 
to apply the methods of action officially promoted by the ‘white world’ and 
– in theory – used by it. But the use of these types of actions proved to be 
ineffective. The key proposed by the dominant culture, based on the rules of 
said dominant society, did not open any doors, did not solve any problems 
that were to be solved. In this situation, an attempt to ‘open the door’ with 
the ‘old key’ should not come as a surprise. This key is the matrix functioning 
in the ‘traditional’ cultures of these peoples. The use of cultural and physical 
violence against the inhabitants of the Amazon by the authorities and other 
actors from the dominant community supports the reproduction of a pattern 
of war. Thus answering the questions posed at the beginning of this article 
we cannot say that violent actions undertaken by indigenous peoples mean a 
rejection of ‘Western’ ways of doing things, because the various dimensions 
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of violence are used by dominant ‘Western’ society in their attitude toward 
indigenous peoples.
If the conflicts taking place in the region are not transformed, then – 
according to Galtung – ‘peace’ will still only remain in the form of a ‘ceasefire’. 
However, perhaps, this state – of permanent ceasefire – is not ultimately an 
undesirable state. Arjun Appadurai writes, ‘instead of saying that minorities are 
causing the violence, it would be more accurate to say that violence, especially 
at the state level, requires minorities’ (Appadurai, 2009, p. 51). Appadurai 
believes that the state, forced to make concessions on their sovereignty by 
globalisation processes, ‘acts out’ by treating minorities as a threat. ‘The old 
joke about explosions of peace has become a sobering fact in modern society’ 
(Appadurai, 2009, p. 23). Societies in which peace is only a temporary absence 
of war, are in danger of a situation where – according to Achille Mbembe – 
violence or the possibility of it is something commonplace, regular and just a 
matrix (Mbembe, 2003). Breaking the pattern requires strength. When one 
is powerless, all that remains is to surrender to it (Krysińska-Kałużna, 2011).
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5. Neogeography, development and 
human rights in Latin America
Doug Specht
‘We should now talk of people making not their own history but their own 
geography’ – John Urry
Latin America has a long history of exploitation and oppression of populations, moreover it has been suggested that the ‘postcolonial’ quest for rapid national ‘modernisation’ has led to an increase in the 
extractive, neoliberal, policies of corporations and governments working across 
the region (Bryant, 1998, p. 85). Rarely, however, has this been taken lying 
down. Social movements and activist groups are operating all across the region, 
fighting for human rights, land rights, environmental rights, indigenous rights 
and many more in the face of corporate and government oppression. This 
strong history of activist movements and the continuing exploitation of the 
region makes Latin America a suitable location to explore the way knowledge 
is created and disseminated, with a view to promoting social movement 
organisations (SMOs) fighting for development with a focus on human rights. 
Coupled with challenging geographies and a rapid uptake rates of mobile and 
digital technologies, the region presents itself as a prime location to explore 
the interrelation between those movements, spatial knowledges and the use of 
geographic information systems.
One of the first times that the notion that human rights and development 
were intrinsically linked was in the 1995 text ‘The Right Way to Development’ 
(Human Rights Council of Australia, 1995, cited in Sano, 2000), yet the 
concept was not met with universal approval. The idea of development had 
never previously been based upon the notion of human rights, and the authors 
were naive in not making a stronger case for their suggestion that it should 
be. Fast forward just five years, however, and a rather different landscape was 
unfolding. The introduction of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
following the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in 2000, placed 
the notion of Human Rights at the very centre of the development agenda. 
Furthermore, the MDGs committed governments to a particular pattern of 
growth and development, which was equitable and supportive of human rights 
(Fukuda-Parr et al., 2014). While human rights and human development were 
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still distinct conceptual frameworks, each with its own intellectual origins and 
histories, they were finally seen as being related (UNOHCHR, 2006). Despite 
this seeming advancement, by 2005 they were still only seen as ‘ships passing 
in the night’ by many (Alston, 2005). Yet in Latin America, in the face of 
continuous ‘development’ at the hands of the US and the West as a whole, the 
two have been interwoven in the minds of indigenous populations and SMOs 
for centuries (Escobar, 1992b; Mowforth, 2014). The fight for a more even 
process of development in Latin America is indeed a fight for human rights; a 
fight for those things that both the human rights and development frameworks 
have emphasised: ‘the well-being of the individual as the central objective of 
development; equality and non-discrimination in access to economic and 
social opportunities; meaningful participation of individuals in decisions that 
affect their lives and well-being; and adherence to international human rights 
standards’ (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2014). Thus, to continue uneven development, 
something which has almost come to represent the Latin American condition, 
is to continue human rights violations across the region.
Human rights abuses caused by uneven development are, by their very 
nature, an issue of space and spatiality. Development that creates uneven 
geographies of wealth and power – in themselves an abuse of human rights – is 
an essential part of a capitalist society, and is reproduced at all scales from the 
global to the local (Soja, 1989). This story of uneven development is a familiar 
one, and the way in which some places get richer and other places stagnate, 
and the way in which well-connected people get progressively better connected 
relative to the rest, has been well documented (see Castells, 1996; Harvey, 2001; 
Sassen, 2006; Adams and Jansson, 2012). For Lefebvre, this spatial element of 
exploitative development is seen as the ‘instrument of primary importance’. 
The control of space and the segregation and division of these spaces into 
administered and policed areas is in many respects a physical condition of 
the unevenness of development under capitalism (Lefebvre, 2009). Building 
upon this idea of ‘regional underdevelopment’ Soja suggested that it forms ‘an 
integral part of extended or expanded reproduction, creating large reservoirs of 
labour and complementary markets capable of responding to the spasmodic 
and contradictory flow of capitalist productivity’ (1989, p. 105).
Maps have long been employed in the creation of these uneven geographies, 
and to control the space of exploitation. From their outset maps were used to 
demarcate property and value. The oldest surviving map, which dates from 
c.2300 BC, shows the ownership of property in the Babylonian society. Later 
in c.600 BC the Babylonians began to create world maps, omitting the Persians 
and Egyptians, perhaps the first solid example of mapping-as-power. Through 
the Enlightenment, the development of ‘true’ science was often represented in 
art through the use of the tools of cartography, and the age of exploration led 
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to the expansion of maps that revealed the territories sought and controlled by 
dominant Western powers. As the colonial project expanded its way across the 
globe, Latin America became increasingly mapped and remapped. From 1492 
control over these territories was increasingly solidified not just through force 
and murder, but also through a re-rendering of space through maps, creating 
a scientific basis for the exploitation and extermination of populations in new-
found lands. These maps were more than a mathematical representation of 
space; instead they embodied the knowledge and world-view of their creators, 
and sought to support the will of the powerful (Potts, 2015).
If maps then, which outside the fiction of Borges’ celebrated story ‘On 
Exactitude in Science’, are purely rhetorical devices, that do not merely, or 
perhaps cannot truly, represent space, but rather shape arguments and create 
identities and space for the powerful, could it be that counter-maps can subvert 
this dynamic, giving space for subjugated knowledges? There is a long tradition 
of making maps that present alternative interpretations of various landscapes 
and these are often used to reveal implicit relationships between power, control, 
and spatial practice, and this is a practice that is becoming easier to access 
through the use of digital tools such as Google Earth (Institute for Applied 
Autonomy, 2008). This chapter seeks to explore how maps are used to control 
the exploitation of resources in Latin America, with a focus on Colombia, and 
the role of counter-maps in redressing these power dynamics, and to question 
how this might draw us towards a true post-development era.
Post?-development and knowledge
There has been much talk about a digital post-development era, where tools 
such as big data might revolutionise the way in which development work is 
done and the way in which local knowledge and understanding is included in 
this work. Perhaps the clearest example is the establishment of the UN Global 
Pulse project, headed by Robert Kirkpatrick, an organisation set up in 1998 to 
explore the way in which data can be used to create knowledge for development 
projects. This idea of data and knowledge being fundamental to development 
was in many ways born from the World Bank study ‘Voices of the Poor’ which 
concluded that many people desired access to knowledge rather than charity 
to enable them to move out of poverty (Narayan, 2000, cited in Hordijk 
and Baud, 2006, p. 671). Furthermore, as the drive towards the Sustainable 
Development Goals continues, the Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network (SDSN, 2015) suggests that given the ‘breadth and complexity of 
the SDG agenda, many different types of data will be required (demographic, 
economic, social, and environmental) with varying levels of coverage’ (p. 12). 
Yet for all this focus on data and its new-found abundance, the route out of 
underdevelopment has remained a series of hoop-jumping exercises prescribed 
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by the West and performed by the rest (to paraphrase Niall Ferguson). This 
form of ‘development’ continues to offer little in the way of ‘advancement’; 
for the majority of people, although there are of course exceptions, it is 
clear that the West continues to have a profound affect in ‘mapping [the 
South’s] social landscape, sculpting their economies [and] transforming their 
cultures’ both literally and figuratively (Escobar, 1992a). This has important 
implications when examining the way in which knowledge is created and 
used in mobilisations of the global South. There appears to be a need to make 
local knowledge and understandings of local situations more easily accessible 
and valued in order to support grassroot movements in the global South who 
seek to have control over their own development, development agendas and 
territories. According to Dove and Carpenter (2008, p. 4), local people and 
particularly indigenous peoples have important knowledge based on intimate 
and prolonged interaction with a given set of biophysical conditions and, as a 
result, local people are best placed to understand and regulate those conditions 
in most cases (see also Hurst, 1990; Banuri and Apffel Marglin, 1993; 
Colchester and Lohmann, 1993).
The continued imbalance of data used, collected and analysed for 
development projects is perpetuated through the differing weights attributed 
to knowledges. Certain formulations are considered as ‘truth’, others as ‘false’. 
‘The work of cultural and political ecologists has demonstrated how subordinate 
groups are dis-empowered by the characterization of their understandings of the 
natural world as non-scientific, tradition bound, overly risk-adverse, shaped by 
superstition, or simply biased’ (Goldman et al., 2011, p. 9). In many cases, it is 
this competition about the legitimacy of knowledge that is central to the way 
in which disputes over the appropriateness of development projects form and 
develop. It has long been ‘scientific’, ‘Western’ knowledge that has been used 
to ‘settle’ arguments, while the problems on the ground manifest themselves in 
the form of Western scientists ‘proving’ that certain truths remain.
There is no single definition of knowledge. Nevertheless, an important 
distinction can be made between information and knowledge. While the 
former consists of hard numbers, data and facts, the latter involves personal 
experience (Ackoff, 1989). There is also a large variety of knowledge existing 
among different actors (Somers 2012, p. 14). According to Hordijk and Baud 
(2006), to build knowledge from information, context must be added. Since 
context is influenced by individual perspectives, it affects the meaning and 
value of knowledge. Further to this, ideas can never be seen as innocent but 
‘either reinforce or challenge existing social and economic arrangements’ 
(Bryant, 1998, p. 87). Indeed, from a critical theoretical stance it is possible 
to suggest that knowledge is always there ‘for someone and for some purpose’. 
There is always a connection between the knower and the known and thus it 
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would be impossible to consider knowledge as ‘neutral’, but rather it is value-
laden and constructed from interests (Hordijk & Baud, 2006, p. 672). 
There are essentially two basic analytical models of knowledge-building. 
The first one is the classical linear model of knowledge, which relies on 
expert and scientific knowledge systems. The underlying assumption for this 
model is that codified knowledge is universally applicable, independent of the 
context in which it is produced (Baud et al., 2011). This perspective has been 
widely criticised for being ignorant towards social circumstances and existing 
hegemonic knowledge discourses. The second model recognises the existence 
of several types and sources of knowledge and understands knowledge building 
as a social process, ‘produced by interactions between researchers, citizens 
and organizations’ (Somers, 2012, p. 14). This second mode of knowledge 
production lends itself to building counter-narratives through recognising 
the importance of individual experiences for the building and production 
of knowledge. Taking this as a starting point for new modes of knowledge 
construction might enable marginalised communities to own and leverage the 
same kind of knowledge and data that are so often used as arguments to their 
disadvantage in policy decisions (Hordijk and Baud, 2006, p. 677). 
As has already been alluded to, different types of knowledge are produced 
by different actors. Van Ewijk and Baud (2009) make a distinction between 
three different forms of knowledge that might be produced by these actors. 
The first type is tacit knowledge, which is built up through individual practice 
and experience. Contextually embedded knowledge consists of technical, 
economic and political, as well as community-based and social knowledge and 
is embedded in technical, social and political networks. This form of knowledge 
is also created through practice, but is more widespread than tacit knowledge. 
The third knowledge type identified by Van Ewijk and Baud is called codified 
knowledge and is expressed systematically. Circulating mainly in the academic 
sphere, a great deal of it being laid down in written documentation. Although 
this distinction is quite useful for the categorisation of knowledge, it should 
be noted that none of these forms of knowledge can claim to be universal 
or ‘true’, nor independent of the influence of dominant discourses. What is 
important to note however, is which knowledges are and are not included in 
each of these forms. It is by ‘excluding certain forms of knowledge – such as 
practical experience and traditional knowledge – that more powerful actors 
can also exclude the interests of the less powerful: invalidating an argument by 
contesting the source of knowledge and the legitimacy of the claim’ (Hordijk 
and Baud, 2006, p. 673). 
There are numerous actions that can create these knowledges, and numerous 
artefacts that can contain them. To explore all these and their values is beyond 
the scope of this chapter; rather the focus is drawn towards the way in which 
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS114
these knowledges are constructed, codified and shared through cartographic 
(primarily the PGIS) artefacts.
Maps, neogeography and power
Issues of power over knowledge have persisted in the studies of knowledge 
construction and dissemination through geographical and cartographic 
artefacts. Much of the literature points to maps being created through classical 
linear constructions of knowledge by experts that is then imposed upon 
the other. This supports the dominant Eurocentric and Western discourse 
and Western knowledge systems that have been used as ‘an instrument of 
cultural violence on the Third World’ and which through their production, 
accumulation, circulation and functioning permeate rigid power structures 
(Escobar, 1992b). Recently, however, the field of cartography has moved in 
directions unimaginable just ten years ago. In the ‘last few years cartography 
has been slipping from the control of the powerful elites that have exercised 
dominance over it for several hundred years’, and while much control is still 
exercised by organisations such as Google or Esri, spaces have been opening up 
through reduced costs, alternative platforms and increasingly accessible APIs 
and interfaces bringing about the conditions for the creation of ‘neogeography’ 
and the democratisation of participation (Crampton and Krygier, 2006). 
Maps are no longer being solely produced and reproduced by trained elite, 
but along with most other information we create them when we need them 
ourselves (Crampton and Krygier, 2006). Maps and spatial representations 
produced by local people have a long history, and very possibly a prehistory 
(Chambers, 2006, p. 2). All maps have an inherent power and objectives, 
just as all knowledges have inherent power and objectives. Indeed, maps are 
often seen a visual representation of knowledge; ‘space is fundamental in any 
exercise of power’ (Foucault, cited in Soja, 1989, p. 19). The power held within 
maps is not necessarily negative, nor does it necessarily need to be removed; 
indeed if power has repressive affects it also produces subjects who act freely 
and many problems of politics and power require spatial knowledge (Brewster 
and Althusser, 2001; Foucault, 1980). New information technologies allow 
for the challenging of elites, a challenge that should be embraced by social 
movements rather than feared. Maps may now be much more readily used by 
people for the production of space and place and combined with the political 
identities of the people who inhabit the spaces represented by the map (Pickles, 
1992), moving them beyond being a purely communicative tool (Crampton, 
2001) and expanding their emphasis from the delivery of information to also 
encompass its exploration. It is this shift to the self-construction of space and 
cartographic artefacts through new information technologies that has brought 
around a reimagining of the term neogeoraphy. While not wholly new in its 
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ideas, neogeography has found a reawakening and redefining since 2006. The 
term refers to techniques, tools and practices of geography that have been 
traditionally beyond the scope of professional geographers and geographic 
information systems (GIS) practitioners (Turner, 2006). Rather, neogeography 
embodies a diverse set of practices that operate outside, or alongside, or in 
the manner of, the practices of professional geographers (Szott, 2006). For 
Goodchild (2009), neogeography goes even further than just changing 
practices or the inclusion of more people, but also implies a reinvention of 
geography, in which the traditional roles of expert producer of geographic 
information and amateur user have broken down, with the amateur becoming 
both a producer and user. This change in the way maps are produced, and 
thus the alternative power over maps and what they represent, has significant 
implications for NGOs and social movements operating within the terms of 
geographical change and human rights (Crampton, 2001).
Academic cartographic production has often ignored the power relationships 
of maps, however in a neogeographical age maps must be viewed through the 
more critical cartographic lens, a discipline that arose during the 1990s, but 
which has achieved greater prominence in recent years (Crampton and Krygier, 
2006, p. 11). There is already an extensive body of literature examining how 
maps become sites of knowledge and power. Key writers in the field include 
Harley (1989), Wood (2003) and Pickles (1992; 1995). Pickles views maps as 
being a production of space and place combined with the political identities 
of the people who inhabit the spaces represented by the map. Harley was more 
inclined by Foucaultian thinking, bringing poststructuralism to the world of 
cartography, which had previously viewed maps purely as a communicative 
tool (Crampton, 2001). These shifts mean that cartography is now being 
positioned away from the hand of experts and has expanded its emphasis from 
the delivery of information to encompass its exploration. This change in power 
over maps has significant implications for social movement organisations 
operating against geographical changes and over large areas, allowing for the 
inclusion of occluded and subjugated knowledges within debates (Crampton 
and Krygier, 2006). While the differences in power between these types of 
maps still needs to be considered and addressed, a space for multiple spatial 
perspectives is growing.
A harmony between the scientific maps of old and newly ‘hacked’ maps 
means it is now possible to express a variety of knowledges in co-existence. As 
Robbins (2003) puts it: 
By simultaneously allowing the expression of a variety of knowledges – 
those apparently distant as well as those apparently proximate to that of 
the researcher – with the same tool, and including both those of producers 
and those of professional planners, this approach to GIS creates a level 
playing field for comparing knowledge consensus and division. In so doing 
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it allows a wider exploration of the cultural and political conditions that 
direct human understandings of the environment (Robbins, 2003, p. 238).
In this vein, Harley (1989) has suggested that a single map should consist 
of multiple, competing visualisations. These should not however be created 
by an expert cartographer, but produced by the users themselves on the spot 
(Crampton, 2001, p. 236). These ‘counter-maps’ which express local knowledge 
in cartographic form can form a powerful tool in promoting the rights of 
communities (Robbins, 2003). These kinds of mapping exercises have been 
known to researchers for a long time, and the development of participatory 
geographic information systems allowed researchers to draw out maps from 
communities representing the community’s world view and priorities. This 
kind of ‘bottom-up’ GIS has been lauded as very successful in promoting the 
inclusion of marginalised communities (Robbins, 2003; see also McCall, 2003; 
McCall and Dunn, 2012; Rambaldi et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that beyond including marginalised 
knowledges, GIS can also be used to interrogate knowledge itself, exploring links 
between production and information, politics and ideas. Robbins (2003) has 
suggested that while previously GIS has been used to eliminate epistemologies 
and codify knowledge into set rigors, the fast changing digital landscape and 
an increase of PGIS, there is a potential that participatory mapping will be 
at the forefront of breaking down these barriers and opening up new ideas 
on the production of knowledge itself. Indeed, going beyond pure PGIS, it 
is possible to ‘elicit competing localities and ground truths, and so enunciate 
and draw conflict to the centre of attention’ (Robbins, 2003, p. 249). Much 
will depend on how GIS technologies are made available to the world, and 
how much importance ‘conventional’ science and society is willing to place 
on these new maps (Chambers, 2006). Yet with the speed of technological 
advancement, effectively putting PGIS in the hands of billions of people, the 
role of the researcher as a facilitator and teacher of GIS is becoming less and 
less important. Therefore the people, the real power of PGIS, are taking centre 
stage, allowing for a true shift in the way GIS is used, and the way knowledge 
is created, shared and used. 
The power laden within maps has been made clear; however, engaging with 
marginalised and oppressed communities and fostering new maps that begin 
to redress the power balance is a more complex task altogether. For starters 
‘most local people, asked if they can make a map, say no’ (Chambers, 2006, 
p. 6). Yet in reality the ability to make a map, even a stunning interactive 3D 
map, is now available to anyone with a home computer or smart mobile and 
an internet connection (Crampton and Krygier, 2006, p. 12). Even without 
online resources Chambers (2006) found that his reluctant participants were 
able to produce maps with only limited support, but with enough time to work 
117NEOGEOGRAPHY, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS
it out for themselves. The wealth of resources now available via the internet 
makes this process even more personal than that experienced by Chambers in 
2006, and further removes the need to consult an expert. These new resources 
are not so much new mapping software but rather a mixture of open source 
collaborative tools, mobile mapping applications, and geotagging programmes 
(Crampton and Krygier, 2006, p. 12). 
The role of creating maps has become diffused, and thus the power in them 
spread. There is however the issue of learning how to and where to produce 
the map, or even why. And although the internet’s many resources address this 
to the converted, to gain the full wealth of knowledge to produce a map of 
substantive use requires involving as many people in the process as possible. 
Here participatory GIS plays out its role. ‘PGIS practice is geared towards 
community empowerment through measured, demand driven, user friendly 
and integrated applications of geo-spatial technologies’ (Rambaldi et al., 2006, 
p. 2). In order for PGIS to work, effective participation is required. This does 
not mean that the facilitator is required to be on site with the respondents, 
but involves ensuring that mapping software and apps are built in such a way 
as to allow for high levels of participation. Software should be simple to use, 
with the correct language in the user interface, the correct software for all 
devices and the necessary precautions must be undertaken to protect users and 
information. PGIS should also have an emphasis on the product rather than 
the outcome of a map. This changing information and constant adaptation are 
strengths rather than weaknesses (Rambaldi et al., 2006). Furthermore ‘good 
PGIS practice is embedded into long lasting spatial decision making processes, 
depends on multidisciplinary facilitation and skills and builds essentially on 
visual language’ (Rambaldi et al., 2006, p. 2). 
Participatory GIS or mapping projects focused on community-based and 
non-mainstream activities are then situated in the second type of knowledge 
identified by Van Ewijk and Baud (2009): contextual-embedded knowledge. 
Since community-based knowledge is always related to a specific locality, 
there is a spatial dimension to that form of knowledge, and it is important 
to note the effect of this spatial dimension on the formation and validation 
of this knowledge. Baud points out, that ‘spatializing knowledge provides 
the researcher with different types of knowledge existing within the same 
space’ (2011, p. 10). Furthermore, when discussing the knowledge systems of 
marginalised communities, the interplay of space, power and framing become 
increasingly important, and many geographers would argue that the spatial 
location and context is critical to seeing why the political and knowledge 
process of these communities develop the way they do (Miller, 2000, cited 
in Leach and Scoones, 2007). Increasingly however this spatial context is 
becoming wide and diffuse as links are made between diverse local sites across 
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global spaces, constituting forms of ‘globalisation from below’ (Appadurai, 
2002, cited in Leach and Scoones, 2007, pp. 13–14). 
Knowledge into action
Potts, building on the work of historian Brian Harley, argues that ‘cartographers 
manufacture power’ (2015, p. 19). Understanding this, and understanding 
how that power can transfer to counter-maps is well and good, but moving 
towards a human rights focused post-development era still requires action in 
both the production and understanding of these newly revealed knowledges. 
The use of spatial data by humanitarian and environmental organisations 
and projects has exploded in the last five years, driven by drastically reduced 
costs and a proliferation of open source mapping tools and data collection 
applications. The release of Google’s Forest Watch via their outreach project, 
Map Action’s work on tracking the Ebola epidemic, hacked maps such as 
Harass Map in Egypt, and emerging platforms such as Voz, which maps human 
and environmental rights, have all helped to highlight the potential of maps 
and geospatial representations in codifying local knowledge and presenting it 
in quickly accessible and useable formats. Using a combination of rich data 
sources, often collected through mobile devices, coupled with advancements in 
processing capabilities, we are able to turn ever larger, imperfect, complex and 
often unstructured data into actionable information with increased speed and 
efficiency (Hilbert, 2013; Burns, 2014). The release of free and open source 
yet highly powerful and adaptable applications has led to a proliferation of 
map hacking; the practice of exploiting open-source mapping applications 
or by combining one site’s functionality with another’s. These exploitations 
are possible because of extensible markup language (XML) and application 
programming interfaces (APIs) (Crampton and Krygier, 2005). This has taken 
us beyond merely increasing the ease with which spatial data can be digitised, 
but as the neogeographical age progresses, it is allowing for the repurposing 
of such spatial data, opening up the concept of geography and cartography 
and allowing for its ‘repackaging’ via digital media and the internet (Wilson 
and Graham, 2013). Foucault may have seen these new developments within 
digital media and ICT as being able to invert his previous metaphors of the 
panopticon, which consisted of oppressive self-regulation (Foucault, 2007). 
Rather these new information technologies allow for the challenging of elites. 
It is conceded that this reversal is not without its flaws, and it is still possible 
for corporations to hide malpractices; it is however a step towards holding 
the bourgeois elite to account through public participation in observing and 
monitoring through new digital means, turning the mirror back on those in 
power (Foucault, 1980; Garrett, 2006).
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This presents exciting opportunities for NGOs and social movements. 
Without falling into the trap of technological determinism, these opportunities 
could be expected to grow further in line with the growth of the technologies 
needed to utilise geographic information systems and their associated 
applications and tools (Smith and Marx, 1994). By 2020, more than 70 
per cent of mobile phones are expected to have GPS capability, up from 20 
per cent in 2010 (Smith and Marx, 1994), leading to a massive increase in 
availability of spatially located data. The connections between these increases 
in the accessibility of geospatial digital tools, activism and SMOs, however, is 
still an emerging field, and one that changes as quickly as it is written about. 
It is though ‘rarely contested that digital media have an impact on civic and 
political involvement’ (Anduiza et al., 2014, p. 1). Exactly what this impact is 
and what role knowledge creation and use through spatial media play largely 
remain open questions. 
As previously stated, the last eight years have seen significant developments 
in the worlds of digital media and participatory geographic information 
systems, and the future promises many more changes. So, what then does 
the neogeographical age mean in terms of positioning local knowledges, 
those defined by Foucault as, emerging from particular people, settings, sites, 
points and networks, that have an effect on challenging ‘totalitarian theories’, 
within the social movement organisations of Latin America? This geographic 
‘insurrection of knowledges’ to continue the use of Foucault’s terminology 
(Wood, 2003, p. 9) has seemingly occurred overnight, with a massive increase 
in map hacking and access, although it has not been without its problems 
and opponents. The process has been diffuse, as it occurs from the bottom up 
with little top-down control. Despite this, it is a movement that is expected 
to grow and develop whether or not the academic discipline of cartography 
is involved (Wood, 2003). Some scholars have argued that this is leading to 
cartography becoming undisciplined, yet rather when framed in terms of 
providing access to knowledge and platforms for knowledge creation it is 
perhaps better to think of it in terms of becoming ‘freed from the confines 
of the academic and opened up to the people’ (Crampton and Krygier, 2006, 
p. 12). This socialised, free cartography does not fit easily into any of the 
traditional scientific camps. MacEachren and Taylor (2013) produced a model 
and concept of ‘Cartography cubed’ (C3) which highlights the differences 
between visualisation and traditional cartography. Cartography cubed enables 
us to understand the way in which different maps are used and by whom and 
for whom they are produced. The ‘cube’ contains three dimensions: private–
public, high interactivity–low interactivity and revealing knowns–exploring 
unknowns (see Figure 1). Traditional cartography has emphasised public use, 
low interactivity and revealing knowns, while visualisation emphasises private 
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use, high interactivity and exploring unknowns (Crampton, 2001, p. 244). 
The kind of open source mapping that would provide a basis for knowledge 
production for social movement organisations would fall between public use, 
high interactivity and exploring unknowns, at least unknown to the dominant 
discourse and elites. In this way, it shares characteristics with both visualisation 
theory and traditional cartographies. 
Figure 1
In order for social movements to move towards this public, highly interactive, 
exploration of unknowns; for this situated knowledge to then promote 
international attention and for local knowledge to influence dominant, 
oppressive and neo-liberal discourses, it must be translated into a tactical 
counter-cartography. The notion of tactical cartography was put forward by 
the Institute for Applied Autonomy (2008), building upon the ideas of tactical 
media as a direct challenge to the presumed neutrality of mapmakers. ‘Tactical 
cartographers make claims about not only landscapes, but also about their own 
status as authors of spatial narrative. In creating maps that confront power, 
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tactical cartographers claim their right to set the rules of debate and to provide 
interpretations of local events with both an authority and a contingency equal 
to official representations’ (Institute for Applied Autonomy, 2008, p. 35). So, 
while this breaks down the notion of the map as the territory, the work of the 
Car-Tac Collective resonates: ‘to make maps is to organize oneself, to generate 
new connections and to be able to transform the material and immaterial 
conditions in which we find ourselves immersed’, the map they assert ‘isn’t 
the territory but it definitely produces territory’ (cited in Casas-Cortes and 
Cobarrubias, 2008, p. 64).
Here the construction of counter-maps begins to touch upon the field of 
representation, indeed, as noted earlier, no map is perfectly accurate, they in 
themselves are only representations (three dimensions flattened into two), and 
the counter-maps offer only an alternative representation. While this chapter 
does not pertain to discuss in depth the complexities of representation, it 
is important, at least briefly, to consider some key elements when turning 
knowledge into action. The kind of self-representation offered by counter-
maps will not automatically free the occluded from their oppression (Kidd, 
2016) but this kind of representation, which no longer requires intermediaries 
to call, invite, edit or prescribe in any way what the text produced will turn 
out to be, presents important implications. Firstly, to borrow from Stuart Hall, 
because ‘representation is a site of active political, cultural and social movement 
within which, each and every one of us implicated’ (1997, p. 343). But further 
because space is a participatory construction, and thus we are all implicated here 
too (Adams and Jansson, 2012). So, to avoid the no-win situation described by 
Joe Bryan as ‘map or be mapped’, the insertion of self-representation within a 
culture of tactical cartographies becomes paramount to their importance and 
power (cited in Paglen, 2008).
A number of examples of mapping tools and techniques have been alluded 
to and discussed through this chapter, and there are a number of researchers 
who have studied this practice empirically, notably Joe Bryan and his work 
on the ongoing struggles of indigenous peoples in the US and Nicaragua. To 
solidify the importance of such tactical counter mapping insurrections, here 
is a short example of the use of maps in creating counter-narratives around 
mining projects in Colombia.
Colombia’s liberalisation of the mining sector and recent stability have 
brought a ‘gold rush’ of large mining multinationals seeking to exploit the 
country’s significant reserves, which include 12 of the world’s largest gold 
deposits. Amongst them was the South African giant AngloGold Ashanti 
(AGA), which began local prospecting in the early 2000s. Their finds included 
a rich seam of gold with estimated inferred resources of 20 million ounces of 
gold, with a density of 3.3 pounds per ton of ore (Llewellyn, 2013) running 
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS122
through the Tolima region and directly under the town of Cajamarca, but at 
the time it was considered inaccessible due to ongoing security risks. Since 
2009, however, the company has redoubled its efforts, spending millions to 
promote the benefits of the mine (La Colosa) and stimulate the mining sector 
in the region.
In 2013, with low inflation and Colombia’s economy growing at 4.2 per cent, 
Cajamarca’s residents were split down the middle over the costs and benefits of 
the proposed mine. But in the March 2017 referendum a remarkable 98 per 
cent of residents rejected AngloGold Ashanti’s attempt to turn the town into 
the world’s largest gold mine. Though the company is likely to pursue a legal 
challenge, it may well be thwarted by laws on collective rights. So how did local 
social-movement organisations achieve this shift in a context of subsistence 
farming and severe poverty where the appeal of jobs and prosperity could easily 
outweigh concerns about the environment?
The main mining concession lies 14 km from the town of Cajamarca 
and 6 km from the main highway, and the concession itself covers 600 km2 
which includes lands in and around the town of Cajamarca and significant 
proportions of the Coello basin (Llewellyn, 2013). If it becomes operational, 
La Colosa will form the largest open cast mine in South America, and will 
add significantly to AngloGold Ashanti’s portfolio within Colombia, which 
already consists of concessions in 20 departments and covering approximately 
15,000 km2, and which has involved US$255 million of investment. Despite 
AngloGold Ashanti’s ‘commitment to environmental stewardship’, there are 
significant concerns about the environmental and human rights impacts of La 
Colosa (Specht and Ros-Tonen, 2016). These concerns are based around firstly 
the potential destruction of the páramo where, according to the Colombian 
mining code, mining is not permitted, and also around the use of rivers and 
the potential for contamination of the water table (Specht and Ros-Tonen, 
2016). The very nature and size of Anglo-Gold Ashanti’s operations embeds 
these concerns deeply in the spatial imperative. The boundaries of the mining 
concession, the physical proximity of water sources, land ownership, access 
routes, the displacement of peoples and the fundamental physical scarring of 
the landscape place space at the heart of the project and so to at the heart 
of its resistance. It is then little wonder that it is digital mapping tools that 
are providing the backbone to the legal struggle against this major extractive 
project as well as informing public opinion. A very significant example where 
spatialised data played a role is in trips to the páramo areas. Rather than using 
maps with the public, the landscape itself offers a connection to spatialised 
information. ‘Some people have never seen what they are about to lose,’ says 
Fernando Peréz, a local activist interviewed by the author; ‘as soon as they see 
it their opinion about the mine begins to change’. To this end the SMOs in 
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the area would arrange to take people by jeep up into the high hills around 
the area. These trips were generally seen as eye-opening and awe-inspiring 
experiences that were sure to change people’s minds. Sadly though, the costs, 
both in terms of fuel and jeep hire, as well as in terms of time – each trip was 
a full 12–hour day – meant that they were unable to reach many people this 
way. Instead, to further support showing people to the páramo, a 3D model 
of the area has been constructed by local groups, headed by Semillas de Agua, 
to show to those who are unable to make the trip. The model, when used, was 
invaluable in being able to show the extent of the mining project, and just how 
much land would be lost. The marking of springs and water sources also made 
it clear just how likely it was that the water table would be damaged. Showing 
the community what would be lost in such a spatial/visual way enabled the 
SMOs to develop stronger arguments and convince the local population of 
the potentially destructive nature of La Colosa. Furthermore the model and 
other maps placed the people within the landscape, inserted their knowledge 
into the discussion through the inclusion of local understandings that were not 
represented on official maps. The maps produced were used tactically to call the 
mining company and government to account, demonstrating that it was not 
only the mining company that could produce data, that not only the mining 
company could codify that data. Rather, these counter-maps represented 
alternative knowledges and alternative power dynamics. 
During fieldwork, the community of Cajamarca was bitterly divided over 
the desirability and impact of AngloGold Ashanti’s La Colosa project. Tensions 
were high on all sides, including the government’s. The situation boiled over on 
a number of occasions, most tragically with the killing of Pedro César García 
Moreno, a member of SMO Conciencia Campesina, who was shot and killed 
in November 2013. The military were also regularly deployed to the town, 
complete with armoured vehicles, rocket launchers and riot-squad support. In 
a few short years the situation has changed beyond recognition. SMOs have 
managed to bring about a massive shift in the attitudes of the local population 
and have recently achieved a bold and important victory in having the mining 
concession closed, at least for the time being. Contestatory cartography is but 
one of the many tools that SMOs have used to galvanise the population of 
Cajamarca. The SMOs would rather invest in GIS software and tools than in 
social media training or campaigns. Despite the limitations of such tools, as 
highlighted by Baud et al. (2011) – including and not limited to: the expense 
of software; levels of expertise required; requirements of data accuracy; and its 
tendency to promote scientific over local knowledges – these maps and models 
represent a creative use of spatial knowledge that can and should be noted by 
scholars and activists the world over. And we should seek to further explore the 
ability of maps and geographic data to codify knowledge in a way that is seen 
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as legitimate and scientifically grounded (Robbins, 2003) in the context of 
human rights and development.
Conclusion
It was back in 2006 that Sarah Elwood of the University of Washington 
asked why, if so much has changed in terms of how geographic information 
systems work, and how they are used, are we still being asked questions about 
access, representation, expertise and power? Now over a decade later her 
question remains pertinent. Much of the work of movements using geospatial 
technologies relies on a degree of local participation, either actively or through 
Volunteered Geographic Information (VGI), yet, as previously stated, when 
most people are asked if they can make a map, they say no. To take this at 
face value and to ignore the spatial knowledge of these groups though is to 
miss an exciting opportunity to overturn the classical mode of map production 
that supports knowledge building that were, or are, colonial and oppressive in 
nature, and to usher in a true age of neogeography codifying local knowledges 
in such a way to enable them to break into the main. 
Spatialised knowledge is perhaps still confined to reproducing forms 
of western scientific knowledge and is yet to fully transcend the barriers of 
epistemology into a more participatory form allowing for the opening up of 
ideas around knowledge production itself (Robbins, 2003; see also section 
2.2). Spatialised knowledge is still very much held by key individuals and ‘there 
is the risk of furthering inequality if the population of social media users is 
skewed toward the technologically savvy and those with high human, social, 
and economic capital’ (Valenzuela, 2012, p. 17). There is, however, little doubt 
that Ziccardi (2013) is right to suggest that ‘a smart use of technology can 
help the expansion and the manifestation of human rights’ especially in the 
development context.
Maps always have been and always will be social constructs that must be 
viewed in the context of their inherent power, their relationship to the public 
and private sectors, their seeking or representation of knowledges and their 
levels of human interaction. A map is not objectively ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ that 
which is represented, nor can one track back from the representation to some 
ultimate object, knowledge or mind. One of the important implications of this 
is that we must accept maps as rhetorical devices which dismantle the ‘arbitrary 
dualism’ of propaganda versus ‘true’ maps or scientific versus artistic maps 
(Harley, 1989; Crampton, 2001, p. 240). The ease, though, with which many 
people can now access and produce maps is breaking down many of the old 
theories of how maps are used. There is a significant shift in the power of maps 
and the sources of the information they represent. While still a long way from 
fully changing global power dynamics, the marriage between digital media and 
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PGIS is open space for new and exciting conversations, and more importantly 
a lot more people are inviting themselves to the conversation. 
The rise of digital technology presents some exciting new opportunities for 
international development and social movements in Latin America, however, 
they are not a ‘silver bullet’ or even a straightforward solution for universal 
inclusion, or insurrection, of these alternative and local knowledges. It is easy 
to view maps and digital mapping platforms as just neutral tools that can be 
used both to promote good and bad causes. However, in doing so, we would 
fail to address the conscious and subconscious agendas that run through the 
creation of such tools. Every technology and digital interface is built based 
upon the ideologies of the creator, whether they are aware of them or not, and it 
is thus impossible to suggest true neutrality. Digital technologies are inherently 
a conservative force that can lull people into thinking that they are creating 
change, all the while pacifying them from making any real changes; they ‘make 
it easier for [people] to express themselves, but harder for that expression to 
have any impact’ (Gladwell, 2010, n.p.). Indeed, information collected online 
and through GIS, and other places such as big data, might be louder and 
quicker than ever before, but nothing guarantees that those voices will be acted 
upon once they are heard; success is not automatic. Questions around access 
also still persist, and while the digital divide is narrowing in terms of access to 
technology it is essential to remember that society’s most vulnerable people 
are likely to be significantly underrepresented when collecting data through 
digital technology. Caution too should be taken not to open a new digital 
divide around the power of analytics; it must be remembered that ‘computers 
will talk to anyone, but only the wealthy teach them to speak’ (Cubitt, cited in 
Summerhayes, 2015).
There is in motion a significant shift in the power of maps and the sources 
of the information they represent. While still a long way from fully changing 
global power dynamics, the percentage of people around the globe who are 
still offline vastly outstrips those who might be considered online (Broadband 
Commission, 2015), and while acknowledging that data will not necessarily 
lead to better policy making and more accountability (Stuart et al., 2015, p. 
46), ‘many people and projects have demonstrated that the internet can indeed 
be harnessed to challenge entrenched economic, cultural and political interests’ 
(Graham, 2013, p. 9).
As we fully enter the age of neogeography we may have the opportunity 
to evolve a model of working that does not perpetuate the neo-colonial 
dependency theory-based models of knowledge management. While trying to 
avoid the trap of romanticising of the indigenous it is important to remember 
that local people, and particularly indigenous peoples, have important 
knowledge based on intimate and prolonged interaction with a given set of 
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biophysical conditions and that, as a result, local people are often best placed 
to understand and regulate those conditions in most cases. It is essential to 
include these knowledges in our work, our maps and to foster the creation of 
counter-maps in order to foster a true post-development era. Escobar (1992a) 
suggested that an acknowledgement of local knowledge as equal to that of 
Western knowledge systems is required to move from neo-colonial/neo-liberal 
forms of development and fully into the post-development era. Using counter-
maps, tactical cartographies and understanding that uneven development is, by 
its very nature, an issue of space and spatiality, it may be possible to strike down 
the current paradigm of the postcolonial quest and build something new: a 
new mode of development, with true human rights at its centre.
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6. From human rights to an urbanising 
environmental politics: understanding flood and 
landslide vulnerability in Brazil’s coastal mountains
Robert Coates
As the world’s urban population approaches 60 per cent of the total, split roughly in half between metropolises and cities of less than 500,000 (UNDESA, 2014), a key commentator, Erik Swyngedouw (2015), 
argues that our analysis must move from an ‘urban politics of the environment’ 
to an ‘urbanizing environmental politics’. Making the ongoing extension of 
urban materiality a starting point for enquiry – rather than an inevitability, or 
an uncomfortable side effect of other processes – reveals that the vast majority 
of space and territory (state, rural, marine, or otherwise) is in some way 
mobilised, demarcated, or managed in the service of the urban. Latin America 
is a particularly stark exemplar, where some 80 per cent of people now reside in 
urban areas (UNDESA, 2014), and where diverse manifestations of ‘the rural’ 
are increasingly concentrated in large-scale extractivism, or else ecosystem service 
markets – all destined to either supply, or offset damages from, urban growth at 
home or overseas. Indeed, the very ideas of ‘sustainability’ and ‘resilience’ reveal 
the key contemporary environmental paradox: that tremendous effort is being 
expended on micro-engineering socio-ecological relationships at interrelated 
political scales, whilst simultaneously these actions themselves demonstrate 
awareness of urban deterioration and precarity (Swyngedouw, 2015). Could it 
be that environmental politics itself urbanises?
This chapter examines the construction of vulnerability to flood and 
landslide in a medium-sized Brazilian city – Nova Friburgo, in Rio de Janeiro 
state – and asks what significance human rights discourse has to understanding 
(and ultimately reducing) vulnerability, in the context of an urbanising 
politics. Floods and landslides are on the rise in Latin America, as they are 
globally. From Ciudad Juárez in Mexico to Medellín in Colombia, and from 
Bogotá right down to Santa Fe in Argentina, rainy-season tragedies annually 
affect urban areas, and this has prompted a variety of recent scholarship on 
vulnerability, climate change, and risk reduction (see, for example, Collins, 
2009; Hardoy and Pandiella, 2009; Hardoy et al., 2011; Rubin and Rossing, 
2012; Valencio, 2014; Winchester and Szalachman, 2009; Zeiderman, 2012). 
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In Brazil these types of disaster manifest chiefly along the 3,000 km length of 
the coastal Serra do Mar mountain range – and most notably within its urban 
areas in the states of Santa Catarina, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Espírito 
Santo. Guerra (1995) notes a gradual increase, through the 20th century, in 
landslides in Petrópolis (Rio de Janeiro state), while Sherbinin et al. (2007) 
discuss the occurrence of the first recorded hurricane in the South Atlantic, 
which inundated Santa Catarina state in 2004 and led to numerous casualties. 
Four years later, floods and landslides caused one hundred deaths in the same 
state, and this was followed by widespread land slips in Rio in 2010, which 
killed some 250 and left thousands homeless. Scarcely a year later, over 1,000 
people died in a similar extreme-weather event in the cities of Nova Friburgo, 
Teresópolis and Petrópolis: to date, Brazil’s worst ‘natural’ disaster.
An increase in landslide and flood hazards is linked to changes in rainstorm 
frequency and intensity, as well as to sea-level rise and storm surges, all shaped 
around anthropogenic climate change. At the same time, urban settlement, 
deforestation and erosion limit the land’s capacity to form a protective barrier. 
Uneven development processes have ensured that poorer, marginal, sectors of 
society – those with limited rights – remain the most exposed and the most 
unable to recover. Vulnerability, as numerous authors assert, is complex and 
multifaceted (Hardoy and Pandiella, 2009; Oliver-Smith, 2004; Pelling, 
2001; Watts, 1983; Winchester and Szalachman, 2009). Making sense of it 
in essence has to probe the allegedly authoritative boundary between human 
social, political and economic development on the one hand, and the abstruse 
‘nature’ of natural disasters on the other. Is human development to be seen 
as unnatural, as it is spaced across territory, just as much as natural hazards 
are viewed as unhuman? Hazards and disasters challenge us to extend our 
conceptions of social life through political-ecological thought (Bakker and 
Bridge, 2006; Braun, 2014; Collins, 2009; Oliver-Smith, 2004; Valencio, 
2014; Zeiderman, 2012; Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003).
This chapter considers the relevance of human rights discourse to an 
understanding of social vulnerability in urban Brazil. It draws on qualitative 
fieldwork by the author in 2013–14, in Nova Friburgo (Rio de Janeiro state) 
– the location of Brazil’s most serious landslide and flood event in 2011. 
Over the course of a year, 80 interviews were undertaken with people in at-
risk areas, as well as within government agencies charged with reducing risk 
and vulnerability. This was accompanied by significant observational and 
document analysis work. The aim, in brief, was to unpack the meanings of 
rights and citizenship across different social groups acting on the front line 
of vulnerability and risk reduction. In the context of long-term flood and 
landslide risk, the more specific target was to unpack the everyday realities of 
vulnerability, rather than to view disasters as an exception to ‘normal’ life. Not 
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wanting to pre-empt possible solutions to disaster/hazard risk, it focussed on 
the long-term political, ecological and socio-economic changes within which 
vulnerable subjectivities are formed.
Crucially, the chapter argues that human rights discourse – through 
focussing on ‘the human’ as separate to, or controlling of, wider ecology – offers 
too narrow a frame to inform an understanding of vulnerability and disaster. 
Instead the problematic is turned on its head, through the questioning of why 
– regardless of all the analysis and understanding of rights and their associated 
interventions – flood hazards continue to increase, and why a substantive sense 
of rights is ultimately undermined. Drawing on Povinelli (2011) and Braun 
(2014), the chapter contends that late liberal governance, of which human 
rights discourse forms a part, depends upon its relationship to ‘nature’ – in 
the form of environmental problems – in order to declare what it is to be 
human. Thus the discursive production of natural disasters serves to reproduce 
separation between the human and the environmental, which enables the 
urbanising, anthropocentric, and vulnerable milieu to repeat in cyclical fashion. 
Disasters, externalised as natural, authorise liberalism to proclaim an absence 
of rights, which justifies urbanising interventions, ultimately leading to greater 
vulnerability.
To this end, the chapter is divided into five core sections. The first offers 
a broad overview of theoretical literature linking human rights, disasters 
and vulnerability, much of which draws from Brazilian and Latin American 
contexts. The second and third sections provide discussion of the historical 
contexts in which socio-ecological vulnerability has emerged in Brazil’s 
Serra do Mar, and specifically in Nova Friburgo. We then turn to interview, 
document and observational data gathered by the author to demonstrate the 
overtly political context in which recent housing developments have taken 
place, and to question the basis of efforts to reduce risk. The last of the five core 
sections, prior to the conclusion, examines river improvement programmes to 
manage flood risk, and the situation of those people living at river margins who 
are threatened with eviction. The analysis here leads us to reflect on the way 
human rights are construed, justified and practised in relation to the human 
and the non-human, and on the authorities which claim to understand and 
demarcate both.
Human rights, urban vulnerability and disaster
Human rights discourse has an ambiguous relationship with space and ecology. 
Foundational human rights texts – written during post-war upheaval and state 
making – emphasised human individuality beyond the geographic boundaries 
of states, as well as sovereign rights to utilise natural resources and wealth in 
the (potentially equitable) interests of national populations (see e.g. Eckersley, 
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1998). This sense of distributional justice was to apply universally; however, it 
also represented clear instruction over the basis of liberal state sovereignty, at 
a time when de-colonial movements were gaining significant global-political 
traction. As Eckersley (1998) points out, while human rights could be effectively 
mobilised for the interests of minority groups under state homogenisation, 
there were never any clearly recognised ‘environmental rights’, or rights against 
degradation per se. Instead, so-called ‘third generation’ rights – to a healthy 
environment and to generalised human well-being – were articulated as a 
tangible part of sustainability discourse in the 1987 Brundtland Report, and 
then extended to broader economic, social and cultural rights under the UN’s 
Right to Development in 1996 (see Bakker, 2011; Rist, 1997).
The lexicon of human rights was therefore underpinned by an episteme of 
‘the environment’ as separate from (or to be utilised by) the human, and a vision 
of environmental degradation as being relevant only when directly connected 
to human health. In turn, human health became a proxy for the environment as 
a whole (Le Billon, 2015). Delimiting ‘the environment’ necessitates defining 
what ‘we’ are, and who or what ‘the other’ is (Le Billon, 2015, p. 601). The 
discourse implied spatial governance, as the human was viewed as dominant 
over an ecology presumed stable in the face of human action. But it also 
produced temporal governance, because the longer-term processes of ecological 
degradation associated with development (and ultimately impacting upon 
human health) were considered irrelevant to rights in the present. Ultimately, 
human rights discourse overlooked the human place in a mutually constituted 
environment, and instead directed us toward rights and justice in a future of 
sustained and expanded development. The historical specificity of the discourse 
– namely its links with a particular geopolitical époque of Western liberalism, 
state making, industrialisation and urbanisation – was ignored.
This is illustrated more clearly if we look at the Brazilian development and 
legislative context, particularly in the new millennium. ‘Progressive’ government 
by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) – as with others in Latin America – 
stressed the expansion of the extractive economy (agri-business, mining, etc.) 
as the means to invest in cash transfer and other social programmes, in order to 
achieve (largely urban) social development outcomes (Morais and Saad-Filho, 
2011). Natural resources, named as such for their anthropocentric usage, would 
serve progress in the expansion of social and economic rights to those in the 
margins, who had traditionally been excluded from the ‘right to have rights’ 
(Dagnino, 2005). The ecological degradation associated with intensive land 
use – both in commodity export expansion, and linked urbanisation following 
rural to urban migration – was separated from the achievement of rights to 
land/shelter and to health for the majority urban population, which it was 
claimed would materialise in the future.
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In Brazil, legal-institutional reforms such as the 2001 City Statute, which 
followed the lead of the bulky 1988 Constitution, enabled the regularisation 
of informal settlements by advancing universal rights to land and habitation – 
and by extension to public services (Fernandes and Rolnick, 1998; Fernandes, 
2007). The ‘private property rights’ previously associated with landowner 
monopolisation of the state had become the ‘right to property’ across all of 
society (Fernandes and Rolnick, 1998; Fernandes, 2007). James Holston 
(2008) famously viewed these major legislative changes as a direct product 
of the social movements of the poor, who took their right to land and their 
place in the state into their own hands through urban auto-construction, so 
that the state was obliged to reform and respond. However, the legislation 
failed to discuss the ecologies of the spaces that would be legally fought over 
and occupied, deeming their environmental particularities to be of secondary 
concern to the pressing issue of human rights. In the numerous agglomerations 
of the Serra do Mar, auto-constructed urban peripheries – very often deforested 
and developed by unscrupulous contractors – were located on steep inclines 
and along river margins, where rights to housing, healthcare, development, 
and a place in the state would always lie in the shadow (or at least alongside 
the tacit acknowledgement) of climate risk and social vulnerability (Maricato, 
2003; Valencio, 2014).
Although the thrust of Brazil’s recent development policies has unhappily 
married extractivism with social rights and urbanisation, there is no shortfall 
in environmental legislation that relates to landslide and flood risk. As far back 
as 1965, Brazil’s Forest Code outlawed deforestation, or development of any 
kind, in a plethora of specific zones called Áreas de Preservação Permanente 
(APPs), including river margins, hilltops, and gradients of over 45 degrees.1 
Though the Forest Code came under threat in 2012, through revisions tabled 
and won by large-scale agribusiness, the resulting document does maintain the 
above-mentioned protections. Of course, the fear of degradation and erosion 
related to both human health and the economic security of natural resource 
use and urban growth, rather than to ‘the environment’ per se. Throughout, 
immediate human health was the proxy of overall environmental health, and 
developmental imperatives were seen as the answer to future rights for all. 
Other related legislation came in the form of the 1988 Constitution, which 
protected the remaining Atlantic Forest as national patrimony – and echoing 
this, the formation of the UNESCO Serra do Mar Biosphere Reserve in 
1992, signed by the later-impeached president Collor de Mello (Dean, 1995). 
Further promises of conservation came in through the Lula and Dilma Rousseff 
years – including legislation Dilma was working on shortly before her own 
1 The link between the lack of APP enforcement and the 2011 disaster is explored in a Federal 
Environment Ministry report entitled Areas of Permanent Preservation and Areas at Risk: how 
do the two connect? (FME, 2011).
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impeachment process began, in 2016. Overall, forest protection legislations 
only served in adding gloss to global sustainability discourses, and implicitly 
acknowledged that extractivism did in fact represent a major threat to longer-
term development, and ultimately to human rights. Most of all, however, the 
legislation is notable for its utter failure in protecting against deforestation and 
urban expansion – particularly on inclines and along rivers – especially where 
it contradicted the granting of rights to land, services and a place in the state 
to urban peripheries.
The contradictions and absences inherent to human rights discourse 
discussed above – particularly with regard to the imagination of development 
and urbanisation – have not prevented the firm conceptualisation of 
vulnerability to flood and landslide solely in terms of socio-economic 
development and social and political rights. In a report on urban climate risk 
and vulnerability for ECLAC, Winchester and Szalachman (2009) highlight 
the practices of socio-spatial segregation and deprivation that have pushed the 
poor into peripheral, hazard-prone locations. The authors stress the need to 
ensure shelter and tenure rights, alongside sanitation, education, and income 
opportunities. Rights must thus guide climate adaptation focussed on state 
reform, public service expansion, and ‘regulatory frameworks for land use 
and building standards’ (Winchester and Szalachman, 2009, pp. 23–4). The 
call was admirable – rightly ‘denaturalising’ disaster, and refocusing us on 
addressing exposure and development failure – but ultimately it avoided the 
difficult question of why and how urbanisation emerges in the first place, in 
favour of adding state-based legislative solutions that history had shown little 
evidence of having successful application.
The approach is developed somewhat in other work. Pelling (2001) drew 
on urban flood risk in Guyana to argue that catastrophes should be viewed 
as extensions of ‘chronic’, everyday disaster. The disaster-development 
‘continuum’ was based, as above, around an absence of rights: multiple arenas 
of risk – whether ‘environmental’, or unemployment and crime – gradually 
increased exposure to the next event. Elsewhere in respect of Latin America, 
authors stress government incapacity, corruption, patron-client coercion, and 
the obfuscation of responsibility following chaotic state decentralisations in 
the1980s, as reasons for increases in landslide and flood exposure (e.g. Allen, 
1994; Hardoy and Pandiella, 2009; Maricato, 2003). Maricato (2003) focuses 
on the production of ‘environmental apartheid’ in the Serra do Mar, based 
on differential access to justice. Like favelas, loteamentos clandestinos (illegal 
subdivisions) were built on deforested slopes and yet were incorporated into 
utility markets; they are closely linked to politicians, and pay land tax to the 
same municipal authorities constitutionally charged with controlling land use. 
Valencio asserts that the PT’s very real development gains on income poverty, 
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health, and education are contradicted by a ‘public machine [that] dissolves 
the capacity to claim rights’ – whether in terms of security and justice or in 
mitigating environmental disaster (2014, p. 300).
Uniting all of these authors is a plea for an accountable, substantively 
democratic state that can reduce exposure by guaranteeing rights. Chronic 
vulnerability places the state as both the central problem and the solution: its 
failure to guarantee rights leads to disaster and further calls for state reform. 
Effectively aligning human rights with distributional environmental justice, 
the approach offers exemplary documentation of the uneven exposure of 
the poor to environmental hazards (whether toxic dumps or landslides) and 
the externalisation of these risks for the elite, but it says less about how the 
materiality of (urban) ‘nature’ is articulated and interwoven with political 
power and liberalism itself (Swyngedouw, 2015). Flood hazards are in a sense 
denaturalised through a focus on socio-economic inequality and vulnerability 
– ‘an urban politics of the environment’, for this same author. Yet the focus also 
implies the occurrence of hazard events over an already present population. ‘The 
urban’ is thus perceived as present prior to the non-human nature that envelops 
and co-constitutes it. If this is correct, and the materiality of urban expansion 
is taken as a given, how are we to think through risk and vulnerability in terms 
of an urbanising environmental politics?
Tracing the political-ecological roots of vulnerability, Oliver-Smith (2004) 
notes that classic liberal thinkers like Rousseau (echoing Hobbes and Locke) 
framed ‘wild’ nature – including forests, ‘resources’, and their attendant 
indigenous populations – for management, domestication, and emancipation 
through (urban) modernity. This idea of ‘ecological succession’, where nature 
would be superseded through development, offers much to an understanding 
of the role of environmental hazards in urban expansion, as opposed to 
traditional views that link vulnerability directly to poverty, marginalisation 
and an absence of rights (Gandy, 2006). It was to be expected that those 
populations categorised as subordinate would be placed into the nature/past 
tense category and thus consigned to the most dangerous locations. Given that 
efforts to increase human security are concentrated on reducing the symptoms 
of disaster, through engineering interventions for urban ‘resilience’, it should 
be no surprise that these efforts ‘condemn us to constantly repeat the exercise 
since both causes and symptoms evolve with our attempts to address them’ 
(Oliver-Smith, 2004, p. 14). If ‘the social’ is co-constituted with ecological 
processes, rather than operating in a one-sided technical or controlling 
capacity, this chimes with readings of ecology as dynamic, rather than passive 
and stable, in the face of human behaviour – and implicates biophysical scales 
such as watersheds in human development and social change (Zimmerer and 
Bassett, 2003). Human rights discourse presents parallels with the idea of 
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ascending out of nature. This impacts upon the human ability to define its 
place in relation to space and ecology, and risks contributing to the kind of 
governance that promotes urban expansion – and which, ironically, leads to 
greater vulnerability and a diminished experience of substantive rights.
With this in mind, Povinelli (2011) helps us to consider the political 
meanings of disaster for late liberal governance, particularly in states of settler-
colonial heritage. Rather than focussing on producing a more just state that 
could uphold the rights imagined by liberal theorists, she asks what kind of 
governance produces cycles of chronic social vulnerability. Ultimately she 
questions the ‘eventfulness’ that is routinely awarded to ‘sublime’ crises – as 
opposed to the ‘non-eventfulness’ of ongoing chronic vulnerability:
[The vulnerable are] not part of a system of disposability because [they] 
cannot be disposed with. In the oscillation between this state of neither 
great crisis nor final redemption there is nothing spectacular to report. 
Indeed nothing happens that rises to the level of an event let alone a 
crisis […] Life-as-suffering will drift across a series of quasi-events into a 
form of death that can be certified as due to the vagary of ‘natural causes’ 
(Povinelli, 2011, p. 4).
Recognising ‘nature’ thus both deflects responsibility for disaster and enables 
liberal governance to imagine a ‘thriving’ future of rights and justice. New 
legislation, governance institutions, and risk/vulnerability reduction 
interventions separate a past of irrationality with poor ethics from a future 
that can progressively calculate and monitor the environment. Yet non-human 
environments rarely comply with planners’ designs, and as chronic vulnerability 
deepens, the cycle of recognition of natural hazard eventfulness is repeated.
The following sections focus first on the Serra do Mar and then on Nova 
Friburgo, in order to illustrate and develop these critical-theoretical themes. 
The purpose of the theory, of course, is to help to analyse and explain social life 
in order to find meaningful ways to engage with, and ultimately ameliorate, 
pressing conflicts and abuses. Where the experience of disaster appears to be 
on the rise, we are right to question why human rights discourse – alongside 
wider liberal frameworks – is failing to deliver on its promise. Understanding 
the extensive vulnerability from which landslide and flood disasters take their 
form requires a spatial and temporal frame that is able to explain the expansion 
of human settlement and the co-constitution of social life with the non-human 
– to which matter we now turn.
The time-space of development and disaster in the Serra 
do Mar
The Serra do Mar mountains form the backdrop to the metropolises of Rio 
and São Paulo, along with many smaller cities, and separates them from the 
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high plateau (Planalto Central) of the Brazilian interior. The growth of cities 
within the range began in earnest in the mid 19th century, though their origins 
in fact go back much further, to indigenous villages, mining settlements, sugar 
and coffee plantations based around African slave labour and associated settler 
colonies. The mountain environment cannot be separated from the Atlantic 
Forest (Mata Atlântica) biosphere – which, at its peak, covered an impressive 
one million square kilometres and which, retreating and expanding through 
its 12,000-year history, remained stable in size and scope for some 3,000 
years until 1500 AD. The commodity cycles of gold, sugar and coffee that 
followed – combined with selective logging and more recent agriculture – led 
to fundamental patterns of degradation and erosion that today have reduced 
the forest to four or five per cent of its original size (Dean, 1995; Nehren et 
al., 2013).
Whereas the deforestation of much of Brazil’s coastal lowlands in the 17th 
century was due to the sugar economy, in the 18th century it was gold exports 
that opened up the Serra do Mar’s leeward valleys to erosion. After 1720, 
the caminho do ouro [Gold Trail] – from Rio de Janeiro to mines inland, in 
what later became the state of Minas Gerais – carried large gangs of slaves, 
bandeirante colonisers, and armies of horses and mules, all of them dependent 
on deforested agricultural settlements for foodstuffs and grazing pasture along 
the route (Dean, 1995, p. 99). The so-called ‘green gold’ of coffee was to 
dominate 19th-century Rio, then Brazil’s capital city, driving forward national 
development and providing capital for urban industrialisation. Planters – 
awarded sesmaria land grants by the Emperor – notoriously favoured virgin 
forest, for the substantial depth of humus it provided for the coffee plant’s long 
roots (Dean, 1995, pp. 182–8). While valley floors were too damp for coffee 
to prosper, the mountainsides offered ambient conditions. After 30 years of 
planted coffee, the soil degraded and more virgin forest was required. By 1860, 
60 per cent of Rio de Janeiro state was cleared of forest – the majority for 
sugar and coffee, including large tracts of subsistence land for the male slaves 
who cut, burnt and planted, and for the women and children who dried and 
processed coffee berries for export (Dantas and Coelho Neto, 1995; Dean, 
1995; Nehren et al., 2013).
Substantial problems with erosion and landslides ensued across Rio state: 
the culmination of over 200 years of human-led soil degradation in the Serra 
do Mar (Dantas and Coelho Neto, 1995; Nehren et al., 2013). This was a 
deterioration that, according to these authors, in large part explains São Paulo’s 
dramatic rise in coffee production from the mid 19th century – patterns of 
socio-ecological commodity production and erosion that were then mirrored 
along much of the continent’s 3,000 km-long coastal mountains. The fact that 
the Mata Atlântica biosphere is in the main self-generating – with soil quality 
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depending upon the humus generation and mineralisation that results from 
heavy leaf-falls, which in turn enables tree growth (van Breemen, 1992) – makes 
the forest hard to reconstitute and ‘highly vulnerable to trauma’ (Dean, 1995, 
p. 15). With urbanisation developing alongside the networks of rail, and then 
roads, that carried coffee and later agricultural crops down to the coast, the 
forest was increasingly fragmented, and consigned to higher altitudes. Often 
interspersed with eucalyptus plantations, or pasture for beef cattle, both the 
built environment and contemporary agriculture have contributed to further 
soil degradation and frequent landslide incidence in urban peripheries (Nehren 
et al., 2013).
All of this points to the ecology of soil degradation and landslide 
vulnerability as inseparable from an extractive political economy – based on 
colonial trades in sugar, timber, gold, coffee, and so on – which forces the brunt 
of environmental problems into the hands of the poor. The idea of mitigating 
disaster risk through correcting the uneven practices of, or access to, human 
rights in the present – to secure housing, property, health, labour, hazards 
protections and response, etc. – appears to overlook the complexity of the 
spatial and temporal production of vulnerability through that same colonial 
political ecology. Put another way, by asserting the desire for rights to security 
against the risks associated with externalised nature, rights discourse is caught 
within the recognition of humanist ontology – where ‘extractivist’ and then 
‘urbanised’ spaces are produced in continuity – and that, in the final instance, 
could reduce any substantive imagination or achievement of equality.
Nova Friburgo and the production of vulnerability
A clearer understanding of the latter argument is possible if we consider Nova 
Friburgo, a city and municipality of some 200,000 people, nestled in a valley 
within a remnant of the Mata Atlântica, at 846 m above sea level, and 130 
km from Rio. Founded by royal decree in 1818, it lay close to the existing 
regional centre for coffee production. For Araújo and Mayer (2003, p. 36), 
this new Swiss colony – established by 1,600 impoverished migrants – became 
‘an island in a space already ruled by the slave world […] which necessitated 
their adaptation to the slave order’. This very idea of implanting an island 
of European civility in the higher reaches of the Mata Atlântica connects 
territorial control with narratives of ethnic and developmental backwardness. 
As such, this type of settlement, throughout the now disaster-prone Serra 
do Mar, must be viewed within the schema of 19th-century immigration 
aimed at ethnic ‘whitening’ and environmental/territorial cleansing (Costa, 
2008; Dean, 1995; Skidmore, 1993). Friburgo’s forest surrounds were, from 
the start, etched into local memory and maps as o terreno de índios bravos 
[‘the land of angry Indians’] (Costa 2008, p. 18). Such associations of the 
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forested interior with poverty, indigenous backwardness and vagrancy then 
continued, with the emergence of quilombos (Maroon settlements) of escaped 
slaves, and the numerous hideouts of illicit gold traders (Dean, 1995). Nova 
Friburgo’s creation juxtaposed a modern, regal, and ideally urban presence with 
an interior of dubious race, perceived lawlessness and untamed nature. The 
practices and timescales of settlement varied through the mountains, but the 
discourse remained constant, in Nova Friburgo as elsewhere.
The Swiss settlers suffered significant problems. Their new home was located 
in a wetland, and the Bengalas river flooded during each rainy season, carrying 
away the first bridges, crops and animals, disrupting livelihoods, and resulting 
in death and disease. The population possessed learned knowledge of neither 
locale nor climate, and the land grants – parcelled out in sizeable rectangles 
by means of a lottery by Rio bureaucrats – ignored topography and gave no 
indication on how to farm with erosion and landslides in mind. Aided by the 
arrival of 343 German Protestants and numerous slaves in 1824, the colony 
began attempts to safeguard homes and livelihoods. Jaccoud (2006) reports the 
passing, through the 19th century, of some 40 municipal acts relating to flood 
risk reduction – with four major river-straightening initiatives gaining federal 
funds. Yet each consequent intervention failed to bring improvement, and the 
local council acknowledged the initiatives’ total ineffectiveness. The failures 
exposed the need for more sophisticated engineering.
Simultaneously, showpiece roads and praças were built on the floodplain: 
squares were laid out in the fashionable symmetrical French garden style, lined 
with imported eucalyptus, which both perfumed the air and served to dry 
out the saturated soil. This echoed what was happening in Rio itself, as the 
then capital city. The heavily populated Castelo and Santo Antônio hills were 
simply removed, to make way for urban growth – with their soil and rock used 
for landfill, for the creation of new squares and districts (Abreu, 2006). The 
Cidade Nova district – a drained and filled bay inlet – became immediately 
susceptible to flood and rampant mosquitos, resulting in its residential use 
almost entirely by the poor.
In the Serra, Nova Friburgo became a contradiction between being within 
– or subject to – nature, and a signifier of organised European development 
ascending out of nature. The settlement was clawed back, like Rio itself, from a 
perceived hostile and wild landscape of forests, rivers, rocky peaks and suspect 
races. One of the architects of turn-of-the-century sanitation reforms, the medic 
Miguel Pereira, famously declared that the Brazilian interior was ‘condenado 
pela raça’ – or condemned to backwardness by race (Fischer, 2008, p. 215). 
Nineteenth-century discourses of scientific racism and degeneration remained 
a feature of Rio’s intellectual and governmental life, informing the desire for a 
new belle époque of urban purity (c.f. Borges, 1993; Needell, 1987; Skidmore, 
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1993). Ironically, Pereira also advocated escape to the mountains as a clean-
air treatment for the dreaded tuberculosis sweeping through the metropole, 
and Nova Friburgo – riding on the back of the coffee boom – became an elite 
resort: cooler and cleaner than the grime of Rio, and with abounding space 
for grand properties, amidst mountain features and patchy but existent forest. 
Tourism was dependent on nature both for what it was presumed to offer and 
for the human ability to tame and manage it.
Nova Friburgo’s morphosis into a city began in earnest a decade into the 
20th century, as German industrialists were drawn by hydropower potential. 
Small dams and textile factories were built, which grew rapidly under state-
assisted industrialisation. President Vargas himself visited in 1932, in praise 
of the small city’s burgeoning industry – proof that national advancement was 
possible even in difficult locations. Neighbouring towns – for almost a century 
focussed on coffee – began to empty as Friburgo grew. It was during this same 
period that local elites began to craft the myth of Friburgo as a ‘Brazilian 
Switzerland’ – an imagery prevalent today, aesthetically and perceptively, 
among much of the city’s population. In reality, there was very limited Swiss 
heritage, as both the African and Swiss presence had been vastly diluted by the 
arrival of Syrians, Portuguese, Italians and Germans. The myth itself, historians 
argue, was born during the First World War to hide the fact that German 
industrialists now effectively ran the town’s economy (Costa, 2008). Promoting 
Friburgo as a centre of Swiss, rather than German, culture concurred with 
Brazil’s political allegiances, and was consistent with the desired differentiation 
of (northern) European civilisation from pejorative indigenous, Afro-Brazilian, 
or Portuguese-mestizo stereotypes. The Suiça Brasileira became embedded in 
local politics and imagination as the founding component of what was in fact a 
town built on forest, coffee, slavery, floods and German engineering.
According to the census, Friburgo’s population grew from 12,400 in 1940 to 
some 70,000 in 1960, as the city offered far better life chances than dependence 
on a beleaguered coffee crop, whose price collapsed after the Great Depression 
(Araújo and Mayer, 2003). New districts of makeshift homes emerged, 
principally close to central amenities, which provided an instant cheap labour 
force for metals and textiles entrepreneurs, city commerce and service providers. 
Yet these favelas presented a scar on the landscape, inhibiting the Swiss ideal 
and elite tourism. To counteract this, the city masterplan of the 1960s took its 
cues from Carlos Lacerda’s violent evictions in Rio, which called for zoning, 
removal and resettlement (Fischer, 2008, p. 301). Aimed at attracting the Rio 
elite through the Swiss themes of clean air, spa treatments, fine mountain views 
and chic foods, the plan outlined the necessity of maintaining Friburgo as an 
example of civility to the rest of Brazil. Much of what was ‘undesirable [or] 
ugly, or that symbolised the absence of civility’ was relocated to the city’s fringes 
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(Costa, 2008, p. 22). Yet predictably, in a deforested mountain environment, 
this massively exacerbated landslide and flood risk.
The dams that were built to serve the electricity needs of city factories in 
the early 20th century were accompanied by a longer extension of the Bengalas 
river canal, northwards from the centre, aimed at safeguarding new industry. 
And yet flood incidence continued apace. By the end of the century, the urban 
population had more than doubled, to 160,000, and so flood casualty numbers 
significantly worsened, with one analyst identifying 17 major flood incidents 
between 1979 and 2005, four of them causing significant mortalities (Volotão, 
2006). The 1996 city-centre flood was the prime justification for further river 
interventions in 2002 – and ‘yet they aggravated floods in […] Conselheiro 
Paulino, downstream of this stretch, which suffered an unprecedented 
inundation [in 2005]’ (Volotão, 2006, p. 42). Fatal landslides in a number 
of locations in 2007 were followed in 2011 by the most serious single disaster 
event in the history of the city, its region, and all of Brazil. A month of wet 
weather, soaking the weakly bound and frequently degraded soil, culminated in 
the collision of two weather fronts above the Serra do Mar and the unleashing 
of torrential rain for some eight hours. Thousands of slips resulted across both 
ecologically and socially vulnerable locations, including in numerous places 
around the city’s fringe, and the descending mud and water then quickly 
overwhelmed the canalised river along the urbanised valley floor.
The river’s meandering course through the valley had been rerouted and 
canalised, firstly to fit the 19th-century schema of colonial implantation, and 
secondly to embed relentless 20th-century modernisation. An expanded labour 
force accompanied industrial growth – as Brazil aimed to take its place amongst 
the ‘great nations’ – and yet this growth depended on interventions that 
purported to make the city’s flood risk manageable. The continuous onslaught 
of water and earth that ensued refused to cooperate with the planners’ dreams, 
and the cycle thus continued. Ecological succession has remained a key spatial 
mediator through Friburgo’s short history, with a hazard-prone environment 
providing the material input for progress toward urban modernity (Gandy, 
2006). The following two sections draw on a series of interviews with residents 
and key political actors in Nova Friburgo, in order to progress this brief history 
to the present day, and to further explore the theoretical claims examined 
earlier.
Urban expansion
Nova Friburgo’s most prolific developer, Sergio, had laid out 26 loteamentos 
(housing subdivisions) over 40 years, many of these on the vertiginous slopes 
of the city’s central valley, or else at its distant fringes. In interview with the 
author, Sergio stated that ‘just three [of these] were middle class … the rest 
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were C-class: the poor, you know – so I’m the culprit for a large part of the 
“pollution”.’ At this, he laughed. He went on:
I presented the land, prepared the land; the mayor at that time said he’d 
name the local school after me […] When you open a subdivision you 
bring construction materials; afterwards you bring light, bring water; 
everything is solicited for. You should see how many jobs are created when 
you make a subdivision. It’s a treadmill that never stops.
The developer’s discourse was characteristic of someone that had made his life’s 
work urban growth – and ultimately, by extension, modernisation of both land 
and country. The wide territorial space of Nova Friburgo presented a canvas for 
city expansion, and the poor, in all their backwardness or misconduct, could 
develop in tandem. Sergio’s work, contacts and clients led to a promising career 
in municipal politics, illustrating the connection between development and 
political power that has been the rule, rather than the exception, across Brazil.
Yet the human aspect was also linked strongly with the environmental. 
N.S. de Aparecida was a hilltop subdivision above two others, all of them 
developed by Sergio in the 1980s and 90s – first by clearing remnant Atlantic 
forest (likely regrowth after the decline of coffee) and then by laying out steep 
tracks and individual plot boundaries, where new residents would construct 
their own homes. According to Sergio, this hillside now contained over 1,000 
houses, on land that was formerly ‘[just] hillside; there was nothing there at 
all’. For Nova Friburgo’s modernisers, ‘empty’ hillsides preceded society – an 
antecedent nature that was there to be conquered by the will of human beings. 
Given this, it should be no surprise that Sergio, echoing other municipal power 
holders, viewed the source of the 2011 event as ‘the unprecedented rains, the 
natural disaster’. As Oliver-Smith (2004) makes clear, vulnerability lies first 
and foremost within the nature/culture dynamic – a mutually constitutive 
relationship between discourses of nature and development and the materialities 
of the environment. If cultures of modernisation, backwardness, and nature had 
produced both urban space and vulnerability, then in turn offering recognition 
to the immediate disaster event, rather than to ongoing vulnerability, provoked 
further spatial change and discursive visions of nature and modernisation. 
Human rights discourse in this context is left to act on and over space – as 
much focussed on the socio-economic rights of those positioned within a state 
of nature as it is upon that same population’s right to development. The role of 
space as more than human, or as co-constitutive of the human, was ignored. 
To follow Maricato (2003) and others’ assertions that vulnerability was caused 
by a straightforward lack of socio-economic rights and/or citizenship would be 
to re-emphasise anthropocentric constructions of nature.
Lena, a young seamstress in the local informal clothing industry, lived at 
the top of the N.S. da Aparecida subdivision. Her parents had left behind rural 
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poverty in the early 1990s and, through buying an inexpensive plot of hilltop 
land from Sergio, built their home in the city. With an expanding family, 
and the plot neighbouring their own unoccupied, they squatted it and later 
installed their daughter and her young family. With squatters’ rights under the 
1988 Constitution now legally applied, land tenure and access to social rights 
and public services – however inadequate – had followed. Together with the 
PT government’s expenditure on cash transfers – funded via the extractivist 
commodity boom, and bringing significant income into urban peripheries – 
rural to urban migration had brought forth significant areas of improvement, 
and opportunities to challenge existing rights inequalities (Fernandes, 2007; 
Holston, 2008).
And yet life here was also shrouded in risk and vulnerability. In 2007 a 
landslide killed one of Lena’s immediate neighbours and led to the evictions 
of another 10 houses, which remained derelict seven years later. Though the 
event had offered ample warning of the combined effects of deforestation, 
hillside occupation and heavy rain, just 50 m from Lena’s home a much larger 
2011 landslide killed 43. The larger slip’s location was now undergoing major 
containment works – likely aimed at securing a higher-value subdivision on 
the hilltop beyond – while dense, mainly lower-income occupation remained 
across the surrounding steep hillsides. There was no easy answer to Lena’s 
predicament:
What to do when it rains? Get out and run! But in fact there’s nowhere 
to run to. It’s difficult. […] There will be more tragedies, for sure, due to 
the deforestation in a region with lots of forest and lots of earth that you 
shouldn’t move. If they could cut more trees, they would. Plant? Never. I 
think planting would be good, and also education and health. Education is 
the principal thing. I don’t think we need containment walls.
The hillside where she lived and worked was at risk of landslide, and when heavy 
rain led to rapid inundation of the narrow valley below, there was little room 
for escape. Lena was clear in her condemnation of (very selective) engineering 
works to reduce flood risk, but her comments also highlighted the integration 
of the human population with the surrounding environment, including the 
absence of any immediate human solution outside of the wider ecology. For 
Lena’s human rights to be meaningful or substantive they would have to be able 
to account for the role of space beyond the human, within which human and 
wider environmental health come together. A narrow focus on social, political 
or economic rights would not adequately account for land-use change, climate, 
trees or soil.
Of course, while constitutional rights to development, land and services – 
not to mention municipal politics – all played out across the territory, the tens 
of thousands of constructions on Nova Friburgo’s steep hillsides and along the 
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riverbanks of the valley floor remained entirely illegal according to Areas of 
Permanent Preservation (APP) under the federal Forest Code. As the municipal 
under-secretary for the environment explained:
What is clear is that 90% of landslide areas were APPs – and the losses of 
people, patrimony and residences would not have happened if the Forest 
Code had been obeyed. […] A fundamental thing, which is a huge tragedy 
for Brazil, is that laws are sanctioned, voted for, approved, but not enforced.
The idea of implanting rights – whether to a healthy, secure human-centred 
environment, or against spatial/ecological degradation in and of itself – depended 
not only on production of policy but also on the functionality, harmony, and, 
more broadly, the ‘will’ of a legal-institutional apparatus operating at multiple 
levels of government. While it was exactly the absence of the latter that Allen 
(1994) highlighted, following landslide disaster in Rio in 1988, the broader 
thrust of urbanising processes was left underexplored. Indeed, for Sergio, the 
Nova Friburgo developer, APP regulations were simply there to be ignored, as 
they contradicted the imaginary of municipal development as modernisation 
out-of-nature – while for many residents there was scarcely the knowledge 
that APP legislation even existed. The wheels of the giant federal bureaucracy 
acted independently of any grounded reality of implementation – a territorial-
institutional apparatus that took its raison d’être directly from co-produced 
political-ecological problems such as landslides, in the search for a vision of a 
liberal state of international standing (Freitas and Mozine, 2015).
Given that the Forest Code was a federal law with universal applicability on 
paper, the body that would theoretically lead on APP fiscalização (compliance 
and regulation) was the federal Brazilian Institute for the Environment 
and Renewable Natural Resources, or IBAMA. Yet the organisation’s sole 
representative for Nova Friburgo and its broader region noted, in interview, 
that these laws had never been taken seriously in municipalities, due to ‘a fear 
that the Brazilian environmental movement would use it to “conserve” cities 
and prevent construction’. The problems involved were manifold:
To have fiscalização in the municipality, there are political questions and 
private interests [to take account of ] […] Local administrations don’t 
have – or complain that they don’t have – the resources: a trained technical 
team that can keep up. Nor is there an interest in [fiscalização] due to our 
structure, our political process, and elections. Fiscalização generates such 
a headache, even for a diligent mayor – a headache that loses votes – so 
he prefers to withdraw entirely or delegate responsibility elsewhere. The 
laxness is exploited, and leads to disordered city growth.
In short, the urban imperative – which drew as much on capitalist-extractivist 
mentalities as it did on discourses of a vilified nature – subsumed liberal 
institutional efforts to introduce rights to human health or security. Even where 
the substantiation of human rights had appeared to take place – in the form 
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of urban occupation rights under the constitution and city statute – conflicts 
occurred between laws at different levels of government, such as with APPs, as 
well as with a spatial reality that included other actors such as water, soil and 
forest. Furthermore, the environmental problems and conflicts that emerged 
as a result of urban expansion gave form and purpose to increasing calls for a 
state that could substantiate human rights. Following disaster, liberal discourse 
could separate a potential future of order and justice from a past of poor ethics, 
illiberalism, informality and backwardness, just as Povinelli (2011) argued.
Recognising disaster, and the repetition of chronic 
vulnerability
Along the western riverbank, well below the N.S. de Aparecida subdivision 
and in the shadow of the wide hillside containment works above, some 800 
residents were threatened with eviction. Though there were only a handful 
of fatalities along this stretch of river in 2011, the houses had flooded, and 
the Rio state government environment agency, INEA, had informed residents 
in writing that their homes would make room for river improvement works 
– namely widening, drainage, canalisation and fluvial park construction. 
Lying between the river and the Rua Ferroviária, settlement here was initially 
authorised shortly after the old railway line was constructed in the 1870s, 
designed by British engineers to bring coffee down to the coast, and built by 
enslaved Afro-Brazilians. Migrants and the poor had since squatted remaining 
plots of land, and, as within the loteamentos above, had built their own homes, 
even after the railway closed and the tracks removed in 1964. The APP river 
margin protection zone was never considered by any of the actors concerned.
Many residents here gained employment in factories and services, or else 
worked in the informal economy. Geraldo, a freight driver approaching 
retirement age, built his house there ‘around 1980’, though he explained that 
his father had earlier farmed a plot nearby, with coffee, bananas, chickens and 
pigs. The informal smallholding’s location, he said, was exactly where the river 
now flowed. It had formerly meandered around the base of the hills on the 
eastern side of the narrow valley flood-plain. ‘They moved the river over on this 
side’, Geraldo exclaimed. ‘That was the end of his farm!’ An elderly neighbour, 
Eduardo, appeared in Geraldo’s kitchen and filled in some gaps:
When the river was moved, it was about 1945. [Before that] it passed 
behind [a current road along today’s eastern riverbank]. So, there was 
an original [north-south] route, up on the hillside behind, and here [on 
the valley floor] there was no asphalt, there was nothing […] The state 
government completed the [current] route in 1960, and the plan was for 
another road on [the western, railway] side [of the river’s new course]– so 
[the plan] was for two roads with the river in-between.
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It can thus be argued that, rather than the homes of the Rua Ferroviária lying 
too close to the river – thus placing them at high risk of serious fl ood – the 
inverse is true: the river now lies too close to the homes. While repeated 
canalisation and alteration of the river course had been taking place in Nova 
Friburgo’s centre since the early days of the settlement, its meanders through 
this northern end of the city were not removed until the Vargas regime of the 
1940s, when it was redirected into a purpose-built canal through the centre of 
the valley, with the railway (and accompanying houses) to its west (see Figure 
1). Industrial and road development followed, with the river eventually pushed 
close enough to the Rua Ferroviária for its residents to be deemed directly ‘at 
risk’.
Figure 1: Looking north, the straightened River Bengalas in Nova Friburgo, 2013, with the homes of 
Rua Ferroviária on its western bank.
Th e RJ state planners, with the assistance of emergency federal funding 
and municipal support, had in eff ect used the 2011 event as their baseline for 
future fl ood risk and for residents’ rights to environmental security. Human 
interventions over the river, having consistently failed to prevent fl ood for 
almost 200 years, were ignored – or at the very least considered as irrelevant 
parts of a pre-modern past. A senior offi  cial at INEA’s headquarters in Rio 
stated: ‘People will only have to leave if they are at risk of fl ood,’ before adding 
emotively:
And some of them settled there illegally, against environmental legislation. 
If they’ve cut trees down at the river’s margins, then they’re obliged to 
replant. [INEA] is paying indemnities for [appropriations] – even to 
people that don’t have land title papers.
For Geraldo, however:
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There wasn’t a single house on the riverbank [before the river was forced 
west]. And back then, in the 1980s [the then mayor] came to this house 
and dançava (‘danced’) on our veranda; gave a lecture to us to win our 
votes, all of that […] And when I went to legalise my little house here in 
that era, it cost me something like 8000 reais [R$].
The river, and the people along its course, were to be made neat, controllable 
and modern, as part of a human-owned landscape that would ascend out of 
nature (Oliver-Smith, 2004). With the realities of the past deemed backward 
and irrelevant – even the pursuit and attainment of land rights in the new 
democratic era – the most serious flood event in the city’s history provided 
prestigious justification for both urban consolidation and improved (late) 
liberal governance (Braun, 2014; Povinelli, 2011). Offering recognition to the 
disaster as a natural phenomenon did likewise to liberalism, with its promise 
of a future of rights and justice, just as the chronic vulnerability of urban 
expansion was renewed afresh.
Conclusion
Writing on the ‘ruptures’ presented by environmental catastrophes, and the 
efforts to further embed urban infrastructures and capitals in response via 
‘resilience’-building strategies, geographer Bruce Braun states:
At the very same moment that the age-old spatial divides of city and 
country, society and nature are transcended in a new [urban-global] 
regime […] a new distinction is enacted between the ‘eventful’ time of 
global environmental systems – characterized by rupture, tipping points, 
emergence – and the ‘static’ time of a liberal polity cocooned in an eternal 
present, in which the eternal repetition of the latter produces continuous 
ruptures in the former, yet can conveniently forget that it does (2014, p. 
61; emphasis original).
The ‘static’ liberal polity refers of course to the chronic vulnerability of life 
in the margins – constantly promised betterment, human rights, citizenship, 
and legal-institutional functionality – while simultaneously cocooned within 
processes of urbanisation that result in new environmental responses, feedbacks, 
and ruptures. Recognising the eventfulness of disaster thus enables liberalism 
to reproduce the non-eventfulness of chronic vulnerability.
This chapter has attempted to propound this argument, drawing on the 
historical and recent experiences of the co-production of landscapes of 
social-environmental hazard, vulnerability, and liberal governance in Nova 
Friburgo, Brazil. Central to this is the perception inherent to human rights 
discourse of nature and environment as domains over which the social has 
control, as externalised and stable entities that humans can manipulate at will. 
The absence of substantive rights for the marginalised, in the face of social-
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environmental threats, may thus lie within the episteme of thought that has 
sought to exclude the complexities of ecological space as it searches for resilient 
late-liberal capitalist urbanisation. It should thus be clear that, rather than 
to downgrade the achievement of substantive human rights, the agenda is to 
challenge the episteme upon which the discourse lies, in order to dissipate an 
anthropocentric universe that can be held accountable for ecological problems. 
These theoretical assertions, then, move us from an environmental politics of 
urbanisation – which makes the distributional justice of the liberal state its 
central theme, regardless of existent urban materialities – toward an urbanising 
environmental politics, which traces the social-environmental discourses and 
practices that lead to further urbanisation (Swyngedouw, 2015).
As a key front-line of both planetary urbanisation and hazard risk, Brazil, 
and more broadly Latin America, deserves greater critical attention over the 
production of such a potent environmental dynamic. Analysing the experience 
of Nova Friburgo in the lead up to the 2011 disaster, and in anticipation of 
further disaster events both here and elsewhere, the chapter has attempted to 
show how the liberal imaginary of human rights feeds into a (re)production of 
vulnerable space. Simply put, viewing an absence of distributional justice as 
the cause ignores the complexities of urban materiality which have been built 
alongside and ‘in dialogue’ with those hazardous environments. Promising 
a future of liberal justice suggests that the environment can be tamed and 
dominated by the urban, which gives form and motivation to planners’ ever-
unrequited dreams of a risk-free environment. As these dynamics are awarded 
urgency and prescience in an era of climate change and resilience building, it is 
ever more important to unpack vulnerability in the search for solutions.
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7. Human rights and social-environmental conflict  
in Nicaragua’s Grand Canal project
Joanna Morley
Nicaragua’s Inter-Oceanic Grand Canal (canal project) is a 278 km artificial waterway that is wider, deeper and three and a half times the length of the Panama Canal (Shaer, 2014). Once completed it 
is predicted that five per cent of the world’s commerce that moves by sea will 
pass through it, doubling Nicaragua’s GDP and lifting four hundred thousand 
people out of poverty (Usborne, 2014; Renwick, 2015).1 While the canal 
would likely boost commercial activity and revenue in the region, the project 
carries strong economic and environmental risks (Lugo, 2015). Critics of 
the canal project say that the environmental and social costs of constructing 
the canal could be catastrophic (Renwick, 2015), including destroying or 
altering nearly one million acres of rainforest and wetlands (Shaer, 2014) and 
irreversible damage to Lake Nicaragua (the second largest freshwater lake in 
Latin America) affecting the nearly one million people who depend on it for 
drinking water (Collombon, 2015). In addition, the project cuts through 
two UNESCO biosphere reserves housing endangered species2 and some of 
the most fragile, pristine and scientifically important marine, terrestrial and 
lacustrine ecosystems in Central America (Meyer and Huete-Pérez, 2014), 
also threatening multiple autonomous indigenous and Afro-Nicaraguan 
communities whose territories include the canal route. 
Still, it is clear that Nicaragua is still one of Latin America’s least developed 
countries, where access to basic services is a daily challenge (World Bank, 2017). 
Construction of the Grand Canal is seen as a Sandinista (FSLN)/Ortega legacy 
– to eradicate poverty in Nicaragua through its delivery of 10–15 per cent 
growth over the next five years. Without its construction, growth is predicted 
to be half of this figure and Nicaragua will continue to be dependent on foreign 
aid (Torres, 2016; Haworth Johns, 2013).3 While his economic decisions have 
1 The country of six million people has a per capita income of $1,790, and 42.5% of the 
population lives in poverty, according to the World Bank (Usborne, 2014; Renwick, 2015).
2 For data on the environmental impact of the canal project see also Guardado, 2014; Meyer 
and Huete-Pérez, 2014.
3 In 2011, Nicaragua’s growth hit a record 5.1%, slowing to 4.9% and 4.5% in 2015 and 
2016 respectively. The forecast for 2017 is 4.0%, the lowest rate in the last five years (World 
Bank, 2017). 
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proved fruitful relative to the rest of Central America’s economic development 
(Perez, 2015),4 the discrepancies between Ortega’s political rhetoric and 
economic action have fuelled domestic condemnation of his administration 
from opponents and those who once supported him. Opposition politicians, 
including Victor Tinoco, argue that building the canal is against agrarian 
reform, which was the centrepiece of Ortega’s Sandinista revolution (Rurode, 
2014). 
Sustainable development and human rights
The dilemma between exploiting natural resources for socio-economic 
development and defending both human and environmental rights represents 
a major challenge for Latin American countries (Raftopoulos, 2017, p. 390). 
Despite the radical constitutional reforms which have taken place throughout 
Latin America in the last two decades, strategies of development based on 
natural resource exploitation and mega projects continue to place constraints 
on the possibility of indigenous and peasant communities having meaningful 
participation in decisions that affect them (Cannon and Kirby, 2012, p. 136). 
Governments have placed great weight on generating economic growth by way 
of state interventions, with the aim of not only preparing the ground for market 
actors, but as a means of improving the lives and livelihoods of the majority 
of the population (Bull and Aguilar-Stoen, 2015, pp. 8–9). And yet the need 
to explore and exploit resources in ever more invasive ways impinges on the 
lands of indigenous communities living in countries with important resource 
reserves (Burger, 2014). Across Latin America the lack of public consultation 
and participation, threats to local livelihoods, indigenous rights, ecological 
justice and human rights (Swords, cited in Guardado, 2014), have fuelled 
the mobilisation of social movements and local communities demonstrating 
against extractive and development mega-projects. Most of the indigenous, 
rural and even urban protest movements in the region are about persistent 
environmental degradation and public policies, production processes and 
appropriations of territory (Martinez, 2012, p. 12).5
Neoliberal prescriptions that promoted a one-size-fits-all prescription of 
development are now being tested in debates on sustainable development and 
4 Nicaragua ranks second among countries in Central America, maintaining growth levels 
above the average for Latin America and the Caribbean and with favourable prospects 
for foreign direct investment and trade (World Bank, 2017). Over the course of Ortega’s 
tenure the region has seen double-digit investment and export growth (Perez, 2015) and 
Nicaragua’s macroeconomic stability has allowed the country’s decision makers to shift 
from crisis control mode to longer-term strategies to fight poverty. Massive debt relief by 
the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank’s fund for the poorest 
countries, has helped make this shift possible (World Bank, 2017).
5 See also Gensler, 2013.
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climate change. Globalisation is influencing every aspect of environmental 
management, putting governments under pressure both to resist measures 
that they consider may be obstacles to growth, yet subscribe to an agenda on 
sustainability increasingly addressed by multilateral arrangements (O’Toole, 
2014, p. 129). The manifest failure of the Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs)6 of the 1980s prompted a major push in the 1990s for good governance 
and democracy and a desire from development thinkers to redefine development 
as something more than purely economic growth (Uvin, 2007). In recent years, 
human rights have assumed a central position in the discourse surrounding 
international development policies (Gready and Vandenhove, 2014). At the 
centre of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Agenda 2030) are 17 
SDGs and 169 targets that seek to ‘stimulate action over the next 15 years in 
areas of critical importance for people, planet and prosperity’. Human rights 
are at the core of the entire range of goals and targets (O’Donaghue, cited 
in UNHRC, 2015b), and if not explicitly, a human rights based approach is 
implicit in the agenda (Ruckner, cited in UNHRC, 2015b). The SDGs aim 
to protect the planet from degradation through sustainable consumption and 
production, sustainably managing natural resources and taking urgent action 
on climate change (UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, preamble). 
While there is an emerging consensus on the responsibility of business 
actors to respect human rights,7 the protection of economic and social rights 
raises questions regarding the responsibility of private and economic actors 
for both promoting and violating human rights in a state-centric system of 
international governance (Freeman, 2002, p. 151; Rist, 2008). The protection 
of economic and social rights in international law falls only on the state. In 
practice, private economic actors are increasingly responsible for the delivery 
of infrastructure development projects and their environmental, economic 
and social impact. Examples from across the region demonstrate that local 
social and environmental concerns are subordinate to economic concerns, 
for governments trying to harness the wealth of their natural resources 
for economic growth, and for multinational corporations (MNCs) and 
international financial institutions (IFIs) seeking to consolidate forms of 
neoliberal governance (Sawyer and Gomez, 2014, p. 6). Therefore, there are a 
wide range of important critiques, including matters of fundamental political, 
economic and social concern, which identify many aspects of human rights 
praxis as being deeply problematic in the context of processes of accelerated 
globalisation (Stammers, 2009, p. 205). The state and private actors in many 
cases portray environmental human rights defenders, and those who help 
6 The SAPs imposed economic restructuring on poor countries, to reduce spending on health, 
education and social policies, to ensure debt repayment on conditional loans from the IMF 
and the World Bank (Uvin, 2007).
7 See also UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 2011.
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to defend them, as criminals, characterising their opposition to ‘important’ 
projects or activities as against national interests or anti-development (URG, 
2014, para. 11).
Social-environmental conflict
Schmink and Jouve-Martín explain that ‘Latin America’s historical dependency 
on natural resources, both for local livelihoods and to supply an evolving 
global market, has made environmental issues central in policy debates and in 
widespread contests over the meaning and use of natural species and habitats, 
carried out against the region’s persistent legacy of inequality’ (2011, p. 3). 
Characterised by their complexity, their varied subjects and the great diversity 
of the stakeholders involved (Correa and Rodriguez, 2005, p. 23), conflicts 
surrounding natural resource exploitation are often traversed by political, 
social, ethnic and economic claims, involving struggles against local, national 
and transnational elites by indigenous peoples, small farmers and other 
marginalised groups, as well as middle class actors sympathising with their 
cause (McNeish, 2012).
Latin America provided the test-ground for the imposition of this 
Washington Consensus – a model of neoliberal economic development 
premised on globalisation - that pursued a simplistic form of capitalism in 
which development was more or less coincidental with industrialisation and 
all its attendant process of technological advancement. In recent years, the 
neoliberal orthodoxy has been readdressed (Kingstone, 2010). Since 1999, a 
series of left-wing or progressive8 governments have come to power in what can 
be seen as a reaction against neoliberal strategies and a broadening out of the 
debates on development (Gudynas, 2013a, p. 23). Driven by the high profits 
associated with natural resource extraction, governments have refocused their 
attention on the large-scale extraction of natural materials. Latin America’s 
move away from the Washington Consensus model towards the Commodity 
Consensus, focused not on the re-design of the state but on enabling the large-
scale export of primary products (Raftopoulos, 2017, p. 390) has marked the 
beginning of a new political-economic order that challenges existing state and 
social structures and curtails democracy in the region (Svampa, 2013). 
As Svampa remarks, ‘in terms of the logic of accumulation, the new 
Commodities Consensus adds to the dynamic of dispossession of land, 
8 This group includes the governments of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner in Argentina, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff in 
Brazil, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Tabaré Vázquez and José Mujica in Uruguay, and Hugo 
Chávez in Venezuela. Some would include the past administrations of Ricardo Lagos and 
Michelle Bachelet in Chile in this group and, with greater reservations, the Fernando Lugo 
government in Paraguay and the Ollanta Humala administration in Peru (Gudynas, 2013, 
note 6). 
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resources and territories whilst simultaneously creating new forms of 
dependency and domination’ (Svampa, 2013, p. 118)9. The commitment by 
Latin American governments to expand the extractive economy has also led 
to the repoliticisation of minerals and a general unwillingness by leaders to 
consider demands for environmental justice or to allow civil society to play 
an increased role in mineral politics (Hogenboom, 2012). The Commodity 
Consensus has led to a new cycle of protests that look to transcend traditional 
ideological and class divisions and unite around the negative impact of 
extractive industries, notions of development, territorial sovereignty and the 
defence of the commons and biodiversity (Raftopoulos, 2017, p. 397).
According to O’Toole neoliberal policies remain largely intact in Latin 
America (O’Toole, 2014, p. 172). Svampa argues that a combination of three 
axes – euphemistically described as ‘sustainable development’, ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ and so-called ‘good’ governance, have created a shared framework 
of the neoliberal discourse that aims to legitimise extractive economic projects 
(Svampa, 2013, cited in Raftopulos, 2017, p. 390). Gudynas argues that the 
persistence of conventional development is symptomatic of ‘how deeply rooted 
and resistant to change the ideologies of “modernity” and “progress” are in our 
culture’ (Gudynas, 2013b, p. 168). To question development or the ideology of 
progress implies a critique of modernity itself (Escobar, 2005, cited in Gudynas, 
2013a). The decentring of euromodernist perspectives in Latin America has 
however contributed to strengthening ethnic politics in the region in relation 
to ecology and environmentalism, and opened up critical new political spaces 
allowing for the expression of indigenous knowledge, traditions and cultural 
identity which had previously been oppressed (Andolina et al., 2005; Gudynas, 
2011; Coletta and Raftopoulos, 2016), laying the foundations of today’s social 
and environmental struggles. Social movements in the region are increasingly 
questioning the epistemological frameworks based on a dialectic system of 
inclusion-exclusion upon which the developmentalist socio-economic model 
is based (Raftopoulos, 2017, p. 390). 
In the context of conflicts surrounding natural resource exploitation, 
intermediaries such as community leaders, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), human rights defenders and social movement activists experience 
human rights discourse ‘betwixt and between, as a kind of legal or ethical 
liminality that can both empower the relatively powerless and also place them at 
a greater risk’ (Goodale and Merry, 2007, p. 35). They are powerful in that they 
serve as knowledge brokers between culturally distinct social worlds, but they 
are also vulnerable to manipulation and subversion by states and communities 
9 This turn towards natural resource extraction, which relates to a ‘predatory and backward 
form of capitalism dominant in the nineteenth century’ – the era of conquest and extractive 
colonialisation – has been described as ‘imperialism of the twenty-first century’ (Veltmeyer 
and Petras, 2014, p. 21). 
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(Merry, 2006). This chapter uses secondary sources and documentary evidence 
to explore the dynamics of the social-environmental conflict surrounding 
Nicaragua’s Grand Canal project. Focussing on the economic, environmental 
and human rights concerns of all the actions of all the actors involved in the 
conflict – including local communities along the proposed canal route, the 
Nicaraguan government and the Hong Kong Nicaragua Development Group 
(HKND Group), the Chinese firm behind the canal project – the chapter aims 
to offer a holistic understanding of the practice of human rights and different 
conceptualisations of development by focussing on what participants in human 
rights networks tell us about the meaning and experiences of human rights ‘as 
it relates to other forms of social practice’ (Merry, 2006).
Nicaragua’s Grand Canal project
The canal project would be the largest civil earthmoving operation in 
history, requiring the excavation of approximately 5,000 Mm3 of earth, the 
mobilisation of more than 2,000 pieces of major construction equipment and 
an estimated workforce of 50,000 people. Construction would need to occur 
simultaneously in three separate segments: the West Canal (from the Pacific 
coast), Lake Nicaragua, and the East Canal (from the Caribbean coast). It 
would include more than 10 mega projects: the canal itself, two locks (each 
with their own control centre and electrical substation), a dyke, a stand-alone 
dam below Lake Nicaragua, access and maintenance roads, a bridge over the 
Pan American Highway, new electrical transmission lines, two cement plants 
and aggregate quarries. The plans also include a Free Trade Zone including 
commercial developments, such as an airport, tourist hotels and approximately 
nine worker camps along the canal route (HKND Group, 2014; Luis Carlos 
Buob, 2016, cited in González, 2016). 
The HKND Group propose to cut a 105 km (65-mile) channel across Lake 
Nicaragua so deep and wide that it would require the largest wet-excavation 
project ever conducted (Schneider, 2015). Once operational, the canal and 
locks would operate 24 hours per day, year round, with 14 transits per day 
and a combined annual average daily water demand of 59.2 m3 per second, 
based on predicted vessel traffic in 2050. The Project would obtain power 
from the Agua Zarca Hydropower Project and the canal would require regular 
maintenance dredging, currently estimated at approximately 120,000 m3 per 
year (HKND Group, 2014, p. 32).
The canal project broke ground for preliminary engineering in December 
2014; however, there are still doubts surrounding whether the canal will 
actually be built, and a question mark hangs over the economic viability of the 
project, the legality of how it is being developed and the benefits it will bring 
to the local population (Gomez, 2014). According to a 2015 survey by M&R 
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Consultores, 59.8 per cent of the Nicaraguan people surveyed fully approved 
the construction and 18.7 per cent approve in a partial way. 65.7 per cent of 
the population considered it as a serious project and believed that it would 
become a reality if studies determined that it is feasible. In the environmental 
area, 48.4 per cent of the people hold the opinion that the waterway is an 
opportunity to restore and preserve Lake Nicaragua. 50.1 per cent believe that 
it will be beneficial for owners of properties located along the route (Prensa 
Latina, 2015a).
The canal concession
In June 2013 Canal Law 840 was passed approving the construction of the 
Grand Canal during a seven-day Congressional session without parliamentary 
debate, public consultation or prior feasibility and environmental impact 
studies (Perez, 2015). The Nicaraguan constitution was amended in December 
2013 to make accommodations for the new law (Haworth Johns, 2013) which 
grants HKND Group access and navigation rights to Nicaragua’s territorial 
waters, with the right to ‘extend, expand, dredge, divert or reduce’ them, as 
well as ‘the right to expropriate land and natural resources as it sees fit for 
the success of the project and sub-projects’ (Guardado, 2014). The concession 
granted HKND the exclusive rights to plan, design, construct and thereafter 
operate and manage the Nicaragua canal and the other associated projects for 
up to 100 years (Xu and Ying, 2015).
The HKND Group is a privately-held international infrastructure 
development firm headquartered in Hong Kong and with offices in Managua, 
the capital of Nicaragua. Speculation of the involvement of the Chinese 
government in HKND Group surrounds the canal project although HKND 
Group state that they are carrying out an international project, with chairman 
Wang Jing publicly stating that the project is independent and strictly 
commercial, ‘there was no order from the Chinese government’ (Pang Kwok 
Wai, 2015, cited in Xu and Ying, 2015; Boehler, 2013). Observers suggest 
that although the Chinese government is not actually backing the Nicaragua 
project, they are interested in it, and will ‘wait and see how things progress 
before deciding what role, if any, to take’ (Myers, 2015, cited in Knowledge@
Wharton, 2015).
According to the HKND Group, the development of the canal project has 
the potential to transform global trade, and make Nicaragua an important hub 
for transportation and logistics (HKND Group, 2015a). The 50–year rights 
for HKND Group to build the canal are not tied to a legally defined route and 
legal documentation protects the agreement from governmental changes. The 
law also removes the Nicaraguan government’s right to sue the HKND Group 
in national or international law courts for any environmental damage during 
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the study, construction and operation of the waterway (Silva, 2015). Under 
the concession agreement, the HKND Group would pay $10 million per year 
to the government once the canal is in operation and after the first decade 
Nicaragua would be granted a 10 per cent increase in ownership stake every 10 
years (Renwick, 2015). 
Environmentalists and human rights activists, including the Cocibolca 
Group (a coalition of environmental organisations), Pro-Sandinista small-
holder indigenous farmers and Pro-contra ranchers (White, 2015a) warn 
that the rapidity of the decision and the terms of the agreement between the 
HKND Group and the Nicaraguan government, plus the project’s unclear 
financial backing, set in motion a nightmarish scenario fraught with violence 
surrounding land expropriation, depletion of the region’s largest source of 
freshwater and destruction of biodiversity (Szakonyi, 2015; Haworth Johns, 
2013). The HKND Group insists it is engaged in intense analysis and 
consultations to ensure that the engineering, economic, financial, social, and 
environmental aspects of the canal project are carefully developed, working 
with a global team of experts with deep experience and capabilities (HKND 
Group, 2015b).
Economic considerations
A 2015 report by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) assessed that the canal project could have significant impact 
on the FDI inflows for Nicaragua in the future (Franco, 2015, cited in Sosa, 
2015). Observers have noted that there is undeniable promise with the project, 
as Nicaragua is a logical geographical route and is the safest country in Central 
America, with ample opportunities for foreign investment, boosted by attractive 
social and business conditions (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2014; Sosa, 
2015). These conditions include the policy of the Sandinista government, from 
2007, of dialogue and consensus with business, established in the Constitution 
and included in a new Law of Chambers, to reinvigorate a free trade zone 
regime that has led to increased exports from the country (Sosa, 2015). And yet 
on the World Bank’s rankings of Best Places to Do Business, Nicaragua ranks 
119th out of 182 nations – well below countries such as Colombia, Peru and 
Mexico (World Bank, 2015; Knowledge@Wharton, 2015). Sociologist Freddy 
Franco has claimed that the new interoceanic waterway will fundamentally 
contribute to the economic and social growth of Nicaragua, particularly to 
the social transformation goals of Nicaragua’s National Human Development 
Plan, including poverty alleviation, job creation, more balanced distribution of 
wealth and a sustainable and diversified economic development. Furthermore 
‘the Canal will provide us with the political and economic support integral 
to national sovereignty, and will place Nicaragua in a stronger position in the 
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international arena’ (Prensa Latina, 2015b). Trade unions have also welcomed 
the canal as a way out of poverty. 
In June 2015, the canal project was awarded the ‘Strategic Project of the 
Year’ and ‘Job Creation Project of the Year’ awards at the 2015 Latin American 
Infrastructure Leadership Forum, as the project ‘demonstrated leadership, 
tenacity and imagination’, and will serve as models for vastly increased 
infrastructure investment in the region’ (HKND Group, 2015c). HKND 
Group maintain that ‘international standards are the key to securing global 
financing for the canal project’ (Pang Kwok Wai, cited in Xu and Ying, 2015) 
and that ‘HKND Group is committed to strictly follow all international 
standards, and execute proper control, mitigation and offset measures for the 
canal project’s environmental and social impacts, ensuring that the Nicaragua 
Grand Canal will achieve net positive impact in these two aspects’ (Bill Wild, 
2015, cited in HKND Group, 2015c). 
According to FSLN deputy and general secretary of the National Workers 
Front (FNT) Gustavo Porras, ‘Environmentalists who are speaking about this 
are not taking into account that there is enormous poverty here and that the 
real danger to our country is this continuing level of poverty’ (Nicaragua Now, 
2014, p. 8). However, critics of the project, including Nicaraguan economist 
Julio Francisco Báez, contend that as a project of this magnitude is inherently 
transitory, so are the jobs it introduces. The economic model of mega-
infrastructure projects is such that the local economy is entirely excluded from 
the long-term benefits of a ‘private canal enclave’ as evidenced by Panama’s Canal 
Zone. The Canal will become self-sustaining and thus purely an obstruction of 
land from the perspective of local landowners, without the benefit of jobs, once 
built. In its wake, Nicaragua’s localised, tradable activities such as agriculture, 
cattle raising, and the agro industry will be left uncompetitive within the global 
market, thus exacerbating the income inequalities between the elites benefiting 
from a privatised project and the largely indigenous local economies excluded 
from access to Nicaragua’s wealth (Báez, 2015, cited in Perez, 2015). 
Richard Feinberg, a professor at the University of California and non-
resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, points out that Law 840 
and the HKND concession agreement ‘completely assign all sovereignty rights 
not to a foreign government, but to a foreign company’ (Feinberg, 2015, cited 
in Renwick, 2015). While in 2013 Nicaraguans received in remittances 100 
times the $10 million per year that HKND will pay to the government while 
the canal is in operation (Renwick, 2015; Foreign Policy, 2015), commentators 
observe that by granting a Chinese billionaire the ability to circumvent the 
Nicaraguan legal system and carte blanche to bisect the country, Ortega is 
decisively favouring a capitalist reform agenda at the expense of his already 
precarious socialist populism (Renwick, 2015). Furthermore, in November 
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2016 a report by the International Federation for Human Rights (IFHR) 
concluded that under the concession deal ‘constitutional and legal guarantees 
provided for by the Nicaraguan law are not respected’ (IFHR, 2016, cited in 
BBC News, 2016).
Environmental concerns
The HKND itself has recognised that the route finally chosen for the canal, a 
shipping channel 278 km long, 91 feet deep and up to 1,700 feet wide (Shaer, 
2014)10 will affect internationally protected nature reserves that are home to 
at least 40 endangered species of birds, mammals, reptiles and amphibians 
(Silva, 2015). The canal project will disrupt animal migration patterns and 
ecological dynamics as it cuts through the Cerro Silva Nature Reserve and the 
Indio Maiz biological reserve, which forms part of the UNESCO protected 
Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (CBM) that runs through Central America. 
The ecosystems of the CBM are already experiencing rapid destruction. The 
biodiversity-rich wetlands of San Miguelito and Bluefields, protected by the 
Ramsar Convention list of wetlands of international importance, will also 
suffer from dredging, sedimentation, invasive species and pollution, while 
shipping and deep-water ports on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts will affect 
the habitats of endangered sea turtles, coral reefs and mangroves (Meyer and 
Huete-Pérez, 2014, p. 288).
Environmental concerns particularly focus on the impact of dredging a 105 
km channel, possibly the biggest dredging job ever across Lake Cocibolca (Lake 
Nicaragua), the second biggest source of freshwater in Latin America and an 
essential source of drinking water (Schneider, 2015; Zuidema, 2015). On 28 
July 2010, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted resolution 
64/292 that explicitly recognised the human right to water and sanitation and 
acknowledged that clean drinking water and sanitation are essential to the 
realisation of all human rights (UNGWP, 2013, p. 5). Moreover, according 
to the General Law on National Waters, sources of water intended for human 
consumption have the highest and unwavering priority for the Nicaraguan state 
(UNGWP, 2013, p. 2). The only independent environmental impact report on 
the canal project (by the Centro Alexander von Humboldt) concluded that 
dredging the lake at a depth of more than 30 m, displacing millions of tons of 
sediment, could radically alter and potentially destroy the biodiversity of the 
lake (Collombon, 2014). Plans to use the lake as the reservoir for the canal’s 
lock system, requiring dams to be constructed below it in an area of frequent 
seismic activity, would increase the risk of local water shortages and flooding 
while salt infiltration in the lock zone (as per the locks of the Panama Canal) 
10 Wider, deeper and three and a half times the length of the Panama Canal (Shaer, 2014).
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would transform a free-flowing freshwater ecosystem into an artificial slack-
water reservoir combined with salt water (Meyer and Huete-Pérez, 2014, p. 
288).
The HKND Group contend that industrial production and human activities 
linked to deforestation of the shore have already caused serious pollution and 
severe sedimentation of the lake, while Executive Vice President of HKND 
Group Pang Kwok Wai has said that construction of the canal and locks will 
not cause saltwater intrusion, but divert rivers draining into the Caribbean Sea 
back to Lake Nicaragua (‘East-to-West Water Diversion’) which will improve 
the condition of water resources in Lake Nicaragua. Asserting that ‘amid 
criticisms in the Western media, only one article printed by a less influential 
US magazine sounds reasonable to us’. In the article a geologist reported a 
crack at the bottom of Lake Nicaragua which would pose a potential risk to 
construction works for the canal project. Pang Kwok Wai reported that ‘for 
that purpose we have sent a group of professionals for site investigations and 
the results showed the crack is not severe’ (Pang Kwok Wai, cited in Xu and 
Ying, 2015).
In March 2015, the HKND Group used the submission to the Nicaraguan 
government of its own environmental and social impact study (ESIA), 
completed by UK-based firm Environmental Resources Management (ERM), 
to publicise the ‘substantial changes’ made to the final route selected for the 
canal, and the ‘mitigation measures taken to protect the lake’. It included 
bypassing a river that traverses wetlands the east side of the lake at an additional 
cost of $700 million, and the forests, as well as the resettlement plans for about 
6,800 families that live along the canal route. The ESIA, probably the most 
complicated one in the world, asserts that the canal project will comply with 
international standards as stated in the Equator Principles statement (Wild, 
cited in Agurcia and Blanco, 2015a, pp. 4–5; Xu and Ying, 2015).
According to HKND Chief Project Advisor Bill Wild, ‘once completed, the 
canal will serve as a protective barrier for the Indio Maiz Biological Reserve, 
protecting this particular area from the further encroachment by human 
activities. The project will reserve a 10 km wide “no-go area” in the CBM 
so as not to affect wildlife migration in the area’. Bill Wild went further to 
suggest that because the forestation in Nicaragua is degrading at an alarming 
speed due to the widespread traditional agriculture practice accompanied 
with deforestation ‘the canal project is the only means to halt the current 
degradation of the Nicaraguan forests and prevent destruction of the handful 
of untouched ecological reserves, such as Indio Maiz’ (Wild, 2015, cited in 
HKND Group, 2015c). However, in June 2015, an external independent 
panel of experts, invited to review several chapters of the ESIA, raised serious 
concerns about the scientific evidence underlying ERM’s assessment, asserting 
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that the ‘massive social, economic and environmental impacts, with the little 
information available, have not been properly assessed’ (Williams-Guillén et 
al., 2015a; Adkins, 2015). As environmentalist and government advisor Jaime 
Incer Barquero has commented, the fact that the ESIA was contracted by the 
same firm that will carry out the project, however well respected they are, makes 
the result biased and gives cause for concern over the price paid by Nicaraguan 
sovereignty in the quest for economic development (Haworth Johns, 2014). 
‘Holding the ESIA in secrecy undermines the power of the Nicaraguan citizenry 
to assess the project, and calls into question the legitimacy of the entire ESIA 
process’ (Williams-Guillén, 2015b).
ERM and the HKND Group executives joined government authorities in 
asserting that the canal construction is safe and feasible (Schneider, 2015). 
The HKND Group engaged Nicaraguan Environmental NGO FUNDAR to 
develop the first Biodiversity Management Plans for the canal project and is 
keen to publicise its Educational Reforestation Program for watersheds along 
the canal alignment in Rivas department (HKND Group, 2016a; HKND 
Group, 2016b). It also asserts that ‘if we [HKND] manage to mitigate, control 
and compensate the impacts of the project, then the canal, in the end, will 
bring a net positive impact, i.e., with the protection of the Indio Maiz and 
the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor’ (Ward, cited in Agurcia and Blanco, 
2015b). Furthermore, in February 2015, HKND Group announced that more 
than 15,000 archaeological artefacts collected during the ESIA for the canal 
project, which contribute to understanding the ancient cultures and economy 
of Nicaragua before the conquest, were handed over to the Government of 
Nicaragua (Xu and Ying, 2016).
ERM themselves recommended that HKND Group and Nicaragua 
authorities pursue research that responds to the concerns raised by the special 
panel and other science and environmental NGOs and had been granted a 
three-month extension to undertake further environmental studies (Schneider, 
2015). In December 2015, the Nicaraguan government formally approved the 
ESIA conducted by ERM, thereby granting formal permission for HKND to 
begin what canal commission President Manuel Coronel called the ‘structural 
design and construction processes’ (White, 2015a). However, the November 
2016 report of the IFHR concluded that ‘no element related to sustainable 
development has been included in the project’ and reported ‘hydrocarbon 
pollution, salinity and turbidity problems’ in the project design (BBC News, 
2016).
Local communities along the canal route
The HKND Group acknowledges that the resettlement of 27,000 residents 
along the canal route is even more important and challenging than any 
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other technical problems that might arise during the construction phase of 
the project (Xu and Ying, 2015). They contend that they have committed to 
respect the local population, culture and heritage of Nicaragua and to serve the 
best interests of the region (HKND Group, 2013). HKND Group maintain 
that overall, the affected area under the resettlement program is not significant 
and that compared with the poor local housing conditions, resettlement houses 
provided by the Government of Nicaragua will be of much better quality in 
general (Xu and Ying, 2015). The Nicaraguan government and HKND Group 
plan to build 27 resettlement villages for 7,000 families (Otis, 2015) and 
maintain that those families opting for cash compensation will receive fair 
market prices for their houses’ (Ward, cited in Agurcia and Blanco, 2015a, 
pp. 4–5). However, critics say provisions for compensation severely undervalue 
the properties at risk (Renwick, 2015). According to minister Paul Oquist the 
resettlement plans, which offer a mix between cash and living in a new house 
with a new agricultural set up for them to be able to work and have sustainable 
livelihoods, mean that everyone will be better off than they were before, and 
that ‘the entire region’s economy along the route will be dynamised by the 
canal’ (Oquist, cited in White, 2015a). 
Octavio Ortega, leader of the National Council in Defence of Land, Lake 
and Sovereignty, a coalition actively opposing the passage of Law 840, fears 
that if the canal project does go ahead land will be confiscated for tourism 
development. Moreover, developers will base their offers of compensation 
on the assessed tax value, knowing that many property owners purposefully 
undervalue their properties to reduce their tax burden (Otis, 2015). The report 
of the IFHR in November 2016 points out that up to 120,000 residents 
along the canal route have no way of relocating and there is insufficient 
compensation for them, ‘the [land] expropriations process doesn’t provide 
for any administrative or judicial recourse, but does provide for a blatantly 
insufficient compensation’ (IFHR, cited in BBC News, 2016).
Indigenous peoples
International law has developed a clear principle of the right of indigenous 
peoples to permanent sovereignty over natural resources, based on the 
principle of self-determination contained in common article 1, paragraph 
2 of the two International Covenants on Human Rights and on the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIPS, 
2007).11 The principle of permanent sovereignty is an integral part of the right 
of self-determination, including the right to participate in the governance 
of the state and the right to various forms of autonomy and self-governance 
11 See also IACHR, 2009.
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(UNHRC, 2012, para. 13). According to the International Working Group on 
Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), despite the Nicaraguan government employing 
a pro-indigenous rights discourse that is favourable to natural resource 
conservation, indigenous peoples are feeling ever more threatened on their 
territories (Mikkelsen et al., 2014, p. 94). The Nicaraguan Constitution of 
1987 recognises the indigenous cultures that reside on the land and their 
right to maintain their languages and cultures. Two additional laws, 28 and 
445 (2003), grant autonomy and ‘the use, administration and management 
of traditional lands and their natural resources’ to the indigenous and Afro-
Nicaraguan peoples living in the South Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAS). 
Additionally, Nicaragua signed the DRIPs in 2008 and ratified International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 169 (1989) in 2010 guaranteeing 
prior consultation before projects including natural resource exploitation on 
indigenous territories (McGill, 2015).
Cultural survival
Approximately 52 per cent of the proposed canal route passes through traditional 
lands belonging to the indigenous Rama and nearby Kriol community who 
live in the RAAS. The RAAS is a 407,000 hectare area along the Caribbean 
coast of Nicaragua which is home to six indigenous and three Afrodescendant 
communities totalling 15,000 people (White, 2015a). Minister of Foreign 
Affairs for Indigenous and Afrodescendants in Nicaragua, Eloy Frank, 
confirmed that the canal will pass through eight communities [municipalities] 
of the Rama-Kriol territory, and that these communities have been informed 
through meetings and have approved the project (González, 2016). The HKND 
Group states that the resettlement plan involves 25 indigenous households. 
They plan to lease land from these indigenous communities for 100 years as 30 
km of the canal will pass through their land (Xu and Ying, 2015).
In the Inter-American human rights system, the American Convention 
on Human Rights (ACHR) states that territory is ‘a fundamental basis for 
the development of indigenous communities’ culture, spiritual life, integrity 
and economic survival (ACHR, 1969, art. 21). It encompasses the use and 
enjoyment of natural resources and is directly related, often a pre-requisite, 
to enjoyment of the rights to an existence under conditions of dignity…’ 
(IACHR, 2009 para. 2). In Awas Tigni v Nicaragua (IACHR, 2001), the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) concluded that access to 
traditional lands is ‘a material and spiritual element which they [Awas Tigni 
indigenous community] must fully enjoy... to preserve their cultural legacy 
and transmit it to future generations’ (Awas Tigni v Nicaragua, IACtHR, 2001, 
para.141). Therefore, if the value of indigenous territory is as a material and 
spiritual element to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future 
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generations, then for indigenous peoples monetary compensation in exchange 
for leasing their lands is irrelevant. 
Mónica López Baltodano, executive director of Fundación Popol Na, a pro-
democracy NGO, contends that the canal route will affect seven protected 
areas, destroying approximately 1,930 km. of diverse forests, affecting 13 
municipalities [five more than stated by Eloy Frank], damaging 96 educational 
centres, 35 cemeteries and 90 temples and churches (López Baltodano, 2016, 
cited in González, 2016). However, the HKND were keen to point out that 
anthropologists participated in the ESIA and related work. Furthermore, they 
acknowledged that although ‘the resettlement plan for the indigenous people is 
fairly complicated’, including the need to build several new churches to replace 
the many churches along the canal project, and ‘the need to resettle families in 
a similar living environment including relocating their family graves, etc … the 
final route selected has generally fewer knotty matters’ (González, 2016). Yet 
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights 
of indigenous peoples (UNSRIP), has noted that wherever large-scale projects 
occur in areas occupied by indigenous peoples:
it is likely that their communities will undergo profound social and 
economic changes that are frequently not well understood, much less 
foreseen, by the authorities in charge of promoting them [...] The principal 
human rights effects of these projects for indigenous peoples relate to 
loss of traditional territories and land, eviction, migration and eventual 
resettlement, depletion of resources necessary for physical and cultural 
survival, destruction and pollution of the traditional environment, social 
and community disorganisation, long-term negative health and nutritional 
impacts as well as, in some cases, harassment and violence (UNSRIP, 2003, 
p. 2).
A loose coalition of more than 30 concerned groups, including indigenous 
and Afro-Nicaraguan peoples of the RAAS (Mikkelsen et al., 2014, p. 98),12 
fear that the canal project will severely affect communities’ ability to ‘maintain 
their languages and cultures, as well as to preserve the communal forms of land 
property and their exploitation, use, and enjoyment’ as enshrined in the 1987 
Constitution (para. 5). They filed a suit contesting Law 840 with Nicaragua’s 
Supreme Court in 2013. The suit, one of 31 appeals, claimed that the law 
which allowed the government to award the canal contract to the HKND 
Group without consulting the affected communities or issuing environmental 
impact studies violated 23 articles of the Constitution and other international 
instruments that protect indigenous peoples (Mikkelsen et al., 2014, p. 98). 
As indigenous congressman Brooklyn Rivera stated, ‘We can’t approve of this 
12 These include Mískitu of Tasbapouni, Kriol, Monkey Point indigenous communities, and 
the Indigenous Creole communities of Bluefields (Mikkelsen et al., 2014, p. 98).
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concession without information about it and this law can’t substitute the legally 
established rights of the indigenous under Law 445’ (Haworth Johns, 2013).
In December 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that Law 840 was constitutional 
and rejected all the appeals in one ruling.13 This ruling is based on a resolution 
(703 23–05–2013) issued by the Regional Autonomous Government of the 
RAAS (CRASS) which cites their exclusive right to take decisions regarding the 
indigenous territories. The Supreme Court ruling hinged on the fact that ‘the 
plaintiffs, in the capacity in which they are acting, are communal authorities 
from the noted municipalities, but they do not form part of the CRAAS, 
which alone has the representation and competence to issue resolutions; and 
so, consequently, there is no reason to consult them’ (Mikkelsen et al., 2014, p. 
99). The negligent attitude of the CRASS in publicising the canal as the only 
development pathway for the region and lack of attention to regularising the 
indigenous territories has led to a distancing between the regional autonomous 
government and the territorial and communal authorities for each of the six 
indigenous and three Afrodescendant communities of the RAAS (Mikkelsen 
et al., 2014, p. 99).These communities of the RAAS, with a coalition of 11 
groups including environmental and legal organisations, submitted a petition 
for protective measures to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) citing the rights violations inherent in the canal Law 840 contrary to 
DRIPS, the ACHR as well as ILO Convention 169 (White, 2015a).
At the IACHR hearing in March 2015, Rama leader and lawyer Becky 
McCray conveyed the damage the canal project would do to the culture of 
the region’s indigenous communities: ‘If this project gets implemented, there 
is a strong possibility that the Rama language spoken in Bankukuk Taik will 
disappear as the last people who speak that language get forcibly displaced 
from their land’ (McGill, 2015). Environmentalists and local communities also 
fear that should the communities be able to keep their traditional lands, the 
environmental damage from the canal project will be so severe that the region 
will no longer be able to sustain traditional livelihoods, a threat to the right to 
territorial property as a fundamental basis for the development of indigenous 
communities’ culture, spiritual life, integrity and survival. Representatives of the 
government at the IACHR hearing rejected the allegations, which they blamed 
on ‘political interests’, while arguing that the canal project is environmentally 
friendly (Silva, 2015).
Participation and Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC)
Héctor Thomas, president of the Rama-Kriol territory, has clarified that ‘no 
leader can be against development. What we can be against is the way in which 
13 For details of the court ruling, see also Mikkelsen et al., 2014, p. 98.
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we are not taken into account; what we want is to be taken into account’. In 
the words of Luis Castillo, a member of the Bankukuk community, ‘We cannot 
stop the canal. What we can do is sit down, and if this is going to happen, we 
must negotiate’ (González, 2016).
Law 840 or ‘the Canal Agreement’ was passed through government by 
President Ortega with a vote of 61 to 35. HKND Group’s offer to fund 
the canal mega-project was agreed with the repeal of laws which defend the 
country’s natural resources and all bodies of water, including Lake Nicaragua, 
its tributaries, all drinking water and sanitation. In doing so, HKND Group has 
been granted ‘access to and navigation rights on rivers, lakes, oceans and other 
bodies of water in Nicaragua’ (Haworth Johns, 2013). No formal discussions 
took place with indigenous peoples, and there are concerns about inclusion, 
participation, and the receipt of compensation if the canal project impacts 
their territory. Opposing Liberal Party congressman Luis Callejas said his party 
fears the law because it ‘violates constitutional guarantees to private property, 
natural resources and indigenous lands ... the canal will carve up Nicaragua and 
leave our national sovereignty in pieces’ (Guardado, 2014). The tension levels 
were revealed when Xochilt Ocampo, the only Sandinista lawmaker who failed 
to support the law, was removed from office ten days later without explanation 
(Haworth Johns, 2013).
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) established the 
standard for the need to obtain the consent of indigenous peoples in the case 
of Saramaka v. Suriname (IACtHR, 2007), further affirming in Sarayaku v. 
Ecuador (IACtHR, 2012). ‘The safeguard of effective participation… must 
be understood to additionally require the free, prior, and informed consent 
[of indigenous peoples], in accordance with their traditions and customs’ 
(Saramaka v. Suriname, IACtHR, 2007, para. 137). From the evidence detailed 
above it would appear that the Nicaraguan government failed in its obligations 
to the indigenous communities whose territory is affected by the canal project, 
in not providing the right of effective participation that additionally requires 
the safeguard of FPIC, as mandated in Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Furthermore, 
under Nicaraguan Law 445 the communal lands of the RAAS are ‘indissoluble 
and eternal, they cannot be donated, sold, leased nor taxed’ (Republic of 
Nicaragua, 2003, art.36).
Despite the ambiguity surrounding the provision of FPIC, as referred to 
by Burger (2014, p. 16), general agreement persists on the obligation of states 
to at least undertake consultations with indigenous communities that may 
be affected by development projects. In some interpretations of the right to 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent, communities are not allowed the power 
of a veto of major development projects on their land, but they can choose 
to withhold consent until they are satisfied with the projects’ plans – however 
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long that might take. According to HKND Group, the firm is committed to 
operating according to international best practices in terms of transparency 
and accountability (HKND Group, 2015a). HKND’s admission in January 
2015 that although they had delivered a series of presentations to communities 
affected along the canal route, no formal consultations have taken place 
(White, 2015a) is evidence that the government repeatedly failed to respect 
indigenous rights of autonomy and FPIC. At the hearing of the IACHR March 
2015, Becky McCray declared to the Commission, ‘The state’s omission of 
material in consultation with indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants denies 
our relationship to our lands and our social structures, flagrantly violating 
our territorial rights, our right to participation… [and] to self-determination’ 
(McGill, 2015).
Two months prior to ERM’s ESIA being approved and permission being 
granted to HKND to start the construction phase of the canal project, the 
government of Nicaragua held a total of nine public consultation meetings in 
Managua. From 24 September to 1 October 2015, senior officials of HKND 
Group delivered the key findings of the ESIA and addressed public concerns 
surrounding the project. According to HKND Group the meetings, which 
lasted for 28 hours in total, attracted around 3,000 participants including, 
among others, representatives from communities along the canal route, media, 
university students, labour unions, scientists, youth groups, the Catholic 
church and other religious groups, environmental NGOs, plus representatives 
of the United Nations agencies, European Union, International Monetary 
Fund and Pan American Health Organisation and private entrepreneurs from 
other Central American countries (HKND Group, 2015d).
However, in January 2016 members of the Rama and Kriol territories 
condemned central government pressure to consent to the canal project, with 
the communal authorities claiming their right to free, prior and informed 
consent had been violated. In a statement issued in February 2016 by the 
director of Amnesty International Americas, Erika Guevara, the organisation 
declared that ‘trading on people’s basic human rights for the sake of money is 
not only morally questionable but also illegal. Authorities in Nicaragua must 
ensure they listen to those who will be most affected by the building of the 
canal, and take their views into account for decision making’. The statement 
concluded that despite the communities’ requests for information, to date they 
have not been properly informed of the canal’s impacts on their livelihoods, 
territory and culture and Nicaragua is sidelining local communities in its 
multi-billion-dollar canal project (Amnesty International, 2016). 
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Peaceful Assembly and Association
According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to Freedom 
of Peaceful Assembly and of Association (UNSRFOAA), social conflicts 
experienced in the context of natural resource exploitation are a stark 
demonstration of the severe consequences and counterproductive nature of 
the failure to provide any outlet for excluded groups to air their grievances 
(UNHRC, 2015a, para.11). Nicaraguan citizens have been protesting to 
voice their concerns around national sovereignty, ecological impact, and the 
social disruption of the canal project (Amnesty International, 2016; Runde, 
2015). Pedro Alvarez, professor of civil and environmental engineering at Rice 
University, told the public hearing at the IACHR in March 2015 that there 
has been almost no public debate about the canal or its goals, risks and targets 
(Alvarez, 2015, cited in Knowledge@Wharton, 2015). With the canal project 
managed directly by the president, and the concession agreement with HKND 
Group handled by the president’s son, the finance minister himself also 
complained about the lack of information around project costs (Collombon, 
2014). According to Jorge Huete-Perez, a biologist who is studying the 
environmental impact of the proposed canal, ‘When you do things in an un-
transparent manner…people are going to start speculating about corruption’ 
(Huete-Perez, 2015, cited in Otis, 2015)14 and according to Octavio Ortega, 
many landowners distrust the project because it has been shrouded in secrecy 
(Ortega, 2015, cited in Otis, 2015).
As the preliminary engineering commenced at the end of December 2014, 
the official launch events, one in Rivas department on the Pacific coast and 
one in the capital Managua, took place amid road closures and community 
protests in El Tule, Río San Juan and Rivas city. Protests in Rivas saw hundreds 
take to the streets, while in Managua thousands of protesters, including more 
than 1,000 campesinos, complained that the authorities and the police tried 
to stymie the protests by erecting barricades and harassing protestors (White, 
2015a). On 24 December riot police and the military allegedly used excessive 
force, deploying tear gas and firing rubber bullets at protesters, to try to clear the 
El Tule roadblock on the Pan-American Highway (Al Jazeera, 2014). Dozens 
of protesters were injured amid reports of two deaths, although the police 
denied the claims (Runde, 2015). Octavio Ortega of the National Council in 
Defence of Land, Lake and Sovereignty was arrested along with Ana Margarita 
Vijil, President of the Movimiento Renovacion Sandinista (MRS) (a left-wing 
splinter group of the FSLN) and 33 other anti-canal protesters; Ortega was 
beaten by the police (Otárola, 2015). Although the Nicaraguan police argued 
14 In November 2014 the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International listed 
Nicaragua as the third most corrupt country in Latin America (Council on Hemispheric 
Affairs, 2014).
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that the protestors used guns, machetes, stones and sticks to attack police, 
organisers claimed that their demonstration was peaceful (Panteres, 2014; 
Knowledge@Wharton, 2015).
The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders (UNSRHRD), 
and the Special Rapporteur of Freedom of Assembly and of Association 
(UNSRFOAA) have stated that all peaceful protests and assemblies are 
legitimate, that interference with peaceful assemblies, including dispersal, 
‘should meet the strict tests of necessity and proportionality stipulated in 
international human rights standards’ and that where violence occurs, the state 
must take measures to de-escalate tensions and hold the violent individuals, not 
the organisers, to account for their actions (UNHRC, 2015a). Furthermore, 
the UNSRFOAA holds the view that any interference with peaceful assemblies, 
including the right to freedom of assembly, cannot be limited based solely 
upon an assembly’s message or content (UNHRC, 2015a, paras. 39 and 40). In 
October 2015, thousands of rural residents from across the country marched 
to the capital Managua to protest against the construction of the canal. Many 
Nicaraguan residents travelled for days to the protest as police reportedly set 
up multiple roadblocks in a bid to prevent them from reaching the capital 
(White, 2015a). 
The organisers of the national march against the canal on 13 June 2015 
claim that the movement against the canal project has ‘great potential’, with 
Mónica Baltodano of Fundación Popol Na asserting that ‘People are upset  this 
goes beyond the canal’ (Dyer, 2015). According to Minister Paul Oquist, the 
government view continues to be that the protests will have a short shelf life 
(Oquist, 2015, cited in Democracy Now, 2015). However, as of June 2015 there 
had been approximately 50 protests against the canal project in the preceding 
year (Otis, 2015). Octavio Ortega told the Tico Times that the government 
had created an atmosphere of intimidation to stifle dissent and alleged that 
the military had been harassing peasants under the pretence of protecting the 
environment in Ometepe, on Lake Nicaragua (Dyer, 2015).
Harassment of Human Rights Defenders (HRD)
The UNSRFOAA has deemed human rights defenders in the context of 
natural resource exploitation as the most at risk from attacks and reprisals (Kai, 
2015, p. 30). In February 2016, the European Parliament issued a resolution 
condemning the lack of protection for human rights activists in Nicaragua, 
placing special emphasis on the case of Francesca Ramírez, a colleague of 
Octavio Ortega’s in the National Council in Defence of Our Land, Lake and 
Sovereignty. The resolution urged the national and local police forces to ‘refrain 
from harassing and using acts of reprisal against Francisca Ramirez for carrying 
out her legitimate work as a human rights defender’ (European Parliament, 
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2017). In December 2016, Secretary-General of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) Luis Almagro visited Nicaragua to discuss allegations of attacks on 
democracy with President Ortega. During this visit police convoys besieged the 
local community where Francisca Ramirez lives and works in order to prevent 
her and other leaders of the movement from meeting with Almagro. ‘They 
partially destroyed the main bridge out of the area, confiscated Ramírez’s work 
vehicles and held suspected members of the movement’s Council at military 
checkpoints’ (Gonzalo Carrión, cited in Silva, 2017). Ramírez got around the 
military cordon by walking along footpaths in the dark and crossing a deep 
river, where she almost drowned, to travel to Managua hidden in a truck, where 
she was able to meet with Almagro and tell him of the abuses her community 
had been subjected to for refusing to give up their lands.
The Human Rights Council, in March 2016, called on states ‘to promote 
a safe and enabling environment in which individuals, groups and organs of 
society, including those working on human rights and environmental issues, 
can operate free from threats, hindrance and insecurity’ (UNHRC, 2016a, 
para. 4e). The right of human rights defenders to be protected by states from 
the actions of non-state actors as well as from government authorities, is 
grounded in fundamental norms of human rights law (UNHRC, 2004, para. 
8), and is highlighted throughout the UN Declaration on Human Rights 
Defenders (UNDHRD, 1998).15 Article 1 makes clear that ‘everyone has the 
right, individually and in association with others, to promote and to strive for 
the protection and realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms at 
the national and international levels’ (UNDHRD, 1998, art. 1). 
Sociologist Oscar René Vargas argues that ‘the President is aware that the 
movement is the most important social force that his government is facing’ 
and that the admiration that Ramírez arouses, with her ability to organise 
and lead more than 90 demonstrations across the country, has irritated the 
authorities (René Vargas, 2017, cited in Silva, 2017). Gonzalo Carrión from the 
Nicaraguan Human Rights Centre insists: ‘Ortega’s government has visciously 
mistreated Francisca Ramírez and the farmers who follow her. Her rights have 
been violated, from the right to protest to the right to freedom of movement, 
and we fear that they will violate her most sacred right: to life’ (cited in Silva, 
2017). ‘More than 200 peasant farmers have been arrested, about 100 have 
been beaten or wounded by gunfire, and the government has basically imposed 
a military state of siege in the area … Police checkpoints along the entire route 
to Nueva Guinea and military barricades in the area give the impression of a 
war zone’ (Silva, 2017).
The UNSRHRD confirmed that ‘ending impunity is an essential condition 
for ensuring the protection and safety of [human rights] defenders’ (UNHRC, 
15 See for example Articles 9(1) and 12(2), UNDHRD, 1998.
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2013, para. 73). Moreover, ‘the obligation of States to protect includes both 
negative and positive aspects… States should prevent violations of the rights of 
defenders under their jurisdiction by taking legal, judicial, administrative and 
all other measures to ensure the full enjoyment by defenders of their rights; 
investigating alleged violations; prosecuting alleged perpetrators; and providing 
defenders with remedies and reparation’ (UNHRC, 2011, para. 10; UNHRC, 
2016). This was also further affirmed by the judgement of the IACtHR in 
Kawas-Fernández v. Honduras (IACtHR, 2009). 
Across Latin America the pattern of aggression in the form of repressive 
legislation, harassment, violence and threats used against social movements 
and local communities demonstrating against development mega-projects is 
used as a disciplinary measure to deter other communities from mobilising 
in support of these movements (Martinez, 2012, cited in Brand, 2013, p. 
6). In Nicaragua, protesters have accused the government of using increased 
militarisation to create an atmosphere of intimidation and to stifle dissent 
and pressuring the media to downplay the concerns of environmentalists and 
landholders who face expropriation of their land (Collombon, 2014).
Conclusions
The HKND Group announced in June 2015 that the main work of the canal 
would commence in 2016. By December 2015 a further announcement 
confirmed that work on the canal would be suspended until late 2016, and 
that the funding sources for the project will be disclosed when the time is right 
(Agurcia and Blanco, 2015b), adding weight to the doubts that the project 
would be able to secure funding. The announcement came in the wake of 
news that the fortune of Wang Jing, the billionaire businessman behind the 
canal project, had plummeted as a result of the Chinese stock market crisis. 
A staggering 85 per cent of Wang’s fortune has apparently been wiped out 
(White, 2015b). Activity at the end of 2016 at Brito on the Pacific coast 
(where the proposed West Port at the start of the canal will be located) suggests 
the project may be about to move out of a dormant phase, with residents 
suggesting engineers have conducted geological surveys and marked up the 
area. ‘Farmers have been paid $3,000 to allow surveys of their land, and more 
than 500 acres have been purchased by HKND for road-widening’. However, 
residents in Obrajuelo, where the canal is supposed to enter the western side 
of Lake Nicaragua, say that the last time the Chinese came was two years ago 
‘when some people here threw stones at their car and broke a window. Since 
then, nothing’s happened’ (Watts, 2016). According to Confidencial, the canal 
project will likely require some, perhaps many, new investors. HKND Group 
might eventually be able to contribute 5–10 per cent only of the funds and the 
Ortega government would also be required to underwrite financial guarantees 
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to investors in the project. Quite how a country which is the second poorest 
in the Western Hemisphere would go about providing credible assurance for a 
$40 billion project is unclear (Confidencial, cited in White, 2015b).
The extent to which the tensions and conflicts surrounding the Nicaraguan 
canal project adhere to the observations of multiple international special 
rapporteurs regarding the human rights risks of indigenous peoples and 
human rights defenders points to the unique and distinct nature of conflicts 
surrounding natural resource exploitation. The economic interests at stake 
in the canal project amount to billions of dollars, both for the investment 
opportunities of the companies developing the projects (whether private or 
state owned) and for the state in securing increased GDP growth, seen as 
the platform for driving development and poverty reduction. Socially and 
environmentally at stake in the project is the cultural survival of the local 
indigenous and Afro-Nicaraguan communities along the construction route. 
Lake Nicaragua is an essential source of drinking water and critical habitat for 
important endemic species, making it a site of great importance in the face 
of climate change. This chapter has shown that the environmental and social 
consequences of developing mega-projects threaten not only human rights but 
also international environmental protections. 
Nicaragua’s InterOceanic Grand Canal project is another example of a 
‘troubled vision of development’ (Swords, 2014, cited in Guardado, 2014). In 
the words of Nicaraguan economist Julio Francisco Báez, Nicaragua’s current 
development model, ‘an economically and environmentally unsustainable 
mega-project’ is the antithesis of the argument that ‘the only effective way of 
transitioning from a developing to a developed country (a process that Ortega 
heralds the canal project as achieving) is through a deliberate, sustained and 
persistent effort of structural change maintained over time’ (Francisco Báez, 
2015, cited in Perez, 2015).
President Ortega made a pragmatic political calculation to prioritise 
economic growth through the Grand Canal mega-project over the social and 
environmental pillars of sustainable development. Through a partnership 
with China – whose ability and willingness to navigate challenging business 
environments, and reputation for getting things done quickly has boosted its 
popularity in some host countries that are in need of capital, including Nicaragua 
(Myers, cited in Knowledge@Wharton, 2015) – Ortega has pursued economic 
growth on the premise that it is the only way to fund social programmes and 
reduce poverty. In this sense the canal project is evidence of political moves 
to the left that require pragmatic steps and so are inherently contradictory 
and inevitably lead to conflict (Becker, 2013, p. 45). The political cost of this 
choice has been the alienation of Ortega’s traditional support base and strong 
opposition to the canal project. 
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS178
References
Adkins, J.C. (2015) ‘Scientists question Nicaraguan canal in newly released 
report’, Phys.org, 19 June, available at: http://phys.org/news/2015-06-
scientists-nicaraguan-canal-newly.html (accessed August 2015).
Agurcia, V. and B. Blanco (2015a) ‘HKND, “We are listening to people”’, El 
Nuevo Diario of Nicaragua, 22 June, available at: http://hknd-group.com/
portal.php?mod=list&catid=40 (accessed August 2015).
— (2015b) ‘HKND, The main work of the canal to commence in 2016’, El 
Nuevo Diario of Nicaragua, 23 June, available at: http://hknd-group.com/
portal.php?mod=list&catid=40 (accessed August 2015). 
Al Jazeera (2014) ‘Protest against Nicaragua canal turns violent’, 25th 
December, available at: www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2014/12/
nicaragua-canal-protest-201412251303629570.html (accessed August 
2015).
Amnesty International (2016) ‘Nicaragua side-lines local communities over 
multi-billion dollar canal’, 9th February, available at: www.amnesty.org/
en/latest/news/2016/02/nicaragua-side-lines-local-communities-over-
multi-billion-dollar-canal/ (accessed February 2017).
Andolina, R., S. Radcliffe and N. Laurie (2005) ‘Development and culture: 
transnational identity making in Bolivia’, Political Geography, 24: 678. 
BBC News (2016) ‘Nicaragua canal scheme “must be dropped”’, 14 October, 
available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-37654194 
(accessed February 2017).
Becker, M. (2013) ‘The stormy relations between Rafael Correa and social 
movements in Ecuador’, Latin American Perspectives, 40 (3): 43–62.
Boehler, P. (2013) ‘Interview: HKND chairman Wang Jing aims to 
keep politics out of controversial canal’, South China Morning 
Post, 27 October, available at: http://hknd-group.com/portal.
php?mod=list&catid=40 (accessed August 2015).
Brand, U. (2013) ‘Energy policy and resource extractivism: resistances and 
alternatives’, in M. Gensler, Energy Policy and Resource Extractivism: 
Resistances and Alternatives. Seminar reader, 24–26 March 2013 (Brussels: 
Rosa Luxemburg Foundation), available at: www.rosalux.eu/fileadmin/
user_upload/reader-en-extractivism-tunis2013.pdf (accessed August 
2015).
Bull, B. and M. Aguilar-Stoen (2015) Environmental Politics in Latin America: 
Elite Dynamics, the Left Tide and Sustainable Development (London: 
Routledge).
179CONFLICT IN NICARAGUA’S GRAND CANAL PROJECT
Burger, J. (2014) Indigenous Peoples, Extractive Industries and Human Rights 
[EXPO/B/DROI 2013/23] (Brussels: Policy Department DG External 
Policies European Parliament). 
Cannon, B. and P. Kirby (eds.) (2012) Civil Society and the State in Left-Led 
Latin America: Challenges and Limitations to Democratisation (London and 
New York: Zed Books). 
Coletta, M. and M. Raftopoulos (2016) ‘Whose natures? Whose knowledges? 
An introduction to epistemic politics and eco-ontologies in Latin 
America’, in M. Coletta and M. Raftopoulos (eds.), Provincialising Nature: 
Multidisciplinary Approaches to the Politics of the Environment in Latin 
America (London: Institute of Latin American Studies), pp. 1–17. 
Collombon, M. (2014) ‘Nicaragua canal – environment fears ignored as 
construction work begins’, The Ecologist, 23 December, available at: 
www.theecologist.org/News/news_analysis/2687639/nicaragua_canal_
environment_fears_ignored_as_construction_work_begins.html (accessed 
August 2015).
Correa, H.D. and I. Rodriguez (2005) Environmental Crossroads in Latin 
America: Between Managing and Transforming Natural Resource Conflicts 
(San Jose, Costa Rica: University of Peace).
Democracy Now (2015) ‘We do not want to be an accomplice: Nicaragua 
rejects global consensus on voluntary emission cuts’, 4 December, 
available at: www.youtube.com/watchv=gbCBffIAdvU (accessed 
September 2016).
Dyer, Z. (2015a) ‘Nicaragua Canal project surrounded by air of intimidation, 
opponents say’, The Tico Times, 10 June, available at: www.ticotimes.
net/2015/06/10/nicaragua-canal-project-surrounded-air-intimidation-
opponents-say/ (accessed August 2015).
European Parliament (2017) Resolution on the situation of human rights and 
democracy in Nicaragua, the case of Francesca Ramirez [2017/2563(RSP)], 
available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language
=EN&reference=P8-TA-2017-0043 (accessed February 2017). 
Freeman, M. (2002) Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach 
(Cambridge: Polity Press). 
Gensler, M. (2013) Energy Policy and Resource Extractivism: Resistances and 
Alternatives. Seminar reader, 24–26 March (Brussels: Rosa Luxemburg 
Foundation), available at: www.rosalux.de/en/publication/id/8428/
energy-policy-and-resources-extractivism-resistances-and-alternatives/ 
(accessed August 2015).
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS180
Gomez, T. (2014) ‘Nicaragua canal: Ceremonies and violence’, BNamericas, 
30 December, available at: www.bnamericas.com/news/infrastructure/
nicaragua-canal-ceremonies-and-violence1 (accessed August 2015).
González, R.S. (2016) ‘Battling the Nicaragua Canal’, Cultural Survival 
Quarterly Magazine, June, available at: www.culturalsurvival.org/
publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/battling-nicaragua-canal (accessed 
August 2015).
Goodale, M. and S.E. Merry (2007) The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking 
Law Between the Global and the Local (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press).
Gready, P. and W. Vandenhove (eds.) (2014) Human Rights and Development 
in the New Millennium (London: Routledge). 
Guardado, H. (2014) ‘Nicaragua’s proposed interoceanic canal: a threat to the 
environment and indigenous rights’, The Huffington Post, 3 November, 
available at: www.huffingtonpost.com/hazelguardado/nicaraguas-
proposed-inter_b_6083274.html (accessed August 2015).
Gudynas, E. (2011) ‘Buen Vivir: Today’s Tomorrow’, Development, 54 (4): 
441−7.
— (2013a) ‘Debates on development and its alternatives in Latin America: 
a brief heterodox guide’, in M. Lang and D. Mokrani (eds.), Beyond 
Development: Alternative Visions in Latin America (Quito: Rosa 
Luxemburg), pp. 15–40. 
— (2013b) ‘Transitions to post-extractivism: directions, options, areas 
of action’, in M. Lang and D. Mokrani (eds.), Beyond Development: 
Alternative Visions in Latin America (Quito: Rosa Luxemburg), pp. 
165–88. 
Haworth Johns, A. (2013) ‘El Gran Canal: bringing Nicaragua to the world’, 
Environmental Network for Central America (ENCA), 59: 8–9. 
— (2014) ‘Nicaragua Canal: an update on El Gran Canal from Amy 
Haworth Johns’, Environmental Network for Central America, 60: 11–12. 
HKND Group (2013) Our Mission, available at: http://hknd-group.com/
portal.php?mod=list&catid=31 (accessed February 2017).
— (2014) Nicaragua Canal Project Description, December, available at: http://
hknd-group.com/upload/pdf/20150105/Nicaragua_Canal_Project_
Description_EN.pdf (accessed August 2015).
— (2015a) Company Profile, available at: http://hknd-group.com/portal.
php?mod=list&catid=30 (accessed August 2015).
181CONFLICT IN NICARAGUA’S GRAND CANAL PROJECT
— (2015b) Significance, available at: http://hknd-group.com/portal.
php?mod=list&catid=35 (accessed August 2015).
— (2015c) Nicaragua Canal Project Won “2015 Latin American Projects of 
the Year Award”, 13 June, available at: http://hknd-group.com/portal.
phpmod=view&aid=184 (accessed February 2017).
— (2015d) HKND Committed to Build the Canal in Compliance with 
International Best Practices Nine Public Consultation Meetings Convened 
for Nicaragua Grand Canal’s ESIA Report, 12 October, available at: http://
hknd-group.com/portal.php?mod=view&aid=266 (accessed February 
2017).
— (2016a) ‘HKND Group launches educational tree planting activity in 
around 80 schools in Rivas’, 29 July, available at: http://hknd-group.com/
portal.php?mod=view&aid=413 (accessed February 2017).
— (2016b) ‘HKND Group launches the “Educational Reforestation Program 
in Rivas Department” with support of Nicaraguan government’,  22 July, 
available at: http://hknd-group.com/portal.php?mod=view&aid=410 
(accessed February 2017).
Hogenboom, B. (2012) ‘Depoliticized and repoliticized minerals in Latin 
America’, Journal of Developing Studies, 28(2): 133–58.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) (2009) Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: 
Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09 (Washington DC: Organization of 
American States), available at: www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/docs/
pdf/ancestrallands.pdf (accessed August 2015).
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) (2001) The Mayagna 
(Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua Judgment of August 31st, 
2001 Ser. C No. 79 [Awas Tigni V Nicaragua] (San Jose, Costa Rica: 
Organization of American States).
— (2007) Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname Judgment of November 28, 
2007 Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs [Saramaka V 
Suriname] (San Jose, Costa Rica: Organization of American States).
(2009) Kawas-fernández v. Honduras, Judgment of April 3, 2009 [Kawas-
Fernandez v. Honduras] (San Jose, Costa Rica: Organization of American 
States).
— (2012) Case of the Kichwa indigenous people of Sarayaku v. Ecuador 
Judgment of June 27, 2012 Merits and reparations [Sarayaku v. Ecuador] 
(San Jose, Costa Rica: Organization of American States).
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS182
Kai, M. (2015) ‘Expert essay: The revolution may be televised but most 
protests aren’t’, ISHR Annual Report 2015 (Geneva: International Service 
for Human Rights (ISHR)), available at: www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/
article/files/c_-_2015_ishr_annualreport_web.pdf (accessed August 
2015).
Kingstone, P. (2010) The Political Economy of Latin America: Reflections on 
Neoliberalism and Development (New York: Routledge). 
Knowledge@Wharton (2015) ‘A canal to nowhere? Weighing the risks in 
Nicaragua’, available at: http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/a-
canal-to-nowhere-weighing-the-risks-in-nicaragua/ (accessed August 
2015) (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania).
Lugo, Y. (2015) ‘Nicaragua canal poses significant environmental risks’, 
Global Risk Insights, 26 July, available at: http://globalriskinsights.
com/2015/07/nicaragua-canal-poses-significant-environmental-risks/ 
(accessed August 2015).
Martinez, E. (2012) ‘Struggles against energy projects – experiences of 
socio-ecological transformation’, in Socio-ecological Energy Transformation 
and Energy Policy in Latin America and Europe: Papers and Thesis for 
the International Seminar in Vienna 11–14th July 2012 (Brussels: Rosa 
Luxembourg Foundation), pp. 8–16. 
McGill, M. (2015) ‘Construction of Nicaragua canal threatens indigenous 
lives and livelihoods’, Cultural Survival, 19 May, available at: www.
culturalsurvival.org/news/construction-nicaragua-canal-threatens-
indigenous-lives-and-livelihoods (accessed August 2015).
McNeish, J. (2012) ‘More than beads and feathers: resource extraction and 
the indigenous challenge in Latin America’, in H. Haarstad (ed.), New 
Political Spaces in Latin American Natural Resource Governance (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 39–60.
Merry, S.E. (2006) ‘Transnational human rights and local activism: mapping 
the middle’, American Anthropologist, 108 (1): 38–51. 
Meyer, A. and J.A. Huete-Pérez (2014) ‘Conservation: Nicaragua canal could 
wreak environmental ruin’, Nature, 506: 287–89.
Mikkelsen, C., K. Wessendorf, A. Paredellam, C. Nilsson, C. Erni, D. 
Vingng, M.W. Jensen, G. Rose and L. Garcia-Alix (eds.) (2014) The 
Indigenous World 2014 (Copenhagen: International Work Group for 
Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA)).
Nicaragua Now (2014) ‘Nicaraguan interoceanic canal: from dream to 
reality?’, (Spring), available at: http://nicaraguasc.org.uk/resources/
Nicaragua-Now-2.pdf (accessed August 2015).
183CONFLICT IN NICARAGUA’S GRAND CANAL PROJECT
Otárola, M. (2015) ‘Canal opposition leader ready to fight for the land in 
Nicaragua’, Cronkite Borderlands Project, 17 June, available at: https://
cronkite.asu.edu/buffett/nicaragua/canal-opposition-leader-ready-to-fight-
for-the-land-in-nicaragua/ (accessed August 2015).
Otis, J. (2015) ‘Nicaraguan canal plan riles landholders’, Wall Street Journal, 
4 June, available at: www.wsj.com/articles/nicaraguan-canal-plan-riles-
landholders-1433410202 (accessed August 2015).
O’Toole, G. (2014) Environmental Politics in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: Introduction (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press).
Perez, A. (2015) ‘Nicaragua is not for sale’, Cetri: Southern Social Movements 
Newswire, 9 July, available at: www.cetri.be/Nicaragua-is-Not-for-
Sale?lang=en (accessed August 2015).
Prensa Latina: Agency Informative Latinoamericana (2015a) ‘The majority of 
Nicaraguans approve the construction of the Interoceanic Canal’, 16 July, 
available at: http://hknd-group.com/portal.php?mod=view&aid=217 
(accessed August 2015).
— (2015b) ‘Nicaragua Grand Canal, a key project for humanity’, 21 July, 
available at: http://hknd-group.com/portal.php?mod=view&aid=214 
(accessed February 2017).
Raftopoulos, M. (2017) ‘Contemporary debates on social-environmental 
conflicts, extractivism and human rights in Latin America’, The 
International Journal of Human Rights 21(4): 387–404.
Renwick, D. (2015) ‘Nicaragua’s Grand Canal’, Council on Foreign Relations, 
24 April, available at: www.cfr.org/backgrounder/nicaraguas-grand-canal 
(accessed August 2015).
Republic of Nicaragua (1987) Nicaragua 1987 Constitution (rev. 2005), 
reproduced in English at www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
Nicaragua_2005.pdf (accessed August 2015).
— (2003) Law 445: Law of the communal property regime of the indigenous 
peoples and ethnic communities of the autonomous regions of the Atlantic 
coast of Nicaragua and the rivers Bocay, Coco and Indio Maiz (Managua: 
Centro de Asistencia Legal a Pueblos Indígenas (CALPI)), available at: 
www.calpi-nicaragua.org/law-445-chap-1-to-5/.
Rist, G. (2008) The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global 
Faith (London: Zed Books).
Runde, D. (2015) ‘Should the U.S. worry about China’s canal in Nicaragua?’, 
Foreign Policy, 26 May, available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/26/
should-the-us-worry-about-chinas-canal-in-nicaragua/ (accessed February 
2017).
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS184
Rurode, W. (2014) ‘Nicaragua prepares for new canal through isthmus, 
critics line up to fight new facility’, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 12 
December, available at: www.coha.org/coha-research-nicaragua-prepares-
for-new-canal-through-isthmus-critics-line-up-to-fight-new-facility 
(accessed August 2015).
Sawyer, S. and T. Gomez (eds.) (2014) The Politics of Resource Extraction: 
Indigenous Peoples, Multinational Corporations, and the State (New York: 
United National Institute for Social Development).
Schmink, M. and J.R. Jouve-Martin (2011) ‘Contemporary debates on 
ecology, society and culture in Latin America’, Latin America Research 
Review, 46: 3–10. 
Schneider, K. (2015) ‘Nicaragua canal environmental assessment criticised as 
scientifically weak, technically inadequate’, Circle of Blue, 5 June, available 
at: www.circleofblue.org/2015/world/nicaragua-canal-environmental-
assessment-criticized-as-scientifically-weak-technically-inadequate/ 
(accessed August 2015).
Shaer, M. (2014) ‘A new canal through Central America could have 
devastating consequences’, Smithsonian, December, available at: www.
smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/new-canal-through-central-america-
could-have-devastating-consequences-180953394/ (accessed August 
2015).
Sosa, L.A. (2015) ‘Nicaragua, a country of opportunities for investors’, Prensa 
Latina: Agency Informative Latinoamericana, 3 July, available at: http://
hknd-group.com/portal.php?mod=list&catid=40 (accessed February 
2017). 
Svampa, M. (2013) ‘Resource extractivism and alternatives: Latin American 
perspectives on development’, in M. Lang and D. Mokrani (eds.), 
Beyond Development: Alternative Visions in Latin America (Quito: Rosa 
Luxemburg), pp. 117–45. 
Silva, J.A. (2015) ‘Nicaragua’s future canal a threat to the environment’, 
Tierramérica Network, 31 March, available at: www.ipsnews.net/2015/03/
nicaraguas-future-canal-a-threat-to-the-environment/ (accessed August 
2015).
— (2017) ‘The peasant farmer who stood up to the president of Nicaragua’, 
Inter Press Service (IPS), 24 February, available at: www.ipsnews.
net/2017/02/the-peasant-farmer-who-has-stood-up-to-the-president-of-
nicaragua/ (accessed February, 2017).
Stammers, N. (2009) Human Rights and Social Movements (London: Pluto 
Press).
185CONFLICT IN NICARAGUA’S GRAND CANAL PROJECT
Szakonyi, M. (2015) ‘Human rights, environmental advocates criticise 
Nicaragua Canal plan’, JOC.com, 17 March, available at: www.joc.
com/maritime-news/trade-lanes/north-america-africa/human-rights-
environmental-advocates-criticize-nicaragua-canal-plan_20150317.html 
(accessed August 2015).
Torres, E. (2016) ‘Nicaragua, the new business star in Central America’, 
Forbes, 3 March, available at: www.forbes.com.mx/nicaragua-la-nueva-
joya-de-los-negocios-en-centroamerica/ (accessed February 2017).
UNDHRD (1998) Declaration on Right and Responsibility of Individuals, 
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and protect Universally Recognised 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, UN doc A/53/625/Add.2 
(New York: United Nations General Assembly), available at: www.ohchr.
org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RightAndResponsibility.aspx (accessed 
February 2017).
— (2013) Report of the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights 
defenders, Margaret Sekaggya UN doc. a/HrC/25/55 23 (Geneva: United 
Nations Human Rights Committee).
UNDRIP (2007) United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples UN doc 61/295 (New York: United Nations General Assembly).
UNGWP (United Nations Global Water Partnership) (2013) The Post 2015 
National Stakeholder Consultations on Water: Supporting the Post-2015 
Development: Nicaragua April (New York: United Nations Global Water 
Partnership), available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/
documents/1815nationalstakeholder.pdf (accessed February 2017).
UNHRC (United Nations Human Rights Council) (2011) Report of the 
special rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders (Geneva: United Nations 
Human Rights Council).
— (2012) Follow up report on indigenous peoples and the right to participate 
in decision making, with a focus on extractive industries, UN docA/
HRC/21/55 (Geneva: United Nations Human Rights Council), available 
at: www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/
Session21/A-HRC-21-55_en.pdf (accessed February 2017).
— (2015a) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN doc A/HRC 29/25. (Geneva: 
United Nations Human Rights Council), available at: www.ohchr.
org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/.../A_HRC_29_25_en.doc 
(accessed August 2015).
— (2015b) Accountability Mechanisms for Implementing the Sustainable 
Development Goals: A high-level roundtable discussion at the 29th session 
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS186
of the UN Human Rights Council 18 June 2015, Palais des Nations, 
Geneva, Switzerland, available at: www.fes-globalization.org/geneva/
documents/2015/2015_16_18_Final%20Report%20Accountability%20
Mechanisms%20SDGs.pdf (accessed December 2016).
— (2016a) United Nations Human Rights Council resolution 31/8 23rd March 
(Geneva: United Nations Human Rights Council). 
— (2016b) Report of the special rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders 
(Geneva: United Nations Human Rights Council).
UNSRIP (2003) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people (UNSRIP) UN doc E/
CN 4/2003/90 (Geneva: United Nations Human Rights Committee).
United Nations General Assembly (2015) United Nations Agenda 2030 
Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
United Nations doc: A/RES/70/1, preamble (New York: United Nations 
General Assembly).
United Nations Human Rights Committee (2004) United Nations Human 
rights Committee, general Comment no. 31 UN doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add. 1326 (Geneva: United Nations Human Rights Committee).
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(2011) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, HR/
PUB/11/04, available at: www.ohchr.org /Documents/Publications/
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf (Geneva: United Nations Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights).
Universal Rights Group (URG) (2014) Report of the First Regional 
Consultation with Environmental Human Rights Defenders (EHRDs): 
African and European Regions, available at: www.universal-rights.org/
events-detail/regional-consultation-with-environmental-human-rights-
defenders/ (Geneva: Universal Rights Group)
Usborne, D. (2014) ‘Nicaragua faces questions over new canal after protest 
deaths, links to China and fears over environmental impact’, The 
Independent, 25 December, available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/americas/nicaragua-faces-questions-over-new-canal-after-protest-
deaths-links-to-china-and-fears-over-9945100.html (accessed August 
2015).
Uvin, P. (2007) ‘From the right to development to the rights-based approach: 
how “human rights” entered development’, Development in Practice, 17 
(4–5): 596–606.
187CONFLICT IN NICARAGUA’S GRAND CANAL PROJECT
Veltmeyer, H. and J. Petras (2014) The New Extraction: A Post-Neoliberal 
Development Model or Imperialism of the Twenty-First Century (London 
and New York: Zed Books). 
Watts, J. (2016) ‘Nicaragua canal: in a sleepy Pacific port, something stirs’, 
The Guardian, 24 November, available at: www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/nov/24/nicaragua-canal-interoceanic-preparations (accessed 
February 2017).
White, R. (2015a) ‘Nicaragua’s Grand Canal: 3 No excavation without 
consultation’, Latin American Bureau (LAB), 20 January, available at: 
http://lab.org.uk/nicaraguas-grand-canal-3–no-excavation-without-
consultation (accessed August 2015).
— (2015b) ‘Grand Nicaragua Canal: Another nail in the coffin of the 
Nicaragua Canal?’, Latin American Bureau (LAB), 30 December, available 
at: https://lab.org.uk/grand-nicaragua-canal-6–another-nail-in-the-coffin-
of-the-nicaragua-canal/ (accessed August 2015).
Williams-Guillén, K., P. Alvarez, A.P. Covich, T.A. Crowl, R. Stoa and H. 
Briceno (2015a) Nicaragua’s Mega Canal Could Become a Mega Mistake 
Without a Sound Scientific Basis (Miami, FL: International University 
Southeastern Environmental Research Center and College of Law), 
http://sercweb.fiu.edu/helpful-link/news/2015/nicaraguas-mega-canal-
could-become-mega-mistake/ (accessed February 2017).
Williams-Guillén, K., P.J. Alvarez, A.P. Covich, T.A. Crowl, R.B. Stoa, H.O. 
Briceno, M.T. Brett, N.G. Aumem, S. Chandra, S. Heckadon-Moreno, 
A.W. Henson, M. Maunder, A. Meyer, P. Oliva and W.H. McDowell 
(2015b) Summary Statement of Nicaragua Canal Environmental Impact 
Assessment Review Panel, 9 and 10 March (Miami, FL: International 
University Southeastern Environmental Research Center and College of 
Law), available at: www.circleofblue.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/
Nicaragau-FIU-Panel-Summary.13-April-2015-Final.pdf (accessed 
February 2017).
World Bank (2015) Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations 
(Washington DC: World Bank Group), available at: www.doingbusiness.
org/rankings (accessed August 2015).
— (2017) The World Bank in Nicaragua: Overview Context (Washington DC: 
World Bank Group), www.worldbank.org/en/country/nicaragua/overview 
(accessed August 2017).
Xu, S. and X. Ying (2015) ‘Nicaragua Grand Canal Environmental 
Assessment approved: a critical breakthrough’, Oriental Outlook, 
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS188
28 December, available at: http://hknd-group.com/portal.
php?mod=view&aid=353 (accessed February 2017).
— (2016) ‘Thanks to the canal, Nicaraguan history might be rewritten by 
significant discoveries’, Oriental Outlook, 6 March, available at: http://
hknd-group.com/portal.php?mod=view&aid=374 (accessed February 
2017).
Zuidema, T. (2015) ‘Will the Nicaragua Canal ruin the ‘Galapagos of Central 
America’?’, The Tico Times, 26 January, available at: www.ticotimes.
net/2015/01/26/will-the-nicaragua-canal-ruin-the-galapagos-of-central-
america (accessed August 2015).
8. Sustainable development, the politics of place 
and decoloniality: contradictory or complementary 
approaches to Latin American futures?
Bogumiła Lisocka-Jaegermann
The three concepts mentioned in the title have been developed within three different theoretical and disciplinary contexts. The first one is part of 21st-century mainstream ideas of development, confirmed 
recently within the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. The second 
has been coined by anthropologists and geographers and refers both to specific 
features of places as contexts of human lives and to the protagonism of their 
inhabitants within the global dynamics affecting places and communities. Both 
have been widely discussed in Latin America and beyond. The third concept, 
the decolonial approach, is the Latin American claim of ‘confronting and 
delinking from [...] the colonial matrix of power’ (Mignolo, 2011b, p. xxvii) 
which, in practice, means the rejection of the universal character of Western 
European modes of thinking (Quijano, 2000, p. 544) as well as recognition 
and practical implementation of subaltern reason and solutions (Mignolo, 
2011b). Each concept refers to a particular scenario of the future. This chapter 
discusses possible encounters of the three visions drawing on a critical reading 
of theoretical texts and the field experiences of the author. Tensions and 
contradictions separating the concepts are also discussed. 
Sustainable development 
In the introduction to The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as 
Power, Wolfgang Sachs stated that ‘the idea of development stands like a ruin 
in the intellectual landscape’ and ‘it is time to dismantle this mental structure’ 
(1992b, p. 1). That dismantling has been attempted by many authors (Cornwall 
and Eade, 2010; Veltmeyer, 2011), but the basis of their critiques differ. Some 
of them look mainly at power relations underpinning development theory and 
practice. According to Sachs (1992a), Esteva (1992) and Escobar (1995), the 
modern meaning of the concept of development is basically a tool of hegemony 
of the ‘developed’ West over the rest of the ‘underdeveloped’ world. It reduces 
the role of the latter to that of a passive beneficiary of development programmes 
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shaped according to Western values, concepts, ideas and interests.1 The post-
development authors reject ‘developmentalism’ claiming that traditional local 
knowledge, bottom-up initiatives and solutions should be more important 
in the search for effective change for local communities than theories and 
concepts tailored elsewhere, giving cross-cultural evidence supporting that idea 
(Esteva and Prakash, 1998; GTZ, 2004; Latouche, 1998; Max-Neef, 1993). 
Another group of authors draw attention to the fact that our understanding of 
development is based on the concept of growth. In the 21st century critiques 
of the development paradigm based on growth have been incorporated into a 
number of disciplines – beyond individual and marginalised voices heard earlier 
in social sciences. They rose to mainstream attention after the publication of 
a report by economist Tim Jackson, issued in 2009 by the United Kingdom’s 
official Sustainable Development Commission, titled ‘Prosperity without 
Growth?’ (Jackson, 2009). It promoted the actions of a network of academics 
and social activists called the ‘de-growth movement’ who promote the idea of 
increasing human wellbeing by aiming for smaller scale economies, recovering 
traditional livelihoods and reducing pressure on ecosystems.
The meaning and essence of sustainability have been analysed and debated 
from different perspectives ever since the concept was put onto the political and 
social agenda by the Brundtland Commission in 1987 (WCED, 1987). The 
concept is ambiguous and unclear (Bonevac, 2010), according to some critics – it 
is oxymoronic and therefore perverse when used by development institutions and 
governments (Latouche, 2004). Its original meaning was strongly related to the 
need for protection of environmental resources, but later, it acquired the sense 
of endless neoliberal, durable development based on growth with some limits to 
the exploitation of natural resources. Finally social sustainability was added as 
the third dimension of the concept. Consequently, today the term ‘sustainable 
development’ is used both by ecologists and by private business, even if their 
final objectives are completely different (Paton, 2008). In academic literature 
and among practitioners there are quite different ideas about the concept as a 
tool for effecting change. Three different positions can be discerned. The first of 
these is its rejection. Post-development critics say that exactly like in the case of 
the concept of development, sustainability is mainly rhetoric in the interest of the 
Western world and the neoliberal economy. Some ecologists stress that natural 
resources have been subjected to economic interest, so the concept does not work 
and they rather prefer to avoid it by introducing clearer notions, such as ecological 
citizenship. The other two positions accept the concept: in the first, held mainly 
by politicians and planners, sustainable development is understood as a model 
that can guide decision making and action. Technical indicators are introduced 
as a measure of ‘progress’ in its enforcement. The second position accepts the 
1 See the author’s previous publications: Lisocka-Jaegermann, 2011a and b. 
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contested character of the concept, trying to map its different meanings. Perhaps 
the best summary of debates on sustainability has been offered by Ian Scoones 
who reminds that even if it is one of the most widely used buzzword of the last 
twenty years, it is a ‘boundary term’, ‘one where science meets politics and politics 
meets science’ (Scoones, 2010, p. 153), valuable in spite of all the discrepancies.
The politics of place 
Human geographers in the 1970s drew attention to the fact that we experience 
the world through places and they transformed the concept of ‘place’ in one of 
the central categories of their inquiry (Tuan, 1977). Relph observed that ‘the 
essence of place lies in the largely unselfconscious intentionality that defines 
places as profound centers of human existence’ (1976, p. 43). However the 
‘place consciousness’, understood as recognition of the diversity of places as 
contexts and settings for livelihoods, became widespread only with the rising 
awareness of globalisation and its impact on places. Top-down national policies, 
universalist development discourse and practice, and last but not least neoliberal 
capitalism, were erasing differences, so it was necessary to defend places and the 
ways of life belonging to them against external pressures. ‘Place in any case is 
essential to the critique of developmentalism, and imagining alternatives to it’, 
writes Dirlik (1999, p. 44), referring to the work of Arturo Escobar (1995), 
who concludes that the hybrid forms that emerge as result of encounters 
between place-based native traditions and a universalist development discourse 
and practice may lead us towards alternative ways of thinking about life and 
change against a development discourse that claims to be unique and universal 
(Escobar, 1995, pp. 217–22). Diversity of place confirms the need to seek 
local solutions to local problems rather than applying strategies of change 
developed elsewhere according to other people’s goals and values. That does 
not mean that places should be completely closed to the external world and 
immune to everything that comes from outside. Their inhabitants should have 
the possibility to select and reinterpret the ideas and solutions reaching them 
in order to adapt them to their own needs and values. Nowadays they usually 
engage in networks that extend far beyond their immediate surroundings, 
including global ones, and are able to seek suitable ideas by themselves.
This way of thinking, summarised above, has led some ‘development 
thinkers’ towards more place-based development concepts, such as endogenous 
development, with local resources and local participative strategies as its main 
elements. Others prefer to adhere to place, based on conceptual frameworks 
that do not refer to ‘development’ at all. Such is the case of the sustainable 
development framework discussed by the author in the context of sustainable 
development discourse, in her previous texts (Lisocka-Jaegermann, 2011a; 
2015). Both the endogenous development concept and the sustainable 
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livelihoods framework2 come from the academic and institutional world. But 
places themselves, through the activities of their inhabitants, generate new ideas 
and concepts. Researchers of social movements observed that places turned to 
be locations of new, place-based social and political activities. Strong place-
based differentiation within social movements has been observed (Harcourt 
and Escobar, 2005). Particular local groups being part of wider movements 
with general common agendas engage in politics in ways that stem from their 
specific social, cultural and economic place-based experiences and problems. 
The ‘politics of place’ means that we acknowledge the possibility of choice 
rejecting the idea of the inevitable homogenisation of social, economic and 
cultural processes imposed by capitalism. It is important to stress again that 
the term ‘politics of place’ does not mean just a defence against modernity, 
global capital and a top-down development. It rather corresponds to attempts 
to build people’s own place-based political agendas on the basis of their own 
experiences, knowledge, values and needs. Politics of place pretend to make 
space for new places with their own protagonism and dynamics. Inhabitants 
can assert their own visions creating realities that in a hybrid form combine 
elements of modernity and traditional ways. International and transnational 
non-governmental organisations as well as all sorts of social networks can be 
allies in such endeavours. The concept of place-based politics is useful not 
only as a tool that helps to understand ways in which social actors redefine 
politics and political knowledge both from their own particular locations 
and through global networks. There is hope that its dynamics will be able to 
provide potential resolutions to many of the tensions that have tended to riddle 
progressive political movements in their attempts to speak in solidarity across 
diverse cultures, pursue improved livelihoods without succumbing to Western 
notions of development, and more generally to help orient struggles for social 
justice without attempting to posit all encompassing theories and models.
Decoloniality 
The third concept is probably the most complex one, as it refers to a relatively 
recent imaginative and ambitious project of a group of Latin American 
intellectuals and academics as well as Latin Americanists coming from 
elsewhere, seeking a new framework for a Latin American perspective on Latin 
America’s past and future. I would just summarise the main ideas of Modernity/
Coloniality and later what the Modernity/Coloniality/Decoloniality project3 
has produced, aiming for an explanation of the term ‘decoloniality’. 
2 For SLF see DFiD, 1999.
3 The following authors form the central part of the Modernity/Coloniality group: the 
Argentinean/Mexican philosopher Enrique Dussel, the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal 
Quijano, the Argentinean/US semiotician and cultural theorist Walter Mignolo, as well as 
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Authors that are part of Modernity/Coloniality/Decoloniality project 
discuss the concept of ‘coloniality’, although it has a much wider meaning 
than colonialism has. It refers to both the historical condition and an 
epistemological structure binding colonialism and imperialism to modernity. 
European modernity was created during the colonisation of the Americas and 
the structures of power that emerged at that time placed Europe at the centre 
of the world order. They were not only economic but also epistemic and racial, 
excluding peripheries outside Europe and later outside North America as well 
from modernity (Quijano, 2008). Anibal Quijano states that that system 
of power survived the end of colonialism and it is still alive as part of the 
contemporary neoliberal order reinforced by globalisation.
Quijano’s concept of coloniality of power has been developed by Walter 
Mignolo. Talking about differences between the metropolitan centre and the 
colonial periphery, Mignolo comments that ‘by colonial differences I mean... 
(and I should perhaps say “the colonial difference”) the classification of the 
planet in the modern/colonial imaginary, by enacting coloniality of power, and 
energy and a machinery to transform differences into values’ (2000, p. 13). Only 
the Western way of thinking and Western knowledge have been considered 
valuable and therefore universal. Peripheral knowledge comes ‘…from the 
shadow that the light of being has not been able to illumine. Our thought sets 
out from non-being, nothingness, otherness, exteriority, the mystery of non-
sense. It is then a “barbarian” philosophy’ (Dussel, 1985, p. 14). Coloniality of 
power therefore implies coloniality of knowledge, a concept discussed by several 
coloniality/modernity/decoloniality group thinkers. Nelson Maldonado Torres 
(2007) also identified a coloniality of being, drawing on Franz Fanon’s writing 
(among others) on dehumanisation and non-existence experienced within the 
African diaspora. Decoloniality refers to the decolonisation of power, mind 
and knowledge, as well as of being. Quijano asserts, ‘it is necessary to extricate 
oneself from the linkages between rationality/modernity and coloniality, first 
of all, and definitely from all power which is not constituted by free decisions 
made by free people’ (Quijano, 2007, p. 177).
‘Decoloniality’ as a project involves not only political and economic 
delinking, but mainly delinking at the epistemic level. It refers to the 
deconstruction of modern knowledge and its direct links to coloniality. It is 
also a programme of relocation of thought in order to find new frameworks 
of plurality, with pluriversal rather than universal ways of thinking and feeling 
attributing a new meaning to intercultural dialogue. Breaking with modern 
concepts and delinking from the colonial matrix of power does not mean a 
Colombian/US anthropologist Arturo Escobar, Venezuelan sociologist Edgardo Lander; 
a philosopher, Santiago Castro-Gómez, and an anthropologist, Eduardo Restrepo in 
Colombia; Catherine Walsh working in Quito; Puerto Rican sociologist Ramón Grosfogel 
working in the US, among others. 
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complete rejection of the modern conceptual structure. Decolonial thinkers 
claim we need a ‘border thinking’ or ‘border epistemology’ recognising that 
the Western foundation of modernity and of knowledge is, on the one hand, 
unavoidable and, on the other, highly limited and dangerous, and creating 
an equivalent space for non-Western conceptual ways, other logics coming 
from groups that have been excluded and subjugated by coloniality. ‘Rather 
than a new paradigm “from Latin America” (as it could have been the case 
with dependency), the MC[D]4 project does not fit into a linear history of 
paradigms or epistemes; to do so would mean to integrate it into the history 
of modern thought. On the contrary, the MC[D]program should be seen as 
another way of thinking that runs counter to the great modernist narratives 
(Christianity, liberalism, and Marxism)’ (Escobar, 2010, p. 34). Decolonial 
thinking clearly rejects the Western idea of development even if mitigated by 
such adjectives as ‘sustainable’ or ‘endogenous’, although the latter leaves more 
space for ‘border approaches’ than classical development discourse. I see it as 
compatible with place-based approaches, provided they leave enough room for 
‘epistemic disobedience’ and ‘other-thinking’ claimed by decolonial thinkers.
Academic and non-academic lives of concepts. Locating 
knowledge? Research field notes 
In 2011, declared by the general assembly of the United Nations (UN) as 
International Year for People of African Descent,5 I visited several communities 
of Afrodescendants in rural and urban areas of southern and northern Peru, in 
Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela, continuing a research project on place-based 
Afrodescendant communities initiated earlier in Bolivia (Lisocka-Jaegermann, 
2010; 2011c) and Mexico (Lisocka-Jaegermann, 2011d). The proclamation 
of the Afrodescendants Year stated as its general aims: ‘strengthening national 
actions and regional and international cooperation for the benefit of people of 
African descent in relation to their full enjoyment of economic, cultural, social, 
civil and political rights, their participation and integration in all political, 
economic, social and cultural aspects of society, and the promotion of a greater 
knowledge of and respect for their diverse heritage and culture’. I was interested 
to see to what extent local leaders and local inhabitants were aware of the year’s 
agenda and in hearing their opinions about it.
The ‘International year’ theme was present in all the countries I visited. 
National programs were prepared, officers representing Afrodescendants in 
each country were named, meetings were held, information booklets and in 
some cases national reports on the situation of Afrodescendants were published. 
4 MC[D] Modernity/Coloniality[Decoloniality].
5 Resolution A/RES/64/169, adopted on 18 December 2009.
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Some state-wide programmes reached the communities. However it was 
clear that national programmes concerned Afroperuvians, Afroecuadorians, 
Afrocolombians and Afrovenezuelans, and their ‘problems’, homogenised by 
a unifying discourse of each one of the corresponding countries’ institutions. 
In the context of diversity of situations Afrodescendants live in even within 
one country, the programmes were not addressing people’s ‘real problems’ in 
‘real places’. Diversity of local conditions, local agendas and claims was by no 
means the first or the most obvious observation and conclusion drawn from 
interviews with local leaders and community members. 
‘They are talking constantly about sustainable development and human 
rights but they do not want to listen about illegal mining, logging, oil palm 
plantations’ expansion – and these are the problems we have here...’ commented 
one of the local leaders in Esmeraldas, Ecuador, stressing that particular rural 
communities usually face one or two of them in differing degree. The official 
discourse of ‘sustainable development’ is contradictory with everyday local 
experiences of rural communities. Illegal mining is a common practice in areas 
inhabited by Afrodescendants, both in Ecuador and in Colombia. Even if the 
state institutions considering the serious, irreversible environmental damage 
it causes and its links to violence make efforts to stop it, on the legal level the 
state promotes differentiated access to and control over land-based resources 
excluding Afrodescendant communities from accessing environmental goods 
in their territories while favouring private actors (Vélez Torrez, 2014). Similar 
mechanisms are present in the case of large scale oil palm (Elaeis guineensis) 
plantations in Ecuadorian San Lorenzo Canton, Esmeraldas province, where 
they were introduced in 1998. I travelled through Esmeraldas in 1997; 14 years 
later I could experience the dramatic transformation of landscape for myself: a 
sea of oil palms replaced coastal forests and pastures replaced the small farms 
I had observed previously. Research confirms the detrimental agro-ecological 
and social consequences of the expansion of oil palm in the Ecuadorian Pacific 
coast (Hazlewood, 2012). In Colombia the process has been intensified by 
political instability and violence, contributing to massive dispersion of rural 
population from its land (Maher, 2015).
Loss of control over resources managed and used by local communities 
which lack instruments of effective self-defence in cases where illegal or legal 
activities are related to direct violence and lack of public support can have a 
strictly political background, as I observed on the Colombia-Ecuador border. 
However more often it is the result of economic activities threatening local 
livelihoods directly, as in the cases described above, or that of illegal logging 
or destruction of mangroves, or indirectly. In the Colombian Cauca valley 
communities surrounded by big sugar cane plantations complained that even 
if they keep their land, the reduction of water resources and the chemicals used 
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS196
by plantations’ management means they cannot continue living the way they 
used to in the past. 
Policies protecting the environment are increasingly leading towards 
empowerment of Afrodescendant communities, but they are not effective 
enough due to lack of recognition of the diversity of local contexts, among 
other reasons. In a northern Peruvian community I was told people had been 
offered several workshops on racial discrimination, which was not an issue 
at all in that small, still quite isolated place, although the inhabitants were 
perfectly aware that discrimination was a serious issue for those who decided 
to migrate temporarily or permanently to Lima. In several other places local 
leaders complained that NGOs and state institutions usually have their own 
agendas justified by funding mechanisms, so they offer training, workshops 
and expertise on issues corresponding to their projects and not to the current 
needs of the communities they want to work with. Community leaders can 
accept or reject the proposals. If they reject them they risk accusations from 
the institutions that they lack the will to cooperate, and community members 
believe they are doing nothing, while if they accept the proposals, community 
members are annoyed by initiatives that do not fit their context. 
Growing numbers of urban Afro Latin Americans in all the countries I visited 
within the project may have caused a certain ‘urban bias’ within the agendas of 
programmes developed for Afro communities, especially as urban leaders have 
many more opportunities to interact directly with public officers and urban 
NGOs are more visible within national debates on Afro issues than rural ones. 
But even within the urban setting we can observe deep differentiation of the 
demographic and social characteristics of Afrodescendants prevailing in cities 
of one country. Colombia offers a good example of such a situation. Diversity 
of regional cultural patterns and of current political situations contribute to the 
fact that it is difficult to find common ground between the Afrocolombians of 
Cali, where thousands of relatively recent rural migrants/refugees fleeing from 
the Pacific coast villages due to violence settle in poor, stigmatised districts, and a 
much more diverse group residing in Bogota where professional and, in general 
much better educated, Afrocolombians have tended to seek opportunities for a 
better life. Cartagena, with its particular patterns of Caribbean Afrocolombian 
urban culture, is different from either of the two cases mentioned above. 
Local and micro-regional specificity of problems was clearly opposed to 
the national and international agendas of the year 2011, and that observation 
goes far beyond the issue of institutional dynamics. Some people I talked to 
in communities showed a clear preference for a place-based identity over a 
national-racial-ethnic one, complaining that the state-imposed denomination 
which brings them together with groups who share only the same skin 
colour and nationality does not correspond to any reality. I observed one 
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of the most significant examples of such discrepancies in the community 
of Zaña in northern Peru. Zaña has a community-owned, community-run 
and community-designed museum which exhibits Afroperuvian musical 
instruments and objects related to local history as well as to the histories of 
Afrolatinamerican groups in Bolivia and Ecuador. Immediately upon arrival I 
was asked by the first person passing by whether I wanted to see the museum. 
The key was brought and one of the young teenage guides was called. During 
my week-long stay in Zaña I saw it as a genuinely locally owned place, authentic 
and closely related to local identity, with local guides and constant informal 
visits from local children and youth who were dropping by in order to play the 
instruments. The museum organised artistic and academic events concentrating 
on the recovery of some of the local traditions. However, in the opinion of 
the director of the Afroperuvian Culture museum in the capital city Lima, 
presenting the ‘official history’ and the Afroperuvian cultural identity relating 
to the experiences of groups and individuals living south of Lima and in the city, 
Zaña’s museum lacked any value, being a messy collection of accidental objects 
gathered and exhibited by non-professionals. Zaña was funded as a Spanish 
villa, and its inhabitants of mixed Spanish, Black, indigenous and Chinese 
origin do not see themselves as Afroperuvians in racial terms even if they 
identify with the Afroperuvian culture present in the place’s everyday practices. 
Local leaders claim that the concept of Afroperuvian should not be applied on 
the basis of racial but rather cultural criteria. However, such an approach is not 
accepted easily by the state’s institutions and some of the main Afroperuvian 
organisations which stick to the unified image of Afroperuvian identity. One 
of its key elements is a strong, consolidated image of Afroperuvian musical 
traditions constructed several hundred kilometres south of Zaña, well-known 
in the country and internationally due to such popular artists as Nicomedes 
Santa Cruz, Afroperú groups and Susana Baca who led the Ministry of Culture 
of Peru while I was doing the research. The Ballumbrioso family in El Carmen 
and a huge Afroperuvian musical festival taking place each year in the locality 
are a showcase of Afroperuvian folklore. Musical traditions of Afroperuvian 
communities in the north of the country had a colonial background, are not 
well-known and are less attractive to the present-day wider audience, but form 
an important framework for local identities. 
During my trip I was able to observe multiple examples of ‘our ways’ 
(lo propio), as opposed to the ‘official ones’, combined with a strong sense 
of empowerment of people in places, local activists ready to negotiate with 
external actors, seeking coalitions with other places rather than being part of 
amorphous big structures. Particularly in Colombia I was told constantly about 
cultural and social differences between Afrocolombians of the southern and 
northern parts of the Pacific coast, the Pacific coast and the Caribbean, et cetera. 
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Differing present day economic and political contexts are deepening differences. 
Migration to the cities and better and more accessible education contribute to 
growing class differences among Afrodescendants. Legal protection of national 
groups and corresponding state policies, including initiatives related to 2011, 
unify diversity from above and cause local adverse reactions.
The links of such attitudes to the concept of ‘politics of place’ are clear, 
and have been confirmed by my observations and interviews not only in 
Peruvian but also in Ecuadorian, Colombian and Venezuelan Afrodescendant 
communities. They were also part of the results of my previous research in 
Mexico and Bolivia (Lisocka-Jaegermann, 2011c; 2011d). The relationship of 
my research results to the decolonial agenda is more complex, but obvious if the 
historical context is taken into account. Afrodescendants communities living 
in the Andean countries have until recently been invisible. Their experiences 
and history were silenced and were not part of national narratives. It was only 
in the 1990s when, particularly in Colombia and Ecuador, partly as a result 
of legal changes, they were recognised as a separate group of citizens. The 
reconstruction and strengthening of Afrodescendant identities is taking place 
in communities and is still being debated in the region. An Afroecuadorian 
intellectual, Juan García Salazar, talks about the need for ethno-education that 
could give back to the people the sense and pride of being themselves and a 
sense of belonging: ‘The struggle is to return this form of knowledge, and in 
this way understand life, understand our own knowledges and insert in the 
educational process our vision of history and our vision of knowledge’ (Walsh 
and García Salazar, 2002, p. 323). In the book on Territories, Territorialities 
and De-territorialisation (2010), which Garcia Salazar edited as a ‘pedagogic 
exercise to reflect upon ancestral territories’, he presents testimonies gathered in 
communities on their past, present and possible futures. A historical experience 
of maroons, runaway slaves (cimarrones) who once created their own liberated 
territories called palenques, is remembered and transformed symbolically into 
one of the possible links between the past and the future. ‘Maroon thinking’ 
and palenque as a proper, free space appear both in the intellectual discourse 
and practice of Afrodescendant organisations, as synonyms of ‘lo propio’ [the 
own way], and both have much to do with decolonial delinking from the 
modernity/coloniality world. Walsh comments that: 
The use of cimarrón/maroon here is not meant to indicate the fugitive 
nature of the term, but rather its lived significance: the recuperation 
and reconstruction of existence, of liberty, and of freedom, human 
conditions that for Afro-descendants in the Andean region (and generally 
in the Americas) still remain illusory. Cimarronism today denotes the 
revolutionary and autonomous thought found in the struggles for human 
and ancestral rights, the right to life with dignity, and the development and 
respect of ethnic, cultural, historic and political identities […] It is to recall 
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how the first maroons constructed their liberty, freedom, and thinking in 
community, in territorial spaces or palenques defined for their collectivity, 
insurgency, and resistance. But it also to recognise the emergent presence 
and visibility in recent years, of social, political, and epistemic positionings 
by Afro-descendant communities, organisations, and groups, aimed at 
confronting colonial and racialised structures and at marking their colonial 
ancestral-lived difference. It is in this context that the notion of cimarrón 
thought and of palenques, also understood as liberated spaces of thought 
and being, take on an important significance, serving as a kind of floating 
signifier or bridge between the struggles of the past and present and in 
response to the physical, symbolic, existential, and epistemic violence of 
modernity and coloniality (Walsh, 2012, p. 24).
Afrodescendants seek expressions of their own ways, logics, forms and projects 
of ‘other’ thought that might lead to the cultural, social, economic and political 
transformation of their communities.
The decolonial agenda might also be found in practical claims for an 
authentically legitimate governance pattern that would suit Afrodescendant 
communities. In all the countries visited I could observe tensions between 
people living ‘in places’, including local activists and national Afro-leaders, 
even if they came from the same regions or localities. Opinions like the 
following ones: ‘Whom does he represent? We had not elected him’; ‘He was 
named by the authorities and thinks he is the king of the region. He does 
not represent anybody but himself ’ repeated more than twice – even if the 
people expressing them showed friendly attitudes towards the people holding 
those posts. Literature on Afrocolombian organisations confirms the rejection 
of the principle of representation among them. That principle has been 
assumed by state authorities following examples of indigenous communities 
with their internal power structures, where local assemblies elect leaders who 
can represent communities. In Afrodescendant communities there is a wide 
acceptance of deliberation as a method and as a goal instead. Issues should 
be discussed by everybody, no matter how long it takes to do it. Such an 
approach does not correspond to the system of representative democracy. 
‘They talk and talk and never come to solutions’, commented a ministerial 
officer I interviewed, adding that some decisions have to be taken quickly and 
the state has to deal with individuals representing communities, even if they 
did not like it all. The issue was problematic when states looked for partners 
while developing legal solutions for Afrodescendant populations in the 1990s. 
Under time and institutional pressures ‘representants’ were sought and named. 
The same procedure is being applied while ministerial officers responsible 
for Afro issues are being nominated. Recruited from among the elites of 
Afrodescendant communities, they are often consulted as representatives of 
the group, accompanied by leaders of the biggest, mainly urban-based formal 
NGOs of Afrodescendant communities. The political strategies of elite leaders 
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are not the same. Some of them decide to join one of the existing political 
parties, some prefer to act as independent members of parliament representing 
the Afrodescendants’ NGOs and consequently, the whole group. Some of them 
act outside formal party and parliamentary structures using the media and 
particularly the internet as a powerful tool of contact with the public. In all 
the cases mentioned deliberation is difficult to follow as a method of direct, 
everyday work, and that causes problems in contacts with local communities 
who do not want any longer to be mere receptors of decisions taken somewhere 
else. The only case where the local power structures allowed deliberation, at 
least to some degree, is Venezuela and its community councils. I was able to 
take part in its meeting in the Guinea district of the city of Coro, Falcón state. 
Even though Coro is not associated with Afrovenezuelan culture represented by 
the Barlovento region, Guinea has an important Afrovenezuelan population. 
The council’s meeting was long and several decisions were postponed, because 
council members wanted to discuss them in detail with their neighbours or 
peers. The small territorial scale on which the council operated and the everyday 
practices of intense street social life made this possible without disrupting the 
council’s agenda. 
Conclusions
This chapter has discussed three concepts: sustainable development; politics of 
place; and decoloniality; and related them to some of the research experiences 
of the author. I strongly believe that academics representing critical approaches 
within social sciences should be seriously concerned about the power of concepts 
that organise our research endeavour usually in accordance with mainstream 
disciplinary paradigms. Our way of thinking is so strongly channelled through 
the existing sets of established ideas that we are unable to notice what is left 
beyond them. There is not enough critical approach to concepts treated as 
obvious and therefore proper. We seldom think about their origin, or hidden 
sense they might contain. Emmánuel Lizcano states that ‘the well-known 
metaphors think (for) us, while, in all our innocence, we believe that it us who 
think through them’ (Lizcano, 2006, p. 275). 
Such worries have led some authors towards deconstruction, understood as 
the critical dismantling of traditional modes of thought and overall accepted 
concepts. In the field of social sciences, as early as the 1990s Immanuel 
Wallenstein claimed that we should ‘unthink’ – radically revise and discard 
– many of the presumptions that still remain the foundation of dominant 
perspectives today. While in the 19th century they were liberating, now instead 
they are barriers to a clear understanding of our social world (Wallenstein, 
1991). A similar idea inspired Alain Touraine’s book Penser Autrement (2007) 
where he claims the return of an empowered individual subject as a much 
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needed perspective within 21st-century social sciences. ‘Ideas that in our 
nearest past have been the most popular ones do not explain anything anymore 
and are useless as they only widen the gap separating the political and social 
world from the world of thought’ (Touraine, 2007, p. 17).
Whereas I find the concept of ‘sustainable development’ ceases to be 
inspiring, the ‘politics of place’ is still useful as it draws our attention towards 
underestimated diversity and stresses the importance of spatial dimension as a 
key reference of human experiences. ‘Decoloniality’ as a concept is challenging 
as it requires the demanding exercise of moving beyond mental infrastructures 
we have been accustomed to for a long time. Mignolo posits that:
The genealogy of decolonial thinking is pluri-versal (not uni-versal). As 
such, each knot on the web of this genealogy is a point of de-linking 
and opening that re-introduces languages, memories, economies, social 
organisations, and at least double subjectivities: the splendor and the 
miseries of the imperial legacy, and the indelible footprint of what existed 
that has been converted into the colonial wound; in the degradation of 
humanity, in the inferiority of the pagans, the primitives, the under-
developed, the non-democratic (Mignolo, 2011a, p. 65). 
Even if ‘border thinking’ is not easy it is definitely worth the effort, helping 
to understand both other realities and our own limitations.
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